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OxStudMind 3
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Volume 3
- OUP page
Part I. Mind and Science
Chapter 1. Sara Aronowitz, “The Parts of an Imperfect Agent”
Chapter 2. Henry Cowles and Joshua Knobe, “The Average isn’t Normal”
Chapter 3. Gabriel Dupre, “Correspondence and Construction: The Representational Theory of Mind and Internally-Driven Classificatory Schemes”
Chapter 4. Gabbrielle Johnson, “Bias and the Domain of Consciousness”
Chapter 5. Preston Lennon, “Aphantasia and Conscious Thought”
Chapter 6. Maja Spener, “The Introspective Method”
Part II. Sensory Experience: Perception, Imagination, Pleasure
Chapter 7. Dorothea Debus, “Right Here, Right Now: On the Eudaimonic Value of Perceptual Awareness”
Chapter 8. Justin D’Amrbosio and Daniel Stoljar, “Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement”
Chapter 9. Daniel Pallies and Alexander Dietz, “The Dilemma for Attitude Theories of Pleasure”
Chapter 10. Davide Bordini, “Seeing through Transparency”
Part III. Book Symposium on D. Papineau, The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience
Chapter 11. David Papineau, “Précis of The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience”
Chapter 12. Alex Byrne, “Papineau on Sensory Experience”
Chapter 13. Angela Mendelovici, “Truth and Content in Sensory Experience”
Chapter 14. Adam Pautz, “An Argument Against Papineau’s Qualitative View of Sensory Experience”
Chapter 15. David Papineau, “Responses to Mendelovici, Pautz and Byrne”
Part IV. History of Philosophy of Mind: Cavendish and Strong
Chapter 16. David Cunning, “Cavendish and Strawson on Emergence, Mind, and Self”
Chapter 17. Alison Peterman, “‘Actions of a Body Sentient’: Cavendish on the Mind (and against Panpsychism)”
Chapter 18. Galen Strawson, “C. A. Strong: Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism”
