

The phenomenologically manifest

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Abstract Disputes about what is phenomenologically manifest in conscious experience have a way of leading to deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant views. It is this fact, I believe, that leads some to heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I explore the other possible reaction to this fact, namely, the articulation of methods for addressing phenomenological disputes. I suggest two viable methods, of complementary value, which I call “the method of contrast” and “the method of knowability.”

Key words consciousness · phenomenology · heterophenomenology · the phenomenologically manifest

Introduction: Phenomenological disputes

You just had a great dinner at a sushi bar. The fish was fresh and the service fabulous. You're very satisfied and decide to leave the waitress a 22% tip. You realize it isn't easy to figure out what's 22%, so you decide on the following procedure: You will calculate what 20% and 25% are, average the two, and take off a tiny bit, perhaps round it down. Once the bill arrives, you go through this procedure and leave the tip.

Is there something it was like for you to go through the process of calculating the tip? Is there a phenomenology of calculation? Is the phenomenology of calculating a tip different from the phenomenology of calculating a phone bill? Is it different from

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the phenomenology of choosing a tea for breakfast? Is the phenomenology of calculating a 22% tip different from the phenomenology of calculating a 15% tip?

Answering such questions is extremely difficult. For that matter, *getting started* on such questions is extremely difficult. The unusual difficulty associated with phenomenological questions of this sort may tempt us to dismiss them as unanswerable. It is this temptation, I contend, that sometimes leads philosophers to Dennettian heterophenomenology and the like attempts to found Consciousness Studies on purely third-person grounds. In this paper, I want to suggest that the temptation can be fruitfully resisted. I will not offer answers to the above questions, but I hope to make an initial case that the questions ought to be ultimately answerable.

The paper is not intended to provide an argument against third-person methodologies. Rather, it attempts to flesh out first-person approaches. In particular, I do not directly argue here that first-person methods are indispensable for Consciousness Studies. Rather, I argue that they are workable. It is possible for a method to be both workable and dispensable. At the same time, showing that a method is workable presumably removes one motivation for dispensing with it, sometimes the chief motivation.

What is phenomenologically manifest in perceptual consciousness?

The meter is running out. So you shuffle stuff on your desk looking for a quarter to put in it. After removing a napkin with a decision-theory theorem on it, a quarter suddenly comes into your view. You see it, grab it, and go put it in the meter. Naturally, at the time you reach for the quarter, you're not towering above it at exactly 90°. Your angle on it is rather something like 80°. So the quarter impresses an ellipsis rather than a circle on your retina. But at the end of the signal's processing, you clearly think the quarter is round, not elliptical.

As you look at the quarter from an 80° angle, do you perceive it as elliptical or as round? One view is that you perceive it as elliptical, with your perception probably accompanied by a belief or judgment to the effect that it is round.¹ Another is that you perceive it as round: You have an elliptical sensation, perhaps, but sensation is not perception.² A third view is that you perceive the quarter both as elliptical and as round; indeed, perhaps you perceive it as round *by*, or *in virtue of*, perceiving it as elliptical.

Our interest here, however, is not in the question of what you perceive, but in the more specific question of what is *phenomenologically manifest* in your perception. On the first view, it is ellipticality that is phenomenologically manifest, and on the second, it is roundness. The question comes into sharper relief against the background of the third view. Suppose you indeed perceive the roundness *by*, or *in virtue of*, perceiving the ellipticality. It remains an open question which of the two features is phenomenologically manifest in your perception. For on the face of it,

¹ This was most probably the view of the sense datum theorists.

² This is the view of Peacocke (1983), Smith (2000), and Kelly (2004), among others. Kelly holds that one can, if one tries hard, see the coin as elliptical, but that is not the natural attitude.

does not seem possible for *both* to be phenomenologically manifest. That might result in a “phenomenal superposition” of ellipsis and circle – but we do not experience any such superposition.³

So despite there being three straightforward views of the perception, there are only two straightforward views of what is phenomenologically manifest in it.⁴ At the same time, as we will see later, the non-straightforward view that both ellipticality and roundness are phenomenologically manifest can be made to work after all.⁵

With the quarter clutched cold against the palm of your hand, you go out to the street, which is covered in snow. There is a sense in which the snow looks white to you. But if you pay close attention, (I am told you are supposed to see that) the snow in fact looks bluish. So again we can ask whether it is whiteness of bluishness that is phenomenologically manifest in your perceptual experience.⁶

We have focused thus far on low-level properties such as bluishness and roundness. But what about *high-level properties*, such as *being snow*? Whether or not low-level properties are phenomenologically manifest, an independent parallel question arises regarding high-level properties.⁷ Some hold that you may perceive snow, but not *as snow*; rather, you perceive the snow *as white expanse*.⁸ Others hold that you *do* perceive the snow *as snow*. Here it is particularly tempting to hold that one perceives snow as snow by, or in virtue of, perceiving it as white expanse. Thus, we find it natural to say that we hear the car by hearing the sound its engine makes and that we smell the coffee *by* smelling the coffee’s odor. If one does perceive snow *as snow*, does the snowiness figure in the phenomenology of the perception? Is being snow phenomenologically manifest in one’s perceptual experience?⁹

In a similar vein, when you approach the meter, you likely perceive it *as a meter*, not just as a gray meter shape. Here we are going altogether beyond properties, to *concrete particulars*. One might hold that particulars are not perceived at all, but most philosophers hold that particulars *are* perceived (*as* particulars, that is).¹⁰ For

³ Here, and in the sequel, I ignore the question of whether we should understand the phenomenologically manifest as pertaining to the content of experiences or as vehicular properties. I do so mainly because the view one takes on the matter should not affect the issues raised in the paper, but partly also because I hold that phenomenology is inherently intentional (Kriegel, 2002, Ms; see also Siewert, 1998, Horgan & Tienson, 2002).

⁴ With some vigilance, we may call *phenomenological empiricism* the view that only the ellipticality is phenomenologically manifest, and *phenomenological rationalism* the view that only the roundness is.

⁵ This is the view of Noë (2004, Ms).

⁶ In terms of the terminology hesitantly suggested in note 5, we may say that the phenomenological empiricist claims it is bluishness, the phenomenological rationalist it is whiteness.

⁷ I am here presupposing a quasi-intuitive distinction between low- and high-level properties. The distinction has been widely appealed to in philosophy, even though it is not entirely obvious how to draw it. In discussing the question whether perception represents high-level properties, Siegel (2006) takes the approach of simply listing properties to be treated as high-level. If all else fails, we could make recourse to her list.

⁸ Or *bluish* expanse, perhaps....

⁹ For the view that such high-level properties are phenomenologically manifest, see Siewert (1998) and Siegel (2006). For a low-level conception of phenomenology, see Dretske (1995), and Clark (2000), and Tye (2000).

¹⁰ For the view that particulars are perceived, see Soteriou (2000), Campbell (2002), Martin (2003). Philosophers who hold that they are not include McGinn (1989) and McDowell (1994).

these philosophers, the question arises, Is the particularity phenomenologically manifest? Is the meter's particularity phenomenologically manifest in your experience of it? Or are only the meter's attributes manifest?

It has sometimes been claimed that perception involves certain *perceptual expectancies*, certain anticipatory feelings that “surround” its strictly visual component.¹¹ As you approach the meter, you perceive it as the kind of thing that would turn out to have a back side if you peeked behind, as the kind of thing that would feel solid and cold if you touched it, etc. On this view, perception involves awareness of potentialities and affordances. But the question arises, Are these potentialities and affordances phenomenologically manifest? Is it part of the *phenomenology* of your meter perception that the meter is back-sided, solid, cold (or perhaps that it is *potentially* back-sided, solid, and/or cold)?¹²

For each of these questions, there is an *inclusive* answer that allows the contested feature to be phenomenologically manifest and an *exclusive* answer that does not. Although there is no inherent necessity in this, philosophers working on phenomenology are likely to cluster around two poles, the inclusive and the exclusive. We may call *phenomenological inflationism* the tendency to go inclusive and bloat the phenomenology, and *phenomenological deflationism* the tendency to go exclusive and starve the phenomenology. Let me emphasize that phenomenological inflationism and deflationism are tendencies, not theses. They capture general philosophical proclivities or sensibilities, not determinate claims. There are, however, determinate claims associated with these tendencies. The pure deflationist would allow only low-level properties to be phenomenologically manifest. The extreme inflationist would claim that high-level properties, particulars, and expectancies are phenomenologically manifest as well.

There is value in characterizing and labeling these tendencies, because the issues of high-level properties, particulars, and expectancies are unlikely to exhaust all the disputes about the phenomenology of perceptual consciousness. Surely there are others that have not been raised here, and probably some that have not been raised anywhere in the existing literature. When they will be raised, however, they will likely reveal a tension between an inflationist and a deflationist approach.

What is phenomenologically manifest in non-perceptual consciousness?

Beyond the issues that arise in connection with the phenomenology of perceptual consciousness, some arise in regard to non-perceptual consciousness. First and foremost, the question arises of whether there is a phenomenology of non-perceptual consciousness.

¹¹ This has been made known mainly through Gibson's notion of “affordances” (see Gibson, 1979), but has its sources at least in Sperry's (1952) notion of “implicit preparation to respond.”

¹² For the view that they are, see Noë and O'Regan (2001), O'Regan and Noë (2001), and Noë (2004). It is possible to read Noë (and O'Regan) as holding only that the expectancies are inherent to perception but not in a phenomenologically manifest way. But I believe the spirit of his view is that they are phenomenologically manifest. Siegel (*in press*) argues not for a manifold of expectancies, as Noë does, but for two specific ones as phenomenologically manifest.

There is, doubtless, a phenomenology of *emotional* and *somatic* experiences, such as feeling angry or pleasantly ticklish. But emotional and somatic experience seems to have some fundamental affinity with perceptual consciousness. This affinity is hard to articulate, but I will say that perceptual, emotional, and somatic experiences all feature *sensuous qualities* at the heart of their phenomenology. I do not pretend that by using the phrase “sensuous quality” I have removed the problematicity and difficulty in understanding the nature of the affinity. I use the phrase mainly in the hope that it intimates to the reader a feel for what I have in mind.

The question is whether there is a phenomenology in non-perceptual consciousness that does not bear this affinity to perceptual consciousness. Purely intellectual judgments, such as the act of judging that $2 + 2 = 4$, are a candidate. Are such judgments ever phenomenally conscious? If so, do they have a *proprietary* phenomenology, one that goes beyond the visual and auditory imagery that often accompanies them? Presumably, such a purely *judicative phenomenology* would not be a matter of sensuous quality.¹³

A deflationist would argue that there is no such thing as judicative phenomenology. The only thing phenomenologically manifest in our conscious judgments is their accompanying imagery.¹⁴ A timid inflationist might argue that there is at least a phenomenology of the propositional *attitude* involved in conscious judgments: There is a phenomenologically manifest feel associated with *believing* that $2 + 2 = 4$, as opposed to *desiring* or *hoping* that $2 + 2 = 4$.¹⁵ A more sanguine inflationist might go further and defend a phenomenology of the propositional *content* of judgments as well: One’s believing that $2 + 2 = 4$, as opposed to that $2 + 3 = 5$ or that $4 - 2 = 2$, is also phenomenologically manifest.^{16, 17}

If beliefs have a phenomenology, so should desires, decisions, and intentions. According to some, however, there is not only a phenomenology of *intending* to do something, but also a phenomenology of actually *doing* something, or at least of *trying* to do something. There is, in other words, a *phenomenology of agency*.¹⁸

Some inflationists subscribe not only to the existence of a phenomenology of agency, but also to the existence of a proprietary phenomenology of distinctively *moral* agency. On this view, there is something it is like to do something *for a moral reason*, or *with moral concern in mind*. The moral aspect of one’s agency is phenomenologically manifest in one’s conscious life.¹⁹

¹³ I use the phrase “judicative phenomenology” where others often use “cognitive phenomenology,” because I do not mean to restrict to cognitive judgments (in case there are non-cognitive judgments, as – say – moral non-cognitivists maintain moral judgments are).

¹⁴ This view is defended by Nelkin (1996), Jacob (1998), and Prinz (in press).

¹⁵ This view is present in Brentano (1874) and Russell (1948). I consider it favorably in Kriegel (2003a).

¹⁶ This view is defended by Goldman (1993), Horgan and Tienson (2002), and Pitt (2004), among others.

¹⁷ I imagine it is coherent to hold that the content is phenomenologically manifest while the attitude is not.

¹⁸ The existence of a phenomenology of agency is defended by Horgan, Tienson, and Graham (2003) and Siegel (2005).

¹⁹ This view is developed in Horgan and Timmons (2005) and in Kriegel (2007). See also Mandelbaum (1955) and Drummond (2002).

Phenomenological inflationists can thus go on expanding the sphere of the phenomenologically manifest. Deflationists will resist expansion, leading to further phenomenological disputes. I end this section with two further phenomenological issues.

The first concerns the unity of consciousness. Many agree that phenomenally conscious states are unified both *across* time (diachronically) and *at* a time (synchronically). But it is a further question whether the (diachronic and/or synchronic) unity of consciousness is phenomenologically manifest. Is the unity among phenomenal items itself a distinct phenomenal item, or is it merely a non-phenomenal relation among phenomenal items?²⁰

Finally, many philosophers have claimed that phenomenally conscious states have a certain *for-me-ness* (or “mine-ness”) about them: Their contents are present to the subject in a lucid and unmediated fashion. In the way it is like for me to hear a distant bagpipe, the “for me” is integral to the “way it is like for me,” on this line of thought. But it is a further question whether this for-me-ness is phenomenologically manifest in my bagpipe experience. Again, we may ask, Is for-me-ness one more phenomenal item, or merely a non-phenomenal precondition for phenomenality? That is, is there a *phenomenology of self-awareness*?²¹ A deflationist might hold that this for-me-ness is but a dispositional or functional property of conscious states, e.g., their global availability to executive function modules; or that it is simply an artifact of the fact that conscious experiences must be someone’s experiences. But an inflationist would insist that while conscious experiences may be necessarily someone’s, and be globally available, there is a proprietary phenomenology of self-awareness that goes beyond that.²²

There are many more phenomenological disputes that can be raised. Traditional metaphysics provides us with one rich source, as traditional metaphysical debates have clear phenomenological parallels. Thus, we can ask whether our experience of objects might comport with a bundle theory or a substrate theory of objects; that is, whether substrates, or only property bundles, are phenomenologically manifest. Likewise, we can ask whether our experience of causation comports with a reductionist (“constant conjunction”) or realist (“production”) conception of causation; that is, whether production, or only constant conjunction, is phenomenologically manifest. We can ask whether our experience of events comports with a Davidsonian (bare particular) or Kimean (trope) conception of events. We can ask whether our experience of time conforms to an A-series or B-series conception of time. And so on.

This multiplicity of phenomenological disputes is in one way exciting, but in another unsettling. It may be especially dispiriting if we have no firm handle on the

²⁰ This question arises, of course, only for those who think that consciousness is in fact unified. Some have argued that while there is a unity of consciousness, it must itself be a sub-personal feature, not a phenomenologically manifest one. Among those who develop accounts of *phenomenal* unity are Bayne and Chalmers (2003), Tye (2003), and Masrour (2007).

²¹ This question arises, again, only for those who think that there is in fact a for-me-ness built into conscious experiences.

²² For recent exponents, see Zahavi (1999), Levine (2001), Kriegel (2004), (2005), and Horgan, Tienson, and Grahams (2006). For prior discussions of the matter, see Zahavi (1999).

disputes and how to adjudicate them. This potential source of anxiety will be addressed in the second part of the paper. Before fleshing it out, however, I pause to make one more point regarding the tension between phenomenological deflationism and inflationism.²³

Interlude: Non-sensory phenomenology

A central fault-line of phenomenological disputes concerns the existence of non-sensory phenomenology. By “sensory phenomenology” I mean a phenomenology that is exhausted by sensuous qualities (a term I realize I have left unanalyzed).²⁴ Deflationists are often led to their position by rejection of non-sensory phenomenology. Such rejection leaves in place only the phenomenologies of perceptual, emotional, and somatic consciousness, and an emaciated version of those at that.

I will now sketch two arguments for the existence of non-sensory phenomenology already in perceptual consciousness. I offer them in an attempt to persuade, but more importantly to clarify: My hope is that engaging in the debate will help crystallize what is at stake.

The first argument is due to Galen Strawson (1994 Chapter 1). Jack and Jacques are listening to the news in French, a language Jacques understands but Jack does not. Plausibly, what it is like for them to hear the news in French is different. Yet what is strictly sensorily given in their experiences is the same. After all, the French newscast impinges on their sensoria identically.²⁵ Therefore, there is something phenomenologically manifest that is not sensorily given.²⁶

The second argument appeals to the duck–rabbit figure.²⁷ Tim and Tom are looking at the figure, but Tim sees a duck whereas Tom sees a rabbit. What it is like for them to see the figure is different, even though what is sensorily given to them is the same. It follows that the sensorily given does not exhaust the phenomenologically manifest.

The aforementioned phenomenological disputes can be understood in light of the distinction between sensory and non-sensory phenomenology. Thus, plausibly, perceptual expectancies – the awareness in perception of affordances and potentialities – are *not* sensorily given in visual experience. So the inflationist who claims expectancies to be phenomenologically manifest relies on the existence of non-sensory phenomenology, while the corresponding deflationist rejects them.

²³ The point made in the interlude is intended to illuminate the nature of the tension between phenomenological deflationism and inflationism, and in that sense is important to the paper’s line of inquiry. But the paper would be a self-contained piece without it, which is why I designate this discussion an “interlude.”

²⁴ So *non*-sensory phenomenology is phenomenology *not* exhausted by sensuous quality.

²⁵ I intend the citation of the sensorium’s stimulation as evidence for, rather than as constitutive of, the claim about what is sensorily given.

²⁶ Strawson calls that thing “understanding-experience.”

²⁷ I raise this in Kriegel (2003a, p. 8).

I have offered two arguments for the thesis that being sensorily given is not a *necessary* condition for being phenomenologically manifest. What about the converse thesis, that the sensorily given is not a *sufficient* condition for the phenomenologically manifest? This is bound to be more controversial, but is not altogether outlandish.

We considered at the beginning the view that it is roundness and not ellipticality that is phenomenologically manifest in normal angled-coin perceptions, and that it is whiteness and not bluishness that is phenomenologically manifest in normal snow perceptions. In both cases, however, it is not implausible to maintain that what is strictly sensorily given is the ellipticality and the bluishness. (After all, that is how the sensorium is impinged upon.) If so, those who hold that the ellipticality and the bluishness are not phenomenologically manifest are committed to the existence of sensorily given features that are not phenomenologically manifest.²⁸

Against this background, we can also see why the position that both roundness and ellipticality are manifest is viable. If both were sensorily given, the resulting phenomenology would have to feature the sort of geometric superposition we do not seem to experience. But if, as is more plausible, the roundness is phenomenologically manifest despite not being sensorily given, the resulting phenomenology would not involve such superposition. One can be aware simultaneously of the coin's ellipticality and roundness if the former is part of sensory phenomenology whereas the latter is part of non-sensory phenomenology.²⁹

In summary, there are different views on the relation between the phenomenologically manifest and the sensorily given. The differing views may well lie at the heart of the different sensibilities of deflationists and inflationists, with deflationists shunning non-sensory phenomenology and inflationists embracing it. I have argued, rather quickly, on the inflationist's behalf. But my primary purpose was to elucidate the issues at stake rather than settle them.

Footstomphobia, heterophenomenology, and verbalism

The above phenomenological disputes, and others like them, are disconcerting inasmuch as the Consciousness Studies community does not have accepted guidelines for adjudicating them. Phenomenological disputes have a way of leading to apparent deadlocks with remarkable immediacy. Disputants reach the foot-stomping stage of the dialectic more or less right after declaring their discordant positions.

In the face of this predicament, we should seek possible entry points to the phenomenology for which a consensus might be achievable. I will attempt to do so in the remainder of this paper. But first, I want to flag a number of overreactions to

²⁸ In the terminology used, we can say that the phenomenological rationalist is committed to the existence of sensorily given features that are not phenomenologically manifest.

²⁹ This is not the only way to interpret the view that both roundness and ellipticality are phenomenologically manifest, and may not be assented to by all who hold this position. In particular, I do not know whether Noë (2004) would subscribe to this interpretation.

the predicament.³⁰ They are all characterized by undue deference to the initial deadlock of foot-stomping, taking it to have a finality beyond overturn. We may call this theoretical affliction *footstomphobia*.

The most violent reaction is to claim that there is *no fact of the matter* concerning these disputes. Phenomenological disputes are hard to adjudicate simply because they are not adjudicable. This view seems to be committed to a certain phenomenological indeterminacy: It is indeterminate whether roundness or ellipticality is phenomenologically manifest in your visual experience.³¹

A weaker overreaction is the claim that, while there may be phenomenological facts of the matter, we would do well to conduct our business as if there were not. This is the methodological parallel of the ontological indeterminacy view just sketched. It is inspired by the thought that, since there is no way to progress beyond the initial foot-stomping, researchers should find a way to study consciousness in complete disregard of phenomenological convictions.

Dennett's (1982, 1991, 2003) heterophenomenology is a weakened version of this view. Here phenomenological convictions are not *disregarded*, but *bracketed*. The cornerstone of heterophenomenology is a decision to take not experiences but *reports* of experience as starting points for theorizing about consciousness. The goal is to set a framework for a purely third-personal theory of consciousness. In this framework, the theoretician's first-person phenomenological convictions are allowed to carry no weight in the theorization process. The theoretician is to take her views on phenomenology as just more reportage, on a par with any other subject's. Thus no insight into the nature of phenomenal consciousness is to be sought in first-person reflection on one's own phenomenology. Phenomenological convictions are not disregarded, in this framework, but nor are they taken as vehicles or expressions of something deeper (the phenomenology itself). Instead, they are taken as the ultimate subject matter of the theory of consciousness.

The last two overreactions I will discuss are more liberal. The first we may call *phenomenological relativism*. On this view, often *both* sides of a phenomenological dispute are correct: The phenomenology of the disputants simply differs. There are few universals in phenomenology, and disputes arise from seeking non-existent ones.³² Lurking behind relativism may be an attachment to the infallibility of phenomenological convictions: Such infallibility, conjoined with the variation in convictions, *entails* relativism.

Finally, one may overreact by declaring various disputes merely verbal. Whenever disputants disagree on whether some feature is phenomenologically manifest, it is open to us to settle the dispute by distinguishing "phenomenology₁" from "phenomenology₂" and declaring that the contested feature is by stipulation

³⁰ I use the pejorative term "overreaction" unfairly, as I will not directly argue against them. Nonetheless I will allow myself this indulgence.

³¹ It is important to note that the view is not tantamount to eliminativism about phenomenology. According to eliminativism, there is a very determinate fact of the matter regarding such disputes. Thus, it is a fact of the matter that neither roundness nor ellipticality – nor anything else – is (ever) phenomenologically manifest.

³² This view is defended, in the case of *moral* phenomenology, by Gill (2007). I am not aware of it being defended in print in the case of *perceptual* phenomenology.

phenomenologically₁ manifest but not phenomenologically₂ manifest. We may call this tendency *phenomenological verbalism*.³³

Of these five overreactions, heterophenomenology and verbalism have proven the most tempting. My view is that both are wrongheaded, but I leave the task of direct argumentation against them for a future occasion. Here I will argue against them only indirectly, by articulating positive proposals for pursuing phenomenological disputes in meaningful ways beyond the initial foot-stomping. In other words, here I concentrate on the task of seeking a cure for footstomphobia.

Are phenomenological disputes resolvable?

In addressing footstomphobia, one mistake we should take pains to avoid is the thought that progress beyond the foot-stomping stage would require *conclusive demonstration* that one view of the phenomenology is true and the other false. To break out of stalemate, all that is needed is the creation of a *presumption in favor* of one view at the expense of the other. Once a presumption is created, we can engage in the familiar gambit of argumentation and counter-argumentation, in an attempt to bolster one claim and undermine another. Once a presumption is created, mere foot-stomping is no longer as appropriate.

That creating a presumption in favor of a phenomenological view should be possible is evident when we consider obviously implausible phenomenological theses. Consider the thesis that perceptual states in all modalities can sometimes be phenomenally conscious – with the exception of olfactory states. On this view, visual, auditory, gustatory, and tactile perceptual states are often phenomenally conscious: There is a phenomenal feel to them, a way it is like to have them. But that is not the case with olfactory perceptual states. There are phenomenally *non-conscious* olfactory states – akin to unconscious visual states in blindsight and subliminal vision – but there are no *conscious* ones. There is no phenomenal feel associated with the exercise of the sense of smell, and nothing it is ever like for a subject to have an olfactory state. Call this thesis *falsehood*.

Why are we so certain in the falsity of falsehood? Reflecting on this question may lead us to the articulation of reliable methods for adjudicating phenomenological disputes. After all, there must be reasons – mostly implicit, to be sure – for our disinclination to regard falsehood as a credible threat to our phenomenological views. Once identified, these reasons might be generalized and applied to more slippery disputes. But what I want to emphasize here is that we are indeed certain in the falsity of falsehood. When presented with it, we do not seem to be paralyzed by footstomphobia. This suggests that there *must* be ways to break out of foot-stomping stalemates.

Observe that falsehood inspires neither verbalism nor heterophenomenology. Upon consideration of falsehood, we do not feel the need to define one sense of

³³ Thus, in addressing the debate over the existence of judicative phenomenology, a verbalist would declare that there is no substantial issue here, and the best way to settle the matter is simply to distinguish two senses of “phenomenology” and allow that there is such a thing as judicative phenomenology in one sense but not in the other.

“phenomenology” in which perceptual states in all five modalities have a phenomenology and another in which olfactory states are an exception. Nor do we seem to grant anti-falsehood higher credence merely on account of the statistical contingency that most or all relevant human mouthings betray a commitment to the existence of olfactory phenomenology. Instead, we take the proponent of falsehood to be wrong about her own phenomenology (and everybody else’s), and wrong in the very same sense in which we are right.³⁴

I now turn to consider two possible methods for creating a presumption in favor of a phenomenological thesis. In both cases, I will start with an example of a philosopher arguing that a given feature is phenomenologically manifest. I will first describe the argument, then attempt to extract the general method it employs. My presentation of these methods will be relatively hurried and in consequence will involve a considerable degree of simplification. Much could be written by way of working out a precise method, down to its full procedural details. The present paper is more exploratory in nature and does not offer such a full account. In fact, in both cases I will start my discussion with an ostensibly oversimplified version, and later attempt to point in the direction of full development.

The method of contrast³⁵

Prosopagnosia is a condition, probably caused by lesion to the dorsal visual stream, in which subjects are incapable of recognizing faces. When a prosopagnostic perceives his mother, he may recognize that she is his mother, but not by recognizing her face as his mother’s face.

Suppose Prosop and Aesop are modal counterparts, living their almost indistinguishable lives in two different possible worlds. Everything about Prosop and Aesop is the same, and everything that ever happens to them is the same – with one exception: Prosop is, but Aesop is not, prosopagnostic. And now, on their 21st birthday, Prosop and Aesop are looking tenderly into their respective mothers’ eyes.

Intuitively, it seems there is a difference in what it is like for them to undergo their respective perceptual experiences at this moment. There is an element that is phenomenologically manifest in Aesop’s experience but not in Prosop’s. This element is the feel of recognizing mommy’s face. Therefore, the property of being mommy’s face is phenomenologically manifest in Aesop’s perceptual experience. So

³⁴ It might be objected that we are unimpressed with falsehood because it is neurophysiologically unmotivated: If four perceptual modalities are associated with the existence of phenomenology, it would be odd and unnatural for the last modality to stand out. But this seems like the wrong diagnosis: A neurophysiological ignoramus would be just as unimpressed with falsehood. Furthermore, we could concoct a view somewhat more natural. Touch and smell are, unlike the other three, *mechanical* senses. The molecular basis for their operation is known to be distinctive. Yet the conjunction of falsehood and the thesis that tactile perception has no phenomenology would be just as absurd, however “natural” in the sense of carving nature at real joints.

³⁵ The ideas in this section owe much to conversations with Farid Masrour, Susanna Siegel, and Charles Siewert.

high-level properties, such as being mommy's face, can be phenomenologically manifest.

This, more or less, is how Siewert (1998) argues for the thesis that high-level properties are phenomenologically manifest. The general form of the argument is this. There is a pair of perceptual states that differ in one respect only. The difference results in different phenomenologies. Therefore, the respect in question is phenomenologically manifest.³⁶

We may extract the following general method from this form of argument. Say S is a perceptual state with properties F_1, \dots, F_n . To determine whether F_i is a phenomenologically manifest feature of S , try to imagine a perceptual state S^* , such that (1) the only difference between S and S^* is that S instantiates F_i whereas S^* does not, and (2) what it is like to be in S is different from what it is like to be in S^* . Ability to imagine such an S^* would create a presumption in favor of the thesis that F_i is phenomenologically manifest in S ; inability would create a presumption *against* that thesis.

Call this the *method of contrast*. Or rather, this is a first pass at the method. I will discuss shortly a refinement/complication that makes the method messier but also more resourceful. But first, let me make two remarks on the theoretical underpinnings of the method of contrast in its germinal form.

First, it is plausible that imaginability is a special case of conceivability (namely, the case of imagistic conceivability), and that conceivability is *prima facie*, defeasible evidence for possibility. Thus the imaginability of S^* is *prima facie* evidence for the possibility of S^* . The *possibility* of S^* is what actually demonstrates that F_i is phenomenologically manifest. The mere imaginability of S^* is only *evidence* that F_i is manifest. Employing the method of contrast thus provides us with *prima facie* evidence, rather than demonstrative proof, of phenomenological manifestness. But recall that we are not seeking a method for settling phenomenological disputes once and for all, only a method for creating a presumption in favor of one of the parties to the dispute.

Second, note our claim that not only does imaginability create a presumption in favor of manifestation, but *unimaginability* creates a presumption *against* manifestation. This claim must be qualified. Because there are two conditions on S^* , failure to imagine an S^* may be either (1) failure to imagine a state which differs from S only in not instantiating F_i , or (2) failure to imagine a state which, despite differing from S only in not instantiating F_i , does not differ from S in what it is like to have it. The former failure should not be taken as evidence for the inexistence of the relevant phenomenology; rather, it should be interpreted as failure to generate a test in the first place. However, the latter failure does constitute evidence for the inexistence of the relevant phenomenology.

³⁶ To be sure, this argument works only if one accepts that there is a phenomenological difference between Aesop's and Prosop's experiences, or that the case of Aesop and Prosop is indeed imaginable. But in every argument one can reject the premises. The strength of the form of argument we are considering is in the fact that one's judgments about such claims as that there is a phenomenological difference between the two experiences considered is not dictated – at least it need not be – by one's prior theoretical commitments regarding the nature of phenomenology.

This last claim can be grounded in two ways. First, it can be understood as the phenomenological parallel of the psychologist's *null hypothesis*, the working hypothesis that a psychological capacity or feature should be assumed not to exist unless there is evidence that it does. Second, we are accustomed to saying that absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, but this is rather inaccurate: Absence of evidence of a fountain of youth, despite repeated attempts to garner some, does constitute evidence of the fountain's inexistence. It is one thing for evidence of phenomenology to be absent because unsought, quite another for it to be absent because impossible to produce. So the sustained attempt and failure to imagine S^* *could* constitute positive evidence that F_i is *not* phenomenologically manifest.

The first pass at the method of contrast portrays the method as the systematic juxtaposition of pairs of experiences particularly apt to elicit clear intuitions. No theoretical agreement is presupposed, or sought, from the disputants; intuition functions as the sole arbiter. In a second pass, however, the method incorporates an initial stage which involves also a theoretical common ground: Some minimal description of the phenomenology – minimal enough so that both parties to the dispute can accept it – is sought. Once such common ground is found, the question becomes which account of the full phenomenology accommodates the minimal description best.

The structure of the dialectic will exhibit the following pattern. First, the inflationist will argue that her inflationist account is needed to do justice to what is minimally accepted. It would then behoove the deflationist to show that this is not the case, that her deflationist account already has the requisite resources. This procedure makes room for any inflationist to make an initial case for her bloated phenomenology, a sort of case that would require addressing, rather than foot-stomping, on the deflationist's part. The "addressing" in question would consist in providing an alternative accommodation of the minimal description accepted.

The benefit involved in this second pass at the method is that it goes beyond sheer intuition pumping. The concordant complication is that a minimal description must be accepted – and one may simply not. To some extent, the threat of foot-stomping may be pushed further up, with a deflationist bent on foot-stomping always keeping the option of resisting proffered minimal descriptions. To be sure, at some point the deflationist may leave the phenomenology so emaciated that her position becomes implausible, but what is meant by "implausible" here if not "unintuitive"?³⁷

The method of contrast, or something very much like it, is the methodology explicitly employed by Siegel (personal communication; see also Siegel, 2005) and Masrour (2007). Let us consider examples from their work. My concern here is not to *assess* their arguments, and I do not wish (for present purposes) to stand by them. I am only interested in the method they employ in trying to make the case that some feature is phenomenologically manifest. Also, I will describe the arguments as only to the degree of complexity involved in the first pass of the method.

³⁷ At a third pass, we add to the method the traditional resources of philosophical disputes about very fundamental issues: elucidation and disambiguation of key terms, assessment of the validity of reasonings on both sides, etc.

Siegel (2005) argues for a certain kind of agential phenomenology, which she calls “phenomenology of efficacy.” Jean-Pierre and Jean-Claude are fortunate chaps: They each have a wide window overlooking the Eiffel Tower, and can marvel at the way the Tower’s lights come on every night at 9 P.M. Jean-Pierre is eccentric: Every night he tries to flick the switch of his living room lights at the exact moment the Tower lights come on. He succeeds about twice a week, and when he does it is a source of great amusement to him, especially when he surprises his guests, who are oftentimes victims of a momentary illusion that he has turned on the Tower’s light by flicking his living room switch. Jean-Claude, by contrast, does not boast this particular eccentricity. Tonight, both flick their living room switches at the exact moment the Eiffel Tower lights come on. Jean-Pierre is greatly amused, but Jean-Claude is fleetingly startled: He is himself victim of the momentary illusion that he has turned on the Eiffel Tower’s lights by flicking his living room switch. Even if we discount their different emotional phenomenologies (amusement versus startle), there is still a difference in what it is like for Jean-Pierre and Jean-Claude to undergo their experiences in the moment after they flicked the switch. Jean-Pierre does not, whereas Jean-Claude does, experience himself as the cause of the lights’ coming on. This is the only (non-emotional) difference between their experiences: Jean-Pierre’s does not, whereas Jean-Claude’s does, involve the impression of *having done this*, or *having brought about this effect*. Therefore, the impression is phenomenologically manifest.³⁸

Masrour (2007) argues that the synchronic unity of consciousness is phenomenologically manifest. Herbert and Expert are dining together. When they taste the soup, Herbert praises the *cuisine* for its *hautesse*. But Expert, flouting his expertise, remarks that the soup is not quite right, because the mushroom and the garlic haven’t truly fused to generate a single, unified flavor. They are *compresent* rather than *unified*. At the exact same time, Expert’s twin counterpart, Texpert, is having a soup at a different possible world. Texpert is exactly the same as Expert, and everything that ever happened to him is exactly the same – with one exception: Texpert was just served a soup in which the mushroom and the garlic have truly fused to generate a single, unified flavor. To get to the point, what it is like for Texpert to taste his soup is different from what it is like for Expert to taste his. But the gustatory experiences of Expert and Texpert differ in one respect only, namely, the unity of the mushroom and garlic flavors. Therefore, this unity is phenomenologically manifest.

With the method of contrast explicitly articulated, we can try to apply it deliberately and systematically to phenomenological disputes as they arise. Consider

³⁸ In passing, Siegel (2005) also nicely articulates a Husserlian case for the thesis that diachronic unity of consciousness is sometimes phenomenologically manifest by appealing to what she calls “phenomenal contrasts”: “Suppose you hear a series of five notes at times t1 through t5 that form of a melody: C-E-G-E-C. Compare this series to another one in which you hear a series of five sounds, each sounding at the same moment as the corresponding note in the melody (the first one sounds at t1, the second at t2, etc.) These sounds are the clink of a cup against a saucer, the groan of an accelerating bus, a creak from a chair, a snippet of a loud voice, and the honk of a car’s horn. Now, we experience the notes of the melody as unified in a way that we need not experience the five sounds as unified – even if at each moment we remember the sound at the previous moment.”

the tireless long-distance truck driver, who drives absent-mindedly through the interminable Nebraska cornfields. It has sometimes been asked whether she perceives the cornfields about her, and if she does, whether they are phenomenologically manifest in her perception. This is sometimes taken to stand in for the more general question of whether there is phenomenal consciousness outside attention. We may now deliberately apply the method of contrast to this issue. For my part, it seems to me that the overall experience of a color-blind truck driver would differ from that of a color-sighted driver, and therefore that the method of contrast recommends the view that the cornfields are phenomenologically manifest.³⁹

It is noteworthy that we could use the method of contrast to argue effectively against falsehood. Congenital anosmia is a condition in which subjects are born without the sense of smell. Contrast what it is like for you to smell the almond trees' bloom and what it is like for the congenitally anosmic. The difference attests to the fact that smell *is* phenomenologically manifest.

It is a further question whether this is the sort of argument we implicitly and pre-theoretically run in our head when we dismiss falsehood as absurd as soon as we entertain it. My sense is that it is not. There is some other method we employ. That other method will be discussed in the last section.

The need for another method

Another method is needed anyway, because there is one significant limitation in the method of contrast. It is that the method of contrast would be ineffective in bringing out phenomenologically manifest features that are *constitutive* of, or even *necessary* for, *any* phenomenal consciousness.

Consider claims that the phenomenology of expectancies (Noë, 2004) or for-meness (Kriegel, 2004) is a necessary component of phenomenal consciousness. On these views, without the phenomenology of expectancy or for-meness there would be no phenomenology at all. Suppose both views are correct. Then the relevant phenomenologies could not be brought out using the method of contrast. For no conscious experience could be imagined that lacked expectancy or for-meness. That is, where F_i is the phenomenology of expectancy (say), a contrast between a phenomenally conscious state with F_i and a phenomenally conscious state without F_i would be impossible, not because expectancy is not phenomenologically manifest however (*ex hypothesi* it is), but because (*ex hypothesi*) a state without expectancy phenomenology would not be phenomenally conscious at all.⁴⁰

Contrapositively, the successful use of the method of contrast in showing that a certain feature is phenomenologically manifest would in fact *entail* that the feature is

³⁹ I argue this way in Kriegel (2003a, p. 7).

⁴⁰ In other words, if there are indeed phenomenologically manifest features that are necessary for the presence of any phenomenality, we are bound to fail to imagine the contrasting S^* , but only because it will be impossible to imagine an S^* that satisfies (1). Thus the failure of contrast would be failure to *generate* a test, not failure to *pass* a test.

not constitutive of, or necessary for, any phenomenology. So when a philosopher makes a twofold phenomenological claim, to the effect that (a) some F_i is phenomenologically manifest and (b) F_i is a necessary component of phenomenal consciousness, she will be unable to use the method of contrast to establish (a) without thereby undermining (b). She must find another method to establish (a).⁴¹

Once the other method is articulated, however, it need not be used only to establish contingent phenomenologies. The fact that the need for it arises in the context of the method of contrast's limitation does not mean that it could be used only in the sphere that is off limits for the method of contrast.

One method that might be serviceable in bringing out vividly that a certain feature F is phenomenologically manifest would involve imaginative subtraction from normal conscious experience not of F itself, but of everything *but* F . One might try to imagine, for instance, whether there would be something it would be like to have a phenomenology of self-awareness even if all other phenomenology is extinguished.

Exploiting a thought-experiment from Dainton (2004), I would venture a positive answer. As it happens, Dainton argues (2004, p. 370) that if we contemplate what it would be like to be "a point of pure apprehension, gazing outward, all senses keenly alert but detecting nothing," lacking also fringe feelings and thoughts, we realize that there would be nothing at all it would be like. This verdict strikes me as inaccurate, however. As I contemplate what it would be like to be a source point of awareness failing to come down on any content, I find that there would clearly be *something* it would be like. What that "something" would be is hard to put in words, but it is clearly not nothing. If I had to put it in words, I would say that one would still have some dim and non-conceptualizing sense of oneself as subject of awareness, perhaps also a sense of oneself as engaged in an act of awareness. This sense of self-presence is not phenomenologically overwhelming, but it seems to be brought out vividly precisely by contemplating Dainton's scenario. Interestingly, Dainton's scenario is the result of imaginative subtraction of everything *but* self-awareness.

We may call this the *method of sweeping imaginative subtraction*. I suspect it would yield only weak results and only unreliably so. The results will be weak in the sense that the "method" under discussion is ultimately nothing but an intuition pump, and so may not advance us much beyond the initial foot-stomping. Thus, having declared that I can find a phenomenologically manifest sense of self-presence in my experience upon imaginatively subtracting everything else therefrom, I may find to my chagrin that Dainton avows the opposite. The "method" is also unreliable, because the failure to bring out vividly a certain feature by employing it could be explained in any number of ways – other than that the feature in question is in fact not phenomenologically manifest.

In summary, the method of contrast can be used only to establish *contingent* phenomenological claims. Phenomenological claims about necessary features of

⁴¹ It might be claimed that in such twofold claims, only (a) is a genuinely phenomenological claim, while (b) is a modal rather than phenomenological claim. I am actually sympathetic to this view, but it makes no difference to the issue at hand. The issue is whether someone committed to both (a) and (b) can make use of the method of contrast in establishing her phenomenological claim (a). The answer to that question is negative, regardless of whether (b) is also a phenomenological claim.

phenomenal consciousness – features without which no phenomenology is present – cannot be made using the method of contrast. If there are no such necessary features, the problem does not arise, and the method of contrast is sufficient to conduct the business of phenomenological inquiry. But if there are such necessary features, the method of contrast must be complemented with a different method, and the method of sweeping imaginative subtraction is too weak and unreliable to be strongly relied upon.

The method of knowability

Recall the issue, raised toward the beginning of this paper, of whether there is a judicative phenomenology. Elsewhere, I argued for the existence of judicative phenomenology through a series of thought experiments that in effect employed the method of contrast (Kriegel, 2003a).⁴² However, David Pitt (2004) has argued for the existence of judicative phenomenology (which he calls “cognitive phenomenology”) in a completely different way.

Suppose you are undergoing a conscious experience of intensely hoping that the Yankees will not win the next World Series. Pitt notes that you have first-person “immediate” knowledge of both the content and the attitude of your conscious hope. You know both *what* you hope and *that* you hope in a first-person way. However, Pitt argues, you wouldn’t have such first-person knowledge if your hope (both its content and its attitude) did not have phenomenal properties. For you to have first-person knowledge that (say) hope is the attitude you are taking toward the proposition that the Yankees will not win the next World Series, the attitude must be phenomenologically manifest in your judgment. It follows that both the content and the attitude of your hope that the Yankees will win the next World Series are phenomenologically manifest.

Pitt’s master argument can thus be formulated as follows: We can have first-person knowledge of the contents and attitudes of our conscious judgments; only the phenomenologically manifest is first-person knowable; therefore, the contents and attitudes of our conscious judgments are phenomenologically manifest. The *generalized* form of argument would be this: A feature F of our conscious states is first-person knowable; only phenomenologically manifest features are first-person knowable; therefore, F is phenomenologically manifest.

The general method suggested here for creating a presumption in favor of a phenomenological thesis is clear. It is simply to determine whether we can have first-person knowledge of a given feature. If it is determined that we can, the feature is phenomenologically manifest.

Call this the *method of knowability*. Two elements of the method of knowability must be clarified: The appeal to the notion of first-person knowledge, and the claim that only the phenomenologically manifest is first-person knowable.

⁴² Back then I used the term “intellectual qualia.” I have since ceased using the term “qualia” in public altogether (mention is a different thing).

We cannot offer here an account of first-person knowledge. But we can point to the phenomenon. Consider the fact that I am right now visualizing a smiling kangaroo. Both you and I are in possession of knowledge of this fact: We both know what I am visualizing. Yet we know this *differently*. I know it effortlessly, you know it effortfully; I know it without the mediation of inference, you know it with the mediation of inference; I know it quickly, you know it slowly. One may disagree, or be unclear on, one or all of these characterizations of the difference between my knowledge and yours. But surely there is a difference between the two. However one ends up characterizing the difference between my knowledge and your knowledge of the fact that I am visualizing a smiling kangaroo, it is clear that I know it one way whereas you know it another way. The way *I* know it we will call “first-person knowledge,” the way *you* know it we will call “third-person knowledge.”

Ultimately, of course, a full account of the nature of first-person knowledge would be of great value in honing the method of knowability. At the moment, when I am asked whether the snow’s bluishness is first-person knowable, I consult the characterizations offered above. When I determine that my knowledge of the bluishness is neither effortless nor speedy nor unmediated, I am inclined to declare that bluishness is not first-person knowable. But should I be shown a better account of first-person knowledge, fielding other key characteristics, my view might change.

We may consider the theory of first-person knowledge to be part of an enriched method of knowability. The idea is that, at a second pass, the method of knowability involves two stages: first, the offering of a robust account of first-person knowledge, and second, the developing of a case for the existence of a contested phenomenology against the background of the account in question.⁴³

It is important to emphasize, in any event, that no commitment need be made (probably none should) about an alleged infallibility, or even relative authority, of first-person knowledge. By saying that the way I know that I am visualizing a smiling kangaroo and the way you know this are different, one is not implying that my knowledge is *better* than yours. One certainly need not imply that mine is infallible while yours is fallible.⁴⁴ To assert that a certain mode of knowledge exists is not the same as to claim epistemic privileges on its behalf.

It is quite safe to assume, then, that there is a distinctive mode of knowledge, to which we can refer as “first-person knowledge.” But the method of knowability, as framed above, is premised on the substantive claim that this mode of knowledge can take as its object *only* phenomenologically manifest features. What is the justification for this claim?

The short answer is that it’s a long story, and one we need not go into.⁴⁵ A much weaker claim will do for our purposes. The weaker claim is that a feature’s being

⁴³ This is in effect how Pitt (2004) proceeds. A large segment of his article is dedicated to developing at length a subtle and plausible account of first-person knowledge.

⁴⁴ Nor does one need imply that mine is more secure, more reliable, more certain, or anything else. I find it plausible that some of these epistemic virtues will in the end prove to be correct. But one does not claim that they are just by asserting the existence of first-person knowledge.

⁴⁵ I happen to think that the claim, or rather something close to it, is true: I have argued elsewhere that first-person knowability *fixes the reference* (or denotation) of “conscious” as used in everyday discourse (Kriegel, 2004).

first-person knowable is *evidence* – strong, perhaps, but defeasible – for its being phenomenologically manifest. That is, rather than claiming that if a feature is first-person knowable, then it must be phenomenologically manifest, we could claim, more modestly, that if a feature is first-person knowable, then it is quite probably phenomenologically manifest. If this weaker claim is true, the following general form of argument will be legitimate: Feature F of our conscious states is first-person knowable; F's being first-person knowable is evidence for its being phenomenologically manifest; therefore, plausibly (alternatively: probably), F is phenomenologically manifest. This form of argument is non-demonstrative, but will suffice to create a presumption in favor of a given feature's being phenomenologically manifest.

Having said that, there is good reason to believe that it is strictly phenomenologically manifest properties that can be first-person known. To appreciate this, consider the touching tale of Person, who was struck by lightning and consequently lost (1) the entirety of her background knowledge, the whole body of tacit beliefs she has acquired over the years, as well as (2) all sensory capability (sight, touch, and so on).⁴⁶ After the accident, Person still has a rich experiential stream of images, thoughts, etc. We can ask ourselves, what are the features of her ongoing experiential stream that Person can know about? In particular, are there any that are not phenomenologically manifest? The answer seems to be No. For example, as an image of an exotic parrot randomly pops into Person's head a month after the accident, Person can come to know some but not all features of her imagery experience. For example, she can know that it has a greenish component. But she cannot know that the experience occurred on a Wednesday. And indeed, the experience's greenish quality is a phenomenologically manifest property, whereas its occurring on a Wednesday is not.

To be sure, it is a disadvantage of the method of knowability that it is burdened with theoretical baggage, however plausible, regarding what can and cannot be first-person known. Another disadvantage is that applying the method of knowability is not as straightforward as applying the method of contrast. To apply it, one would need reliable markers for the first-personhood of a given piece of knowledge. I have suggested above three possible elements: effortlessness, quickness, and non-inferentiality. But this is at best a very partial list, and moreover the items on it are not as clear as one might wish. Effortlessness, for example, is a relative matter, with murky borders.

So there are undeniable disadvantages associated with the method of knowability. But the method also has a notable advantage, namely, that it applies to necessary phenomenologies as well as contingent ones. This, recall, is the reason we sought it in the first place. Suppose the phenomenology of expectancy is a necessary component of any perceptual consciousness, so that no perceptual consciousness is possible in its absence. Then we cannot establish its existence by contrasting perceptual experiences with and without it. But we can still attempt to establish its existence by determining that it is first-person knowable.

⁴⁶ We must let Person retain her understanding of concepts and (perhaps) language, so that her inability to know certain things will not be confused with a mere inability to classify or name them.

We should also not overstate the difficulty in applying the method. Although I cannot seriously pursue these matters here, let me just note that it strikes me that we have first-person knowledge of the roundness, but not ellipticity, of the angled coin (which creates a presumption in favor of the view that it is only the roundness that is phenomenologically manifest), and that we have first-person knowledge of some normatively pertinent features of our moral judgments (which creates a presumption in favor of the existence of a proprietary moral phenomenology). For that matter, it seems to me that, in the case with which we opened this paper, you do have first-person knowledge of your activity of calculating, and therefore, that, yes, there is a phenomenology of calculating.⁴⁷ Elsewhere, I have argued that the for-me-ness of conscious experiences is phenomenologically manifest on the grounds that we have first-person knowledge of it (Kriegel, 2003b).

As with the method of contrast, we can use the method of knowability to create a presumption against falsehood. The same first-person knowledge we have of (some features of) our visual or tactile experiences we also have of (some features of) our olfactory experiences – so falsehood is false.

Observe moreover that this seems to capture better the implicit, pre-theoretical process by which we come to dismiss falsehood immediately upon consideration. We noted above that although the method of contrast is effective in refuting falsehood, it does not seem to be the method we actually use pre-theoretically. The method of knowability, by contrast, is a credible candidate for being the method we actually use. To my mind, this is not a trivial virtue of the method of knowability.

Conclusion: Phenomenological resolutions

There may be further viable methods for breaking out of foot-stomping deadlocks in phenomenological disputes. I have outlined only two possible methods: contrast and knowability. The upshot of our discussion has two main tenets. (1) For most phenomenological disputes, the primary method should be that of contrast, with knowability playing a supporting role. (2) For some phenomenological disputes – those involving allegedly necessary components of phenomenologies – the method of knowability becomes the one to use. Both methods should not be expected to yield verdicts on phenomenological disputes like an algorithm. Their application may be difficult and require subtle observations and discriminations. But their availability may dissipate some of the sense of intractability that attends us upon first contemplating phenomenological disputes.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ This is not to say that the phenomenology is proprietary. More plausibly, the phenomenology of calculating is just a combination of agential and judicative phenomenologies.

⁴⁸ For comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Stephen Biggs, Mike Bruno, David Chalmers, Alva Noë, Eric Schwitzgebel, and especially Susanna Siegel and Charles Siewert. I have also benefited from conversations with Terry Horgan, Farid Masrour, and David Pitt.

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