I argue that when properly developed, a feeling theory of emotion can overcome the standard objections leveled in the literature. The key is to portray emotional feelings as rather complex, involving cognitive and conative phenomenology.

“Précis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.” Philosophical Studies 2012.

This is a Precis of my book on consciousness for a Philosophical Studies symposium. It does the usual. There is also a "Reply to Critics" that goes with it...

“Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap.” Consciousness and the Self: New Essays 2011.

I present an initially promising self-representationalist approach to the problem of the explanatory gap, and consider what I take to be the deepest challenge to it, namely, an objection due to Joe Levine that I call the "just more representation" objection.

“Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 2009.

I offer a formulation of the phenomenological argument for the self-representationalist theory of consciousness, and defend the theory from certain phenomenological challenges, including the transparency of experience.

(With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We may Know It so Well?” Philosophical Issues 2007.

We defend two theses. The first is that there is a kind of knowledge of phenomenal experiences that is infallible. The second is that what explains this limited infallibility is a special feature of phenomenal experiences, namely, a sort of inbuilt awareness of themselves.

“The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness.” Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness 2006. [click here for Second Version]

Monitoring approaches to consciousness claim that a mental state is conscious when it is suitably monitored. Higher-order monitoring theory makes the monitoring state and the monitored state logically independent. Same-order monitoring theory claims a constitutive, non-contingent connection between the monitoring state and the monitored state. I articulate different versions of the same-order monitoring theory and argue for its supremacy over higher-order monitoring theory.

“Naturalizing Subjective Character.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2005.

When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this “bluish way it is like for me”: the bluish component, which I call qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing subjective character.

“Consciousness and Self-consciousness.” The Monist 2004.

I distinguish two kinds of self-consciousness: transitive self-consciousness is typically reported with “x is self-conscious of thinking that p”; intransitive self-consciousness with “x is self-consciously thinking that p.” I then argue that although consciousness is completely independent of the former, there can be no consciousness in the absence of the latter.

“Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief.” Erkenntnis 2004.

I offer a solution to Moore’ paradox according to which (i) the absurdity of Moorean assertions derives from that of conscious Moorean beliefs and (ii) the absurdity of conscious Moorean beliefs is due to the fact that conscious beliefs are self-representing, in a way that makes Moorean conscious beliefs explicitly self-contradictory.

“Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2003.

This paper offers an early presentation of my master argument for the self-representational theory of consciousness, according to which a mental state is conscious iff it represents itself in the right way.

“Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles.” Synthese 2003.

I argue that the difference between a self-representational theory of consciousness and higher-order theory may be much smaller than might be initially thought, and that what little difference there is favors the former.

“Phenomenal Content.” Erkenntnis 2002.

I defend a version of Sheomaker-style representationalism about qualitative character. (Note: although this paper is couched in terms of phenomenal character, it is meant to apply only to qualitative character; I explain what I mean by distinguishing the two in “Naturalizing Subjective Character” and other places.)

“PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.” Philosophical Psychology 2002.

I argue that representationalist theories of consciousness, typified by Tye’s, may be able to account for differences among phenomenal states in representational terms, but lack the resources to account for the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states in representational terms