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<i>Our conception of intentionality is grounded in introspective encounter with mental states that have their intentional content in virtue of their experiential character ('experiential-intentional states').</i>	
1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances	
<i>Our conception of certain phenomena, including intentionality, is grounded in observational encounter with certain instances ('anchoring instances').</i>	
1.1.1 An Anchoring-Instance Model of Concept Formation	
<i>There are certain concepts ('observational natural kind concepts') such that an item falls under them just in case it has the same underlying nature as their anchoring instances, which are manifest instances one encountered during their formation.</i>	
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<i>The concept of intentionality is an observational natural kind concept. Thus an item falls under it just in case it has the same underlying nature as the anchoring instances of intentionality.</i>	
1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor	
<i>The only instances of intentionality we have observational encounter with are experiential-intentional states. So our conception of intentionality is grounded in observational encounter with experiential-intentional states.</i>	
1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription	
<i>There is a remarkable asymmetry between our ascription of experiential-intentional states to ourselves and all other forms of intentional ascription: the former does not, whereas the latter do, require the deployment of principles of charity.</i>	
1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry	

The best explanation of this asymmetry is that we have observational contact, through introspective encounter, with our experiential-intentional states, but with no other intentional states.

1.2.3. Objections and Replies

It is possible to object that we do not have observational contact with any experiential-intentional states, or that we have one with other intentional states. But neither kind of objection succeeds.

1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality'

Some preliminary questions arise with respect to the notion of experiential intentionality: What would it take for there to be experiential intentionality? Is there in fact such intentionality? If so, how much of it is there?

1.3.1. Definition

Experiential intentionality is intentionality a mental state has in virtue of its experiential character. This is best understood in terms of a certain counterfactual: the state would not have the intentional content it has if it did not have the experiential character it has.

1.3.2. Existence

The existence of experiential intentionality is phenomenologically manifest, but can also be argued for: some conscious experiences are assessable for accuracy purely in virtue of their experiential character.

1.3.3. Scope

Perceptual states are clearly endowed with experiential intentionality, but so are many emotional, somatic, conative, and cognitive states.

2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory 67
One promising view is that states have their experiential-intentional content in virtue of being suitably higher-order tracked to track something (i.e., are higher-order tracked in their capacity as trackers of that thing).

2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality?

An account of experiential intentionality in terms of naturalistically kosher tracking relations between physical states of the brain and physical states of the environment would be antecedently attractive.

2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation

Work on intentionality in the past few decades has centered on the notion of mental representation and on attempts to account for it in terms of tracking relations to the environment.

2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience
According to representational theories of consciousness, a mental state has its experiential character in virtue of representing the environment. Work within this framework offers some options for distinguishing experiential from non-experiential representation of the environment.

2.1.3. Experiential Tracking
Superposition of distinctions between experiential and non-experiential representation upon tracking accounts of mental representation produces a number of elegant, though problematic, options for a tracking account of experiential intentionality.

2.2. The HOT Argument
Tracking accounts of experiential intentionality face an insurmountable problem: it is not what experiences track that determines their experiential-intentional content, only what they are suitably higher-order represented to track.

2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience
According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a state has its experiential character not in virtue of representing, but in virtue of being suitably higher-order represented.

2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality
Given that what a state tracks and what it is higher-order represented to track may diverge, if the higher-order theory of consciousness is true, then what a state tracks cannot account for the intentional content that state has in virtue of its experiential character.

2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking
Experiential intentionality may nonetheless be tracking-based, namely, if higher-order representation is also accounted for in terms of tracking. This would allow a 'higher-order tracking theory' of experiential intentionality: a state has its experiential-intentional content in virtue of being suitably higher-order tracked to track something.

2.4. Objections and Replies
Higher-order tracking theory withstands the main objections against it.

2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking'
There is an important distinction between two notions of representation. Once it is drawn, many objections to the higher-order tracking theory are seen to rest on conceptual confusion.

2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for?

The two notions of representation are the targets of two different philosophical concerns, and only one of those is at the base of the present inquiry.

3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory 129

An interesting and surprisingly plausible view is that states have their experiential-intentional content not in virtue of bearing any relation of intentional directedness to anything, but rather in virtue of exhibiting a non-relational experiential property of being-intentionally-directed-somehow.

3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference

Intentionality has two essential features: the feature that underlies failure of existential generalization ('intentional inexistence') and the feature that underlies failure of substitution of co-referential terms ('intentional indifference').

3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference

One argument against tracking-based accounts of experiential intentionality, including higher-order tracking theory, is that they fail to accommodate experiential-intentional states' intentional indifference. The argument is inconclusive.

3.2.1. The Argument

We can use thought experiments to construct scenarios in which two subjects are in experiential states that track the same entities, and are suitably tracked to track the same entities, but have different experiential-intentional contents.

3.2.2. Responses

The best response is to argue that there is a kind of entities – 'response-dependent properties' or 'centering features' – such that in the relevant scenarios the subject's experiences are higher-order tracked to track different entities of that kind.

3.2.3. Brains in Vats

Brain-in-vat scenarios, which are the converse of intentional-indifference ones, succumb to the same response.

3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence

Another argument against tracking-based accounts of experiential intentionality, including higher-order tracking theory, is that they fail to accommodate experiential-intentional states' intentional inexistence. This argument is much more powerful.

3.3.1. The Argument

We can use thought experiments to construct scenarios in which a subject is in an experiential-intentional state that fails to track, or be suitably tracked to track, anything.

3.3.2. Responses

The conceivability of intentional-inexistence scenarios provides defeasible evidence for their possibility, but the evidence may be defeated by the rebutting consideration that if such scenarios were possible, experiential intentionality could not be naturalized. However, while this rebuts the evidence, it does nothing to undermine it.

3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification

The argument from intentional inexistence paves the way to an adverbial account: experiential intentionality is the non-relational property of being-intentionally-directed-somehow.

3.5. Objections to Adverbialism

Many objections to adverbialism suggest themselves. The strongest is that it is incompatible with naturalism about experiential intentionality.

4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory 196

The most plausible view of non-experiential intentionality holds that states have their non-experiential-intentional content in virtue of being consciously interpretable as having it by an ideal interpreter under ideal conditions.

4.1. Potentialism

One interesting view is that states have their non-experiential-intentional content in virtue of potentially having experiential-intentional content. However, the view cannot account for the intentionality of certain sub-personal states that are not even potentially experiential.

4.2. Inferentialism

Another view is that states have their non-experiential-intentional content in virtue of being inferentially connected to experiential-intentional states. This view cannot account for the intentionality of states of certain simple creatures (as well as sophisticated zombies) that do not have any experiential-intentional states.

4.3. Eliminativism

A simple and elegant view is that non-experiential states never have intentionality. This view clearly does not recover the pre-theoretically apparent extent of intentionality, and moreover has no resources to account for linguistic aboutness.

- 4.4. Interpretivism
The view that states have their non-experiential-intentional content in virtue of being consciously interpretable as having it by an ideal interpreter under ideal conditions manages to recover the pre-theoretically apparent extent of intentionality, and moreover in a unified manner.
- 4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality
An intentional stance theory of all intentionality faces insurmountable difficulties, but a restricted experiential-intentional stance theory of non-experiential intentionality is quite promising.
- 4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed
The view can be developed in a number of directions, depending on one's take on the notions of interpretation, ideal interpreter, and ideal conditions.
- 4.4.3. Objections and Replies
The view withstands the main objections to it, including that it is unduly unrealistic about non-experiential intentionality.
5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality 236
The preceding recommends two general theories of intentionality, generated by combining the adverbial or higher-order tracking theory of experiential intentionality with the interpretivist theory of non-experiential intentionality (against the background of the thesis of the experiential origins of intentionality).
- 5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism
One general theory is that an item has its intentional content in virtue of being either intentionally-directed-somehow or suitably ideally-interpretable-somehow.
- 5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism
A second and slightly more plausible general theory of intentionality is that an item has its intentional content in virtue of either being suitably tracked to track something or being ideally tracked to be suitably tracked to track something.