

Chapter 7.

Will and Emotion

As we saw in Chap. 3, Brentano divides conscious states into three fundamental categories: 'presentation,' 'judgment,' and 'interest.' We have discussed the nature of presentation in Chap. 3 and the nature of judgment in Chap. 4. The present chapter is dedicated to the nature of interest.

Brentano's theory of interest offers a unified account of will, emotion, and pleasure/pain. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the theory of emotion and the theory of pleasure/pain are contentious areas featuring a bewildering variety of competing theories. The account Brentano offers, however, is not properly represented in either literature, and here I will try to make the case for its plausibility. Interestingly, the will, in particular desire, is *not* nearly as contentious in current philosophy of mind, and the account many accept, however implicitly, seems to be precisely Brentano's. Accordingly, I will try to leverage the evident plausibility of Brentano's account of will (§1) to claim similar plausibility for his parallel accounts of emotion (§2) and pleasure and pain (§3).

1. The Will

In contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, discussion of the will focuses on the nature of desire, intention, and action. But the most prominent of these notions is by far desire (see under: 'belief-desire psychology'). Accordingly, I start this section with a presentation of leading accounts of desire in the relevant literature (§1.1). I

then discuss Brentano's account as a particularly well-developed version of one of them (§1.2).

1.1. Desire in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

A common account of desire in current philosophy of mind characterizes it in terms of its *functional role* within the overall economy of mind. The idea is that desire and belief are complementary states that together causally explain the occurrence of observable behavior. For example, if Aristide goes to the kitchen, opens the fridge, and takes out a beer, we can causally explain this piece of behavior by citing (i) Aristide's desire for beer and (ii) his belief that by going through this sequence of actions he will obtain beer (Davidson 1963). Within this picture, belief and desire are characterized in terms of complementary clusters of causal dispositions. Robert Stalnaker puts the picture crisply:

Belief and desire ... are correlative dispositional states of a potentially rational agent. To desire that *P* is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to bring it about that *P* in a world in which one's beliefs, whatever they are, were true. To believe that *P* is to be disposed to act in ways that would tend to satisfy one's desires, whatever they are, in a world in which *P* (together with one's other beliefs) were true. (Stalnaker 1984: 15)

On this picture, desire is nothing but a cluster of distinctly motivational dispositions.

From a Brentanian perspective, this kind of functionalist account is a nonstarter, since, as we saw in Chap. 1, Brentano rejects the existence of dispositional mental states. He accepts that we have the kind of tacit dispositions commonly attributed to subjects, but insists that 'these are not mental phenomena' (Brentano 1874: I, 86 [60]) but merely (neuro)physiological phenomena.¹ Even if one accepts the existence of dispositional states, however, it is natural to suppose that the relevant dispositional profiles are grounded in mental states' occurrent, categorical properties.

There is also a deeper reason why Brentano would completely reject a Stalnaker-style functionalist account. To regard desires and beliefs as clusters of (potentially dormant) dispositions is to treat them as *unobservable theoretical entities*, posited only for the purpose of explaining observable action. For Brentano, however, the phenomena of the will, including desire, are not in the first instance explanatory posits, a hidden explanans of a perceived explanandum. Rather, they are (inner-)perceived types of conscious experience. Indeed, desire is one of descriptive psychology's explananda, in addition to whatever role it plays as an explanans in genetic psychology.² This is not unreasonable: even blindfolded, I can know immediately and noninferentially that I *desire* to eat ice cream rather than *believe* I eat ice cream. The notion that knowledge that I want ice cream is based on inference from observation of my ice-cream-seeking behavior seems absurd. Brentano's view is that it is based on direct inner perception of the desire itself. If so, theorizing about the nature of desire should not be driven entirely by considerations of action explanation. It should first seek an explicit and precise description of that which inner perception presents in an unarticulated and 'blurry' fashion.

Another approach to desire in contemporary philosophy of mind construes it as the paradigmatic state with a world-to-mind direction of fit: whereas belief is the kind of state that is supposed to fit the way the world is, desire is the kind of state that the world is supposed to fit.³

From a Brentanian point of view, however, this approach to desire faces a number of problems. First, it is far from clear what direction of fit *means*; it is a suggestive metaphor, but unpacking it literally proves difficult (Zangwill 1998). Secondly, the most natural accounts of direction of fit construe it as a matter of functional role (e.g., Smith 1994), but as we have just seen, Brentano cannot accept a dispositional account of desire. Thirdly, even if we grant that belief is supposed to fit the world, whereas desire is such that the world is supposed to fit it, these do not seem like brute, inexplicable facts. It seems that something must explain them: there must be something about belief – some psychological feature of it – that makes it

supposed to fit the world, and something about desire that makes it such that the world is supposed to fit it. Facts about supposed fit seem too 'normative' to be psychological bedrock. One is naturally led to surmise that such facts are grounded in more straightforwardly psychological characteristics of the relevant mental states.

There is also a third approach to desire one finds in modern philosophy of mind, which approach dovetails much better with Brentano's thinking. This is the notion that desire is an *essentially evaluative* state: it represents what it does *as good* (in a suitably generic sense). When you desire chocolate, there is a palpable sense in which your desire casts the chocolate in a positive light. Thus philosophers working out the distinction between belief and desire within the framework of 'belief-desire psychology' have sometimes highlighted the following idea: while a belief that *p* and a desire that *p* represent the same thing (have the same content), the former represents *p* 'under the guise of the true' whereas the latter represents *p* 'under the guise of the good' (Velleman 1992). Here is how Dennis Stampe puts it in his classic 'The Authority of Desire':

[W]hile the belief and the desire that *p* have the same propositional content and represent the same state of affairs, there is a difference in the *way* it is represented in the two states of mind. In belief it is represented *as obtaining*, whereas in desire, it is represented as a state of affairs *the obtaining of which would be good*. This *modal* difference explains why a desire that *p* is a reason to make it true that *p*, while the belief that *p* is not. (Stampe 1987: 355; italics original)

We may put the idea by saying that desire is *goodness-committal*: it commits to the goodness of its intentional object. (By this I mean that desire itself is committed to the object's goodness, not that the desire commits *the subject* to the object's goodness.⁴) Sergio Tenenbaum calls this the 'Scholastic view' – which he formulates as follows:

... just as theoretical attitudes such as belief express what the agent holds to be true even when the belief is false, the scholastic view claims that practical attitudes, such as intending

[and desiring] express what the agent holds to be good. (Tenenbaum 2009: 96; see also Tenenbaum 2007: 9)

In a similar vein, Graham Oddie writes: 'The desire that P is P's seeming good (or P's being experienced as good)' (Oddie 2005: 42).

Interestingly, the dispositional account, the direction of fit account, and the evaluative account do not seem to be regarded as competitors in the contemporary literature. They are treated rather as different facets of a single comprehensive picture of the nature of desire. And indeed, at one level there is no reason to choose among them, insofar as desire may well exhibit all three characteristics: a distinctive functional role, and distinctive direction of fit, and a distinctively evaluative character. At the same time, one of these characteristic may turn out to be more explanatorily fundamental than the other two: the latter may be mere symptoms of the former, or the possession of the former may underlie and explain the possession of the latter. This is particularly plausible, in fact, in the present case. As we have seen, dispositional facts about desire's functional role are plausibly grounded in more fundamental categorical facts about desire, and normative facts about desire's supposed-fit relation to the world are grounded in more fundamental 'descriptive' facts about desire's psychological properties. Only desire's evaluative character does not invite inquiring about further underlying properties.

Interestingly, the evaluative character is also well positioned to *explain* desire's dispositional and normative properties. More specifically, I would claim that (i) desire's direction of fit is explained by its functional role and (ii) its functional role is explained by its evaluative character – its goodness-commitment. On the one hand, the *reason* 'success' (or 'fulfillment') for desires involves the world changing so as to come into accord with the mind is precisely that desire, by its very nature, motivates the subject to act on the world and try to mold it in a certain way. But in a second stage, it is also natural to think that my desire for chocolate motivates me to mold the world so that I obtain chocolate precisely *because* it presents it as *good* that I should have chocolate. That is, the desire for chocolate has the functional role

it does because it evaluates the chocolate the way it does. In this way, evaluative character underlies functional role, which in turn underlies direction of fit. This casts desire's evaluative character as the most fundamental of its three distinctive characteristics.

From a Brentanian perspective, it is also noteworthy that nothing prevents desire's goodness-commitment from being an occurrent, inner-perceptible feature. This allows us to do justice to the fact that desire is something we are familiar with from our personal experience, not merely a theoretical posit experientially opaque to us.

All this suggests that desire's goodness-commitment is plausibly regarded – certainly from a Brentanian perspective – as the *essential* feature of desire, what *makes* it a desire. On this picture, desire's characteristic motivational role and direction of fit *flow from* its evaluative character; it is the evaluative character that constitutes desire's deep nature.

1.2. Brentano's Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Desire and Will

Brentano himself does not discuss the will primarily in terms of desire. Nonetheless, I will conduct the discussion as though he does, for the sake of continuity; we will revisit the relationship between will and desire with a more critical mindset in §2.2.

Brentano clearly has an evaluative account of will/desire: 'every [desire] takes an object to be good or bad' (Brentano 1874: II, 36 [199]). However, there is an important difference between Brentano's view and, say, Stampe's or Oddie's. Stampe and Oddie maintain that desire is *perception* of the good. Brentano rejects this, just as he rejects the notion that desire is *belief in goodness*: to desire ice cream is *not* to believe in the ice cream's goodness, and nor is it to perceive the ice cream as good. Instead, it is a *sui generis* way of positively evaluating the ice cream, irreducible to perceptual and belief-like ways of doing so:

I do not believe that anyone will understand me to mean that [desires] are cognitive acts (*Erkenntnisakte*) by which the goodness or badness, value or disvalue, of certain objects are *perceived* (*wahrgenommen*); indeed I note explicitly, in order to make such an interpretation completely impossible, that this would be a complete misunderstanding of my real view. First, that would mean that I viewed these phenomena as judgments; but in fact I set them apart as a special class. (Brentano 1874: II, 89 [239])

The question is how to characterize the sui generis way desire presents goodness.

As we saw in Chap. 4, Brentano takes the essential characteristic of judgment to be its distinctive mode of presenting: its existence-commitment. As a mode of presenting, existence-commitment is an *attitudinal* feature of judgments. A belief in ghosts, we said, does not present ghosts as existent, but rather presents-as-existent ghosts. In saying that desire presents the good, but in its own sui generis way, Brentano suggests that he envisages a similarly attitudinal account of desire's goodness-commitment. My desire's commitment to the goodness of chocolate should be understood not as a matter of presenting chocolate-as-good, but of presenting-as-good chocolate. And indeed, Brentano explicitly says:

The essence of will consists in approval or disapproval, hence in a taking-as-good (*ein Gutfinden*) or taking-as-bad (*Schlechtfinden*)... (Brentano 1874: II, 91 [241])

That is, a volitional state (e.g., desire) concerned with chocolate is directed at the chocolate through the presenting-as-good relation, a distinctive way of intentionally relating to an object.

The attitudinal approach recommends itself very strongly in the case of desire. For clearly, in desiring chocolate one does not desire *that the chocolate be good* (nor desires *the chocolate's goodness*). One simply desires the chocolate. More precisely, while one *can* desire the goodness of a chocolate, or the enjoyableness of a jog in the park, or the pleasantness of holiday in Greece, ordinarily one simply desires chocolate, a jog in the park, or a holiday in Greece. The fact that we do not need to mention goodness of any sort in specifying the content of an ordinary desire, and yet the desire commits to the chocolate's goodness (in a suitably generic sense of the term, recall), suggests that goodness shows up as an aspect of the

desire's *attitude*, of *how* the desire presents what it does, rather than as an aspect of its content, of *what* the desire presents. We might say that the desire casts chocolate in a positive light rather than casts light on positive chocolate. This is just the idea that the desire does not present chocolate-as-good but presents-as-good chocolate. The goodness is a modification of how the desire does the presenting. Accordingly, to desire *x* is to adopt an attitude that somehow *favors x*, is *pro x*. In this respect, the modern notion of 'pro attitude' is very apt here: for Brentano, desires, indeed volitional states more generally, do not just *happen* to be pro attitudes – it is their essential characteristic.⁵

We can appreciate the point by contrasting a desire for chocolate with a belief in or perception of chocolate's goodness. In the latter, goodness appears precisely as part of the state's content; in the former, it is merely attitudinal. Compare the intentional structure of the following four putative states:

Belief that chocolate is good ::	present-as-true <chocolate is good>
Belief in chocolate's goodness ::	present-as-existent <chocolate's goodness>
Perception of chocolate's goodness ::	present-as-existent <chocolate's goodness>
Desire for chocolate ::	present-as-good <chocolate>

In this representation, angle brackets are used to capture a state's content and presenting-as-F designates the state's distinctive attitudinal character. Notice that the attitudinal characters of perception and belief-in are cast as identical (consistently with Brentano's account of judgment – see Chap. 3-4). We can see in this representation that the element of goodness shows up in the *content* of evaluative belief and evaluative perception.⁶ Only in desire does it show up in the *attitude*. It is in this sense that desire involves essentially a *sui generis mode* of presenting the intentional object.

This is something that many modern proponents of the evaluative account of desire seem to have missed. In the above quotation, Stampe refers to the evaluative dimension of desire as 'modal' – presumably in the sense of being attitudinal. Nonetheless, he struggles with the difference between desire and evaluative belief,

worrying that in these two cases ‘one and the same state of affairs is represented “in the same way,” that is, as having the same property’ (Stampe 1987: 356). And that leads him to suggest that desire, unlike evaluative belief, is direct *perception* of value. But Stampe’s supposed problem rests on a mistake. As we have just seen, desire and evaluative belief *do not* present the same object: the belief presents chocolate’s being good, the desire just chocolate.

It might be objected that the content of desire is never simply an object, such as chocolate, but is always a kind of action, such as *eating* chocolate. The canonical logical form of desire ascription is thus ‘S desires to φ ’ and not ‘S desires x .’ When we use the latter form in everyday speak we rely on context to make evident which proposition of the former form we are trying to convey (what can you want with chocolate other than to eat it?!). This objection raises important issues but in the present dialectical context it is a non sequitur. For even if what you want is strictly speaking not just chocolate, but your eating of the chocolate, it is still not the case that what you want is the *goodness* of your eating the chocolate. Thus the full specification of the desire’s content does not need to mention goodness, regardless of whether it needs to mention some action.

In the contemporary literature, only two accounts of desire appear to converge with Brentano’s, namely, Sergio Tenenbaum’s (2007) and Karl Schafer’s (2013). At the same time, important differences persist.

For Tenenbaum, the attitudinal nature of desiderative evaluation seems to bottom out in the fact that desire *aims* at the good in the same sense belief *aims* at the true. But even if ‘aim’ talk can be understood literally, one would expect here, too, that there be something about desire that *makes* it aim at the good. Aim facts, like supposed-fit facts, do not look like psychological bedrock. Brentano would say that such facts are grounded in the distinctive attitudinal character of each type of mental state. A desire aims at the good precisely *because* it presents-as-good. It is this latter property that is the most fundamental in Brentano’s account of desire, grounding desire’s characteristic aim, direction of fit, and functional role.

Meanwhile, Schafer's theoretical goals are importantly different from Brentano's. His primary goal is not to capture the nature or essence of desire, but rather to explain the fact that what it is rational for one to do often depends on what one desires. Schafer's claim is that the best explanation of this fact is that desire is characterized by a special 'imperative force,' where any 'state that presents A with imperative force to me presents A to me as something that I ought to do' (Schafer 2013: 277). This diverges from Brentano's account in two main ways. First, Schafer's designated attitudinal property is something like presenting-as-to-be-done, as opposed to presenting-as-good. Secondly, while Schafer asserts that a desire always employs this kind of attitudinal property, he does not assert that this property is essential to its status as a desire.



Brentano's account of desire can be captured in the following pair of theses:

EVALUATIVE-D :: Any desire D for an object O essentially commits to the goodness of O.

ATTITUDINAL-D :: A desire D's commitment to the goodness of an object O is an attitudinal property of D.

Being a nominalist, Brentano would not put things in terms of properties, of course, but in terms of special kinds of concrete particular (as we saw in the previous chapter). He might say, for example, that a desirer is nothing but a presenting-as-good subject. For expediency, here I put things in terms of properties. Note that EVALUATIVE-D ascribes more specifically an *essential* property. It is an essentiality claim, not just a universal or even modal one. It *implies* that all desires are necessarily goodness-committal, but that can be accepted by functional-role accounts of desire as well. Where it goes beyond the functional-role accounts is in claiming that it is of the essence of desire to commit to its object's goodness – that is part of what it is for something to be a desire. At the same time, EVALUATIVE-D is compatible with accounts of desire that build the evaluation into its content. A belief in the goodness of world peace is also goodness-committal, but through its content.

This is what is ruled out by ATTITUDINAL-D. The upshot is an account of desire that construes desire as essentially goodness-committal in virtue of an attitudinal feature; call this the *evaluative-attitudinal account*.

To repeat, I present this as Brentano's account of desire, but in truth it is his account of volitional states in general, that is, of all states of a person's *will*. I focus on desire only for the sake of continuity with contemporary philosophy of mind, which has tended to take desire as the paradigmatic mental state with world-to-mind direction of fit.

What is Brentano's *argument* for the evaluative-attitudinal account? The answer, I am afraid, is that he has no direct argument. He dedicates §3 of Chap. 8 of *Psychology II* to defending the view, but the defense simply appeals to authority: Lotze, Kant, Mendelssohn, Aristotle, and Aquinas all shared the view, we are told, so the view 'can be regarded as generally accepted (*anerkannt*)' (Brentano 1874: II, 90 [241]). One gets the impression, however, that for Brentano, central to the view's attraction is the way it fits into an elegant bigger picture. In particular, the symmetry between an account of desire in terms of presenting-as-good and an account of belief in terms of presenting-as-true indirectly recommends both. Such 'top-down' considerations rarely play a role in current philosophy of mind, but are highly operative in Brentano's thinking.

Our discussion has raised, however, certain independent considerations in support of Brentano's account. And the extant literature provides further considerations. These considerations can be divided into those that motivate the evaluative approach in general and those that support the attitudinal version more specifically.

What motivates evaluativism in general is the way it avoids the problems attending rival approaches, in particular the functional-role and direction-of-fit approaches. Indeed, as we have seen there are good reasons to think that desire's evaluative character underlies and explains its distinctively motivational functional role and its distinctively world-to-mind direction of fit.

In addition, however, it should be noted that in the contemporary literature a powerful argument for the 'guise of the good' thesis has been developed, which argument readily adapts for EVALUATIVE-D. The main idea is that unless desires are goodness-committal, the behaviors they bring about are doomed to be unintelligible. We can see this, claims Anscombe (1963) for example, by the fact that others' actions are entirely mystifying to us as long as we are unable to understand the good they hope their actions will bring about. The point is nicely articulated in this passage by Philip Clark:

Suppose, for example, that you notice me spray painting my shoe. You ask why I am doing that, and I reply that this way my left shoe will weigh a little more than my right. You ask why I want the left shoe to weigh a little more. Now suppose I just look at you blankly and say, 'That's it.' I seem not to understand your puzzlement. You grasp for straws. 'Is this some sort of performance art, on the theme of asymmetry?' 'No.' 'Is someone going to weigh your shoes as part of some game?' 'No. Why do you ask?' (Clark 2010: 234-5)

The argument may be put as follows: 1) desires rationalize, or render intelligible, the actions they bring about; 2) if desires were not inherently goodness-committal, they would not rationalize, or render intelligible, the actions they bring about; therefore, 3) desires are inherently goodness-committal. The argument might be resisted, of course, but we can see the kind of initial motivation it provides for evaluativism.

As for the attitudinal approach to desiderative evaluation, as we have seen it is supported by the simple observation that in desiring chocolate one is not ordinarily desiring that chocolate be good, but only desires the chocolate. Given that the desire nonetheless commits to the chocolate's goodness, the only way to accommodate this simple observation is to build desire's goodness-commitment into its distinctive attitude. In addition, the attitudinal view shows us how to handle alleged counter-examples to the guise of the good thesis. For it is often objected to the thesis that desire cannot be essentially goodness-committal, since we routinely desire what we know full well to be bad (Stocker 1979, Velleman 1992). One may want the boss to be embarrassed, even though one takes such embarrassment to be

bad morally, prudentially, and otherwise. In response, however, I would claim that such cases involve conflicting evaluations. The desire still presents-as-good boss-embarrassment, but is accompanied by an evaluative *belief* that presents-as-true that boss-embarrassment is bad. The occurrence of state presents-as-good x is perfectly compatible, in a psychological sense, with the occurrence of another state that presents-as-true that x is *not* good – in fact such ‘internal conflicts’ are tragically pervasive in our mental life!

2. Emotion

In addition to an evaluative-attitudinal account of the will, Brentano also presents an evaluative-attitudinal account of emotion (§2.1). This does raise the question of how to account for the evident *difference* between will and emotion – something Brentano has very interesting things to say about (§2.2).

2.1. Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Emotion

The philosophy-of-mind literature on emotion is much larger than that on desire. But here too, a stubborn strand casts emotional states as essentially evaluative. Indeed, the evaluative approach to emotion has gained considerable traction toward the end of the twentieth century. Consider this encyclopedic assessment:

Most recent accounts of the structure of emotion, despite their differences, agree that emotions (somehow) present the world to us as having certain *value-laden features*. Following their lead, we will say that emotions involve *evaluative presentations*. (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000: 66; my italics)

Admiring Shakespeare, respecting one’s colleague, and loving one’s child are all emotional states that evaluate their objects positively; resenting the boss, abhorring Donald Trump, and being indignant about police killings of unarmed African-Americans evaluate their objects negatively. The claim of the evaluative account is

that emotions involve such evaluations universally, necessarily, and indeed essentially.

Brentano too adopts an evaluative account of emotion. We can see this from the fact that he considers 'emotion' (*Gemüt*) one appropriate name for the category of mental state for which he offers the evaluative account. This category covers clearly volitional states, such as desire, decision, and intention, but also emotional states. In one place Brentano writes:

A single appropriate expression is lacking most of all for the third fundamental class [of mental states], whose phenomena we designated as *emotions/affects* (*Gemüthsbewegungen*), as phenomena of *interest*, or as phenomena of *love*... Everybody would call anger, anxiety, and passionate desire (*heftige Begierde*) emotions/affects; but in the general way in which we use the word, it also applies to every wish, every resolution/decision (*Entschluss*), and every intention. (Brentano 1874: II, 35 [199]; emphasis original)

Thus phenomena of the will belong in a single category with emotional states. And the evaluative account is supposed to apply to both equally:

Just as every judgment takes an object as true or false, so in an analogous way every phenomenon belonging to this third class takes an object as good or bad. (Brentano 1874: II, 36 [199])

It would seem, then, that Brentano's evaluative account of desire is intended to apply to emotion as well.

The more recent evaluative accounts typically come in two varieties. One casts emotions as evaluative *judgments* (Solomon 1976): to admire Shakespeare is to judge him admirable, where admirability is a species of goodness (being admirable is a way of being good, in a suitably generic sense of 'good'). The other casts emotions as evaluative *perceptions* (de Sousa 1987): to abhor Donald Trump is to perceive him as abhorrent (where being abhorrent is a way of being bad). As we have seen, however, Brentano does not take mental states belonging to the relevant category to be evaluative judgments or perceptions, but to constitute a *sui generis* category characterized by a distinctive presentational mode. For him, then, the

evaluative dimension of emotion cannot consist in emotion presenting ‘value-laden features’ or indeed any normative entities. It must be rather a matter of emotions *normatively presenting* ‘regular’ entities. As he puts it:

... the expressions which we use here [to designate the evaluative character of emotion] do not mean that, in the phenomena of this class, goodness is *ascribed* to something which is agreeable as good, and badness is *ascribed* to something which is disagreeable as bad; rather, they too denote a particular *way* in which mental activity refers to a content. (Brentano 1874: II, 90 [240]; my italics)

My admiration does not present Shakespeare as good but rather presents-as-good Shakespeare. My resentment does not present the boss as bad, but presents-as-bad the boss.⁷

Accordingly, we may formulate Brentano’s account of emotion on the pattern of his account of the will. The parallel account would look like this:

EVALUATIVE-E :: Any positive (negative) emotion E about an object O essentially commits to the goodness (badness) of O.

ATTITUDINAL-E :: An emotion E’s commitment to the goodness (badness) of an object O is an attitudinal property of E.

We may call this the evaluative-attitudinal account of emotion. Although evaluative approaches to emotion are common in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, their attitudinal version is less so. Indeed, to my knowledge the only contemporary theory of emotion committed to both EVALUATIVE-E and ATTITUDINAL-E is Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni’s (see especially Deonna and Teroni 2012 Chap. 7, 2015). However, in Deonna and Teroni’s account the bodily feelings associated with emotions play a crucial role – the evaluative attitudes of emotions seem to be somehow ‘embodied,’ to be stances taken *by the body* in some sense. This is very different from what Brentano has in mind. For Brentano, all the combination of EVALUATIVE-E and ATTITUDINAL-E means is that the essential property of emotions is an attitudinal property, the property in virtue of which they are emotions, is the

property of presenting-as-good (or presenting-as-bad). Any link to the body is merely causal, not constitutive.

Obviously, if one adopts both an evaluative-attitudinal account of emotion and an evaluative-attitudinal account of will, one faces the immediate question of what (if anything) *distinguishes* will and emotion. This question is the topic of §2.2.⁸

The main motivation for the attitudinal twist on the evaluative theory of emotion is, again, that the value is not part of *what* is presented in emotion, what the subject emotes *about*. When you admire Shakespeare, it is just Shakespeare that you admire. It is not Shakespeare's admirability that you admire, and more generally not his goodness that you emote about. Perhaps you admire Shakespeare *in virtue* of his (relevant type of) goodness. That would mean that Shakespeare's goodness is the *cause* or *reason* of your admiration. All the same, Shakespeare's goodness is not the *object* of your admiration. The object of your admiration is just Shakespeare. Accordingly, any evaluation of Shakespeare involved in admiring him cannot come from the content of the admiration. It must be built into the admiring attitude. To admire Shakespeare is thus not to be in a mental state that presents Shakespeare-as-admirable, but in one that presents-as-admirable Shakespeare. The property of presenting-as-admirable is an attitudinal property. It is related to the property of presenting-as-good as species to genus: presenting-as-admirable is *eo ipso* presenting-as-good in the same sense being a cat is *eo ipso* being a mammal. Just as admirability itself is a species of goodness, presenting-as-admirable is a species of presenting-as-good.

The same applies to negative emotions. When one is afraid of a dog, one experiences the dog as dangerous. But one's fear is not a fear *that the dog be dangerous*, nor a fear of *the dog's dangerousness*. No, it is simply a fear *of the dog*. Here too, the fact that danger need not be explicitly cited in a full specification of the fear's content – that which is feared – suggests that the element of danger must be attitudinal: one's fear presents-as-dangerous the dog (where presenting-as-dangerous is a species of presenting-as-bad).

It should be noted that in speaking of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotions here, we use the adjectives ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ to signal the kinds of *evaluation* encoded in the emotion, not the kinds of *affect* the emotion involves (whether it is pleasant or unpleasant). Positive-affect emotions do often evaluate positively (love feels mostly good, and evaluates positively the loved) and negative-affect emotions typically evaluate negatively (anger feels bad, and evaluates negatively the angering). But the correlation is not universal. Thus, on the face of it the experience of yearning for more tenderness in one’s life presents-as-good such tenderness but is painful rather than pleasant. More subtly, nostalgia for one’s senior year in college presents-as-good that period of one’s life, but involves an unmistakable melancholic streak. Now, it is possible that some philosophical moves could reestablish the coextension between positive-evaluation and positive-affect in emotion, but regardless how that shakes out, what matters for Brentano’s division of emotions into positive and negative is the evaluative rather than affective dimension.⁹

2.2. *Distinguishing Emotion and Will*

Having defended an evaluative-attitudinal account both of will and of emotion, Brentano faces the problem of how to *distinguish* the two. Since they have the same underlying nature, he takes them to belong to a single ‘fundamental class.’ We might put this by saying that there is a single ‘natural kind’ that counts both emotional and volitional states among its members. It remains that there seems to be some real difference between emotion and volition, and this difference needs accounting for. The problem is that finding a satisfactory way to distinguish the two within the Brentanian framework is not straightforward.

2.2.1. Unsatisfactory distinctions

It might be suggested that the ultimate difference between will and emotion is simply *primitive*: there is a feature F that volitional states exhibit and emotional

states do not, and F can be appreciated through direct grasp in inner perception, but cannot be articulated in a theoretically informative way.

Some passages in the Brentano corpus actually appear to recommend this interpretation. Consider:

A man may have exercised his faculties of loving and hating [i.e., his emotional faculties] with great frequency; nonetheless, if he had never willed anything, the distinctive nature of the phenomenon of will would not become fully clear to him from the analysis given here.

(Brentano 1952: 220 [138])

No analysis of the what must be added to a state that presents-as-good in order for it to qualify as a volitional state can make someone grasp the nature of willing who has never experienced willing for herself.

At the same time, the passage just quoted makes clear toward the end that Brentano does offer an *analysis* of the will ('the analysis given here'). Perhaps the idea is that an analysis is possible, though not one that would help a will-less person grasp the nature of the will. Still, those of us who have experienced both will and emotion – both volitional and emotional states – are in a position to articulate the key difference between the two, thus providing an informative account of the difference. The question is what that account ought to be.

One suggestion might be that while emotional states come in both a positive and a negative variety, volitional states can only be positive. For example, it would be a mistake to think that a desire for avoiding vodka presents-as-bad vodka; rather, it presents-as-good vodka-avoidance. (We can see this from the fact that avoidance has to be mentioned in the specification of the content of the desire. What the desire is *for* is: avoiding vodka.) All desires necessarily present-as-good. But some emotions present-as-bad, and this might be taken to mark the difference between will and emotion.

There are at least two problems with this suggestion. First of all, there might be volitional states other than desire that essentially present-as-bad. If aversion is a

volitional state, for instance, it surely constitutes a 'negative volition': aversion to vodka certainly presents-as-bad vodka. More importantly, the present suggestion could not serve as a principled distinction between will and emotion, since for every given *positive* interest state, we still want to know whether it is a volitional state or a positive emotion. Thus an acceptable distinction between will and emotion should identify a feature F that *all* emotional states exhibit and *no* volitional state exhibits or that *no* emotional state exhibits but *all* volitional states do.

(For the same reason, we cannot use the fact that emotions, such as regret and disappointment, can be directed at the past, whereas the will is only directed at the future and present, to draw the will/emotion distinction. For this too offers no help when we want to determine whether a given future-directed interest state is volitional or emotional, given that some emotional states, such as hope, are certainly future-directed. And likewise we cannot say that the content of volitional states is necessarily an action whereas that of emotional states is not. For some emotional states do have actions in their content, as when one is glad that one is writing a book on Brentano.)

A different suggestion might be that we appeal to the presence of bodily feelings to distinguish emotional from volitional states. Brentano himself points out that 'the emotions (*Gemüthsbewegungen*) are usually taken to cover only affects (*Affecte*) connected with noticeable physical agitation/arousal (*Aufregung*)' (1874: II, 35 [199]).

At the same time, Brentano's tone suggests that he sees this manner of separating out the emotions as superficial, a piece of folklore more than a deliverance of descriptive psychology. One may reasonably speculate that, ultimately, he considers bodily arousal accidental to, rather than constitutive of, emotion. What is essential to emotional states on Brentano's view is their evaluative-attitudinal character, but arguably, bodily arousal plays no role in such attitudinally encoded evaluation, even if it accompanies it with complete regularity.

One might push back, suggesting that emotions involve essentially a kind of bodily evaluations – they are ‘felt bodily stances’ (Deonna and Teroni 2015: 293; see also Deonna and Teroni 2012: 78-9). Anger *feels bad*, in that the bodily feelings involved in being angry are unpleasant ones. The suggestion under consideration is that it is *because* anger at *x* feels bad that it presents-as-bad *x*. Moreover, the specific way in which anger at *x* presents-as-bad *x* differs from the specific way in which frustration with *x* presents-as-bad *x*, and the difference comes down to the slightly different ways in which anger and frustration *feel bad*. In any case, all emotional experiences exhibit the attitudinal property *bodily-presenting-as-good/bad*. This is in contrast to volitional states, which rather exhibit *nonbodily-presenting-as-good/bad*.

This suggestion faces a number of serious challenges, however. First, there might be some relatively refined emotions – some occurrences of mild indignation, or aesthetic delight, perhaps – that involve no noticeable bodily arousal. Secondly, as we have seen in some cases yearning for *x* feels bad but presents-as-good *x*. So positive emotional evaluation appears to sometimes goes with negative bodily feeling. Thirdly, even if positive bodily feeling and positive emotional evaluation covaried perfectly, it is unclear what grounds what here: it may well be that in some cases a bodily feeling is experienced as positive only because it embodies positive emotional evaluation. The sensation in one’s stomach when an elevator lifts up briskly and brusquely is not all that different, qua visceral feeling, from the nervous ‘butterflies in the stomach’ – but in the elevator it feels rather nice! So we may surmise that the butterflies in the stomach are experienced as unpleasant precisely *because of their association with nervousness*, which presents-as-bad the unnerving object. Fourthly, some token volitional states may well involve their own felt bodily stances. Paul Ricœur writes: ‘when I have decided to make a delicate move, I feel myself somehow charged, in the way a battery is charged’ (Ricœur 1950: 62); the description resonates for at least some token decisions, and evokes a familiar, if subtle, kind of *bodily* feeling.



A different suggestion, which Brentano seems to support more fully, is that the crucial distinction between will and emotion has something to do with *action*.

Brentano writes:

Every willing (*Wollen*) has to do with a doing (*Tun*) we believe to lie in our power, with a good which is expected to result from the willing itself. (1874: II, 103 [249]; my italics)

A volitional state 'has to do with' (*geht auf*) the achievability of the good targeted (see also Brentano 1952: 219 [137]). If the idea, however, is that emotional and volitional states differ in that the latter imply a belief the former do not, then it is probably only a symptom of a deeper, more essential distinction. For note that it is a *cognitive* difference, whereas in their intrinsic natures volitional and emotional states are *noncognitive* states. Accordingly, the relevant beliefs must be mere accompaniments of volitional or emotional states.¹⁰ Distinguishing volitional from emotional states in terms of these accompaniments would be a distinction in terms of *extrinsic* properties. Yet surely there is some *intrinsic* difference between the two – a difference grounded in their *natures* rather than in their accompaniments.

Chisholm has proposed that Brentano draw the will/emotion distinction in terms of a link to action as well, but action showing up in the content of pro attitudes, not beliefs. He writes:

In the case of an act of will, we have not only a desire for a certain thing, but the desire *that* that desire bring about that thing... An act of will has as part of its object something that the agent *does*. (Chisholm 1986: 22-3)

Chisholm probably does not have in mind here that a desire for *x*, unlike an emotion about *x*, is always accompanied by a higher-order desire that *x* be obtained by the first-order desire. For that would be to explain desire in terms of second-order desire, which would not be terribly explanatory and would launch one on a regress. So what Chisholm must have in mind is that a desire for *x*, unlike an emotion about *x*, has as part of its content its own causal efficacy in bringing about the obtaining of *x*. That is, desires, and volitional states more generally, are *token-reflexive*: they are partly about themselves. A volitional state *V* presents not just *x*, but something like

x-because-V (compare Searle 1983 Chap. 3). When you *hope* to drink beer, the content of your hope is fully specified by <drinking beer>; but when you *intend* to drink beer, the content of your intention is fully specified only by <drinking beer as a result of this very intention> (observe: 'this very' is the *locus* of token-reflexivity).

It is somewhat problematic to attribute to Brentano a content-based way of distinguishing will from emotion. But perhaps Chisholm is not trying to get Brentano exactly right, but is rather free-styling within a broadly Brentanian approach. Still, his suggestion faces substantive difficulties. Even if one grants (the very strong claim) that all volitional states are token-reflexive in the way indicated, it is unclear why one could not emote about one's causal efficacy in bringing about certain results. A new-age enthusiast might, for example, hope not only that world peace obtain, but also that it obtain partly in virtue of that very own hope. He does not hope that lasting world peace come to pass for any old reason – say, as the outcome of 'a war to end all wars' – but rather hopes specifically that it issue from the peaceful hopefulness of so many human individuals, himself among them. His is a token-reflexive hope, then. Such token-reflexive emotions are rarities, but they *can* occur. And when they do, they do not cease to be emotions and suddenly become volitions. So something else must be constitutive of a mental state's status as emotional or volitional. This 'something else' may well explain why token-reflexivity tends to characterize volitional states much more centrally than emotional states, but it is a separate, deeper feature of the relevant states.

The discussion so far lays certain expectations from Brentano's account of the will/emotion distinction. In particular, we should expect it to be (i) a noncognitive rather than belief-based distinction and (ii) an attitudinal rather than content-based distinction. At the same time, it should *explain* the evident fact that volitional states are more intimately connected to action than emotional states. (Thus, although both volitional and emotional states present-as-good their objects, only volitional states tend to entrain beliefs to the effect that these objects are achievable by one.)

One idea might be that volitional states do not present their objects just under the guise of the good, but more specifically under the guise of the *achievable* good, or the guise of the *actionable* good, or something like that. On this view, while my being happy about writing a book on Brentano involves presenting-as-good the writing of the book, my *intending* to write a book on Brentano presents-as-*actionably-good* the writing of the book. A related idea might incorporate Schafer's aforementioned account of desire in terms of presenting-as-to-be-done into an account of the distinction between will and emotion as two kinds of interest state. Perhaps a volitional state frames its object not just as a good, but as a *good to be done*. In fact, I think Brentano went for a third option – in the same general neighborhood, but importantly different.

2.2.2. Brentano's distinction

In Brentano's lecture notes for his Vienna practical philosophy course, which he wrote up originally in 1876 and refined and developed until 1894, Brentano writes:

I can love [i.e., have a positive emotion toward] things that are incompatible (*unvereinbar*) with one another, for example doing sums and writing. The one [positive emotion] does not preclude/rule out (*schließt aus*) the other. In contrast, in any particular case I can decide on (*mich entscheiden*) one of the two. These decisional acts (*Entscheidungsakte*) are not compatible with one another. (Brentano 1952: 218-9 [137])

In a 1907 piece titled 'On Loving and Hating,' Brentano writes this:

There are things which are incompatible (*unverträglich*) with others, as when for example it is impossible for the selfsame material object to be at once round and square, at rest and in motion, liquid and solid, red and blue. Whoever *wants* or *wishes* (*will oder wünscht*) that an object be one of these things cannot at the same time reasonably (*vernünftiger Weise*) want or wish that it be one of the others. But he *can* at the same time *find pleasure* in it being round and in it being square etc. (Brentano 1907a: 156 [150]; my italics)

It is in these passages, I contend, that we get a glimpse into Brentano's ultimate account of the will/emotion distinction; other passages giving voice to the same

approach include Brentano 1889: 78 [114], a letter dated 1908, and Brentano 1911: 156-7 [290]. Here is how I understand the account.

Suppose you have to choose a wine to accompany your meal. You do not like rosé, but would be happy with either white or red. Suppose, however, that the restaurant does not allow 'mixing' and that you much prefer red to white. You are *happy* with white wine, in the sense that you would be perfectly *satisfied* with it, but *decide* on red. Both your happiness (satisfaction) with the white and decision on red present-as-good their respective objects. However, while you can be both happy (or satisfied) with white and happy (satisfied) with red, even on the assumption that you cannot get both, you cannot both decide on white and decide on red in such circumstances (Likewise, you cannot both *intend* to get the white and intend to get the red.) An emotional attitude such happiness or satisfaction with *x* can be rationally directed at incompatible objects, but a volitional attitude such deciding or intending can be rationally directed at most at one among incompatible objects. The general idea, then, is that conflicting emotional states can rationally coexist, but conflicting volitional states cannot – and this is what distinguishes the two kinds of state. That is:

DISTINCTION₁ :: For any interest state *S*, *S* is an *emotional state* iff there is a pair of objects *x* and *y*, such that (i) *x* and *y* cannot coexist and (ii) it is possible to rationally bear *S* both to *x* and to *y*; *S* is a *volitional state* iff there is no such pair.

Here 'object' covers any intentional object (anything we may present), not only concrete particulars; actions, events, and states of affairs are all potential intentional objects. Also, although incompatibility is interpreted here as impossibility, in truth a subtler story is probably called for, where relations of probabilification and improbabilification play a role.¹¹

It might be objected that a person may have both a volitional *and* an emotional attitude toward *x* – say both intend to, and be happy about, donating one's old blanket to charity – but that DISTINCTION₁ does not provide for this (either

donating blanket is compatible with some other action or it is not!). But this is wrong. All DISTINCTION₁ rules out is the existence of a *single mental state* which is both volitional and emotional. A person may certainly bear two separate attitudes toward a single object *x*, one of which it is irrational to hold *also* toward an incompatible *y* and one of which it is perfectly rational to. The person who both intends to, and is happy about, donating her old blanket bears two attitudes toward the donation: the intention-attitude she cannot rationally bear also toward keeping the blanket, but the happiness-attitude she can.

Two aspects of DISTINCTION₁ are not very Brentanian in spirit, however. First, DISTINCTION₁ does not seem to draw the will/emotion distinction in *attitudinal* terms. Indeed, it reads naturally as drawing a content-based distinction. Secondly, it does not seem to cite an *intrinsic* difference between emotional and volitional states: to decide whether a mental state is emotional or volitional, we must determine whether it is rationally compatible with some other state.



Perhaps, however, there is a way to build the distinction pointed to in DISTINCTION₁ into specific attitudes intrinsic to emotional and volitional states.

In contemporary moral philosophy, there is a familiar distinction between *prima facie* and all-things-considered normativity. Against certain critics of deontological theories, W.D. Ross (1930) argued that we do have a duty not to harm others, for example, but it is a *prima facie* rather than all-things-considered duty. Thus if harming a terrorist might save a thousand innocent civilians, the *prima facie* duty not to harm others does not proscribe harming the terrorist. In that scenario, harming the terrorist would be *prima facie* wrong but *ultima facie* (all-things-considered) right. Conversely, helping an old lady cross the street is *prima facie* good, but if it slows traffic to the point that an ambulance arrives to hospital too late to save someone, then it is *ultima facie* bad.¹²

Now, one way to unpack the *prima facie*/*ultima facie* distinction is in terms of compatibility. Thus, to say that helping the old lady cross the street is *prima facie* good is to say that it is good in a sense of ‘good’ that makes it conceptually possible for some incompatible state of affairs to be good as well – for example the state of affairs of the ambulance arriving to the hospital on time. To say that helping the old lady cross the street is not *ultima facie* good is to say that is not good in any sense of ‘good’ that rules out the goodness of other, incompatible states of affairs. Thus there is a straightforward conceptual connection between the kinds of compatibility relations exploited in *DISTINCTION*₁ and the distinction between *prima facie* and *ultima facie* normativity.

I suggest we use this conceptual connection to formulate succinctly Brentano’s distinction between will and emotion in attitudinal terms. The idea is that positive emotions cast their objects in a *prima-facie*-positive light, since positive emotions evaluate their object positively in a way that allows a positive evaluation of incompatible objects; but acts of the will cast their objects in an *all-things-considered*-positive light, since their positive evaluations of their objects rule out a similar evaluation of incompatible objects.

Let us go back to the accompanying-wine dilemma. We may now say that in being happy with white wine, you experience white wine as *prima facie* good, but in deciding on red wine, you treat red wine as *ultima facie* good. (Note well: you may still change your mind and decide on white wine, for whatever reason. But the decision and intention to get red wine cannot survive this kind of change of mind – they must go out of existence when incompatible decisions and intentions come into existence. In this they differ from positive emotions toward either wine.) Thus although both volitional and positive-emotional states are goodness-committal, the goodness in question is *ultima facie* in the case of deciding on red wine but *prima facie* in the case of being happy with red wine.

Recall, now, that all these states are still presentations-as-good of the wine, not presentations of the-wine-as-good. Accordingly, we might say that while your

happiness (an emotional state) presents-as-good_{PF} (for 'prima facie good') white wine, your decision (a volitional state) presents-as-good_{UF} (for 'ultima facie good') red wine.¹³ All positive interest states generically present-as-good their intentional objects, but some specifically present-as-good_{PF} their objects while others present-as-good_{UF} theirs. The former are positive emotions, the latter states of the will. In other words:

DISTINCTION₂ :: For any interest state S toward object x, S is a emotional state iff S presents-as-good_{PF} x (or presents-as-bad_{PF} x); S is a volitional state iff S presents-as-good_{UF} x.

In DISTINCTION₂, we have an *attitudinal* way of distinguishing will from emotion, one that draws the distinction in terms of the essential nature of will and emotion as evaluative states. Relatedly, it draws the distinction in terms of intrinsic properties of these states, rather than in terms of extrinsic properties that ultimately refer to merely accompanying states. At the same time, it explains the intimate connection of volitional states to action: once an intentional object has been not just presented-as-good, but presented-as-*ultima-facie*-good, hence as better than all alternatives, it remains only to *pursue* it.¹⁴ In all these ways, DISTINCTION₂ has the 'look' of a bona fide Brentanian thesis.

2.2.3. A difficulty

Our Brentanian account of the distinction faces an important difficulty, however. In addition to cases of conflicting emotions, we are all familiar with cases of conflicting *desires*. Indeed, there are cases where (i) two of our desires conflict, (ii) we are aware that they conflict, but (iii) it is rational to hold on to both. After all, this is how *moral dilemmas* arise. Consider Sartre's renowned student, who faces the choice between leaving Paris to fight the Nazis and staying in Paris to look after his ailing mother (Sartre 1946). Both the desire to fight the Nazis and the desire to tend to his mother are commendable, but they are incompatible. The decision which one to

pursue is not an easy one, and at least for a while, the student can *reasonably* desire both. If so, both desires merely present-as-good_{PF} their respective objects. By DISTINCTION₂, they would qualify as emotional rather than volitional states. This looks like an unwelcome consequence of DISTINCTION₂.

At the same time, there seems to be an important insight in Brentano's appeal to the prima facie/all-things-considered distinction in drawing the emotion/will distinction. Certainly it is true that our pro attitudes divide into two importantly different groups, depending on whether they cast their objects as prima facie or all-things-considered good. When it comes time to try and implement his pro attitudes in the world, Sartre's student *must* choose between the two options, thus entering a fundamentally new kind of mental state that surpasses his conflicting desires and paves the way to action. Entering that mental state is the beginning of mobilizing the will.

How are we to resolve these tensions? I think Brentano's best bet here is boldly deny that desire is a volitional state and argue that, upon reflection, it is better classified as an emotional state. The question is how to make this sound non-ad-hoc.

For starters, note that although in analytic philosophy of mind desire has often been taken as the paradigmatic state with world-to-mind direction of fit, other philosophical traditions, notably the phenomenological tradition, have opted for other paradigms. According to Paul Ricœur, for example, the paradigmatic volitional state is *decision*, not desire (Ricœur 1950). The reason is that desire involves only a *hypothetical* pull to action, whereas decision's commitment to action is *categorical* (Ricœur 1950: 70). It is essential to my desire for red wine that *if* no other considerations outweigh it, it would lead to my trying to get red wine. Thus in desire the connection to action is conditional or hypothetical: the desire presents the action as to be performed *pending countervailing considerations*. In contrast, a decision's connection to action is categorical: in making the decision to get red wine, I commit to trying to get it, *period*. The commitment is unconditional.¹⁵ The kinship

between Ricœur's picture and Brentano's is evident (compare hypothetical/categorical to *prima facie/ultima facie*). But my point here is just that the tendency to treat desire as a paradigmatically volitional state may be specific to the philosophical tradition of analytic philosophy of mind. It does not reflect some deeper consensus.

More importantly, observe that, all said and done, desire is a *passion* rather than an action – something we find ourselves with rather than something that issues from the exercise of our will. In contrast, when we take a decision, say, we precisely *exercise* our will; to that extent, it is a phenomenon of the will *par excellence*. There is thus a bright line between the two phenomena. As Wallace puts it:

... intentions, decisions, and choices are things we do, primitive examples of the phenomenon of agency itself. It is one thing to find that one wants some chocolate cake very much, ... quite another to resolve [or decide] to eat a piece. The difference, I would suggest, marks a line of fundamental importance, the line between the passive and the active in our psychological lives. (Wallace 1999: 637)

It is therefore reasonable to hold that most important line of division within the realm of mental states that present their objects under the guise of the good places on one side passive states with hypothetical pull to action that present-as-good_{PF} and on the other side active or agentive states with a categorical pull to action that present-as-good_{UF}.¹⁶ We may consider this line a division of interest states into emotional and volitional, or find some other names for the two subclasses. But however we call things, it would seem desire falls on the side of this line in which emotional states belong rather than on the side in which such paradigmatic volitional states as decision and intention do.¹⁷

Is there any reason to think that Brentano himself would look favorably on such a reclassification of desire? I think so. Recall Brentano's claim that volitional states imply the belief that their intentional objects 'lie in our power' (1874: II, 103 [249]). In several places, Brentano is explicit that *wanting* need not imply any such a belief. For example:

It is nowise built into wish or want (*Will*) that I believe it to be something which is in my power to realize/accomplish (*realisieren*). I can *wish*, but cannot *choose*, that the weather be good tomorrow. (Brentano 1907a: 157 [151])

In analytic philosophy of mind, 'want' and 'desire' are typically taken to denote the same mental state. But in any case, Brentano makes a similar claim directly in terms of desire (*Begehrung*):

Kant indeed defined the faculty of desire simply as 'the capacity to bring into existence the objects of one's presentations through those presentations.'... This is why we find in Kant that curious claim that any wish, even if it were recognized to be impossible, such as the wish to have wings for example, is an attempt to obtain what is wished for and contains a presentation of our desire's causal efficacy. (1874: II, 117 [259])

Such passages appear to commit Brentano to the first two premises of the following straightforward argument: 1) for any subject S and object x, if S has a volitional state directed at x, then S believes that S can obtain x; 2) for some subject S and object x, S wants/desires x and S believes that S cannot obtain x; therefore, 3) wanting/desiring is not a volitional state. Brentano tends to make the point with emphasis on wishing, which is more antecedently amenable to reclassification as an emotion than wanting or desiring; but clearly, he plans to extend the same treatment to the latter two as well.¹⁸

In conclusion, the Brentanian account of will and emotion falls within the 'scholastic conception' of treating these as mental states whose essence is to present their intentional objects under the guise of the good. However, Brentano's account stands out in building this into the attitudinal character of emotional and volitional states: their essence is to present-as-good their intentional objects. And his elegant approach to the *difference* between emotion and will is to identify two distinct species of the relevant attitudinal character: emotional states present-as-*prima-facie-good*, whereas volitional states present-as-*ultima-facie-good*. In addition to its considerable elegance, this picture's various components are, I have argued, quite plausible. The picture does imply that desire is an emotional rather than volitional

state, contrary to the way it is typically treated in mainstream analytic philosophy of mind. Upon reflection, however, I suspect this consequence is eminently defensible.

3. Pleasure and Pain

This final section extends Brentano's evaluative-attitudinal account to the algedonic feelings of pleasure and pain. I first present Brentano's account (§3.1), then discuss the relationship between algedonic feelings and will and emotion (§3.2).

3.1. Brentano's Evaluative-Attitudinal Theory

As we saw in Chap. 2, Brentano holds that pleasure and pain are *intentional* states, ones that present something. When we are in pain, we are pained *by something* (and not *only* in the causal sense of 'by'); when we have a pleasure, we are pleased *with something*. This is controversial, of course, but Brentano asserts it unambiguously:

[Pleasure] always has an object, is necessarily a pleasure in something, what we perceive or apprehend (*vorstellen*). For example, sensory pleasure has a certain localized sensible quality (*Sinnesqualität*) for object. (Brentano 1952: 179 [113])

Specifically, pain and pleasure present certain *sui generis* secondary qualities.¹⁹

For most of the twentieth century, the notion that pleasure and pain may be intentional states was taken as a nonstarter. Instead, it was assumed that such algedonic feelings are characterized by monadic phenomenal properties admitting of no further analysis – 'sensations.' In current philosophy of mind, however, intentionalism about pleasure and pain is very much a live view. According to intentionalism, not only do algedonic feelings *have* intentional properties, their specific intentional properties are what makes them (i) the algedonic feelings they are and (ii) algedonic feelings at all.

The big question, within this framework, is how to characterize the distinctive intentional properties of algedonic feelings. An early intentionalist

account of pain identified its distinctive intentional properties with the tracking of tissue damage:

Now *what* I experience or feel, in having a pain in a leg, is that there is some disorder in the leg, some damage that is painful or hurts. So, a pain in a leg, I suggest, is a token sensory experience which represents that something in the leg is damaged... (Tye 1990: 228; italics original)

This account faces a number of difficulties. For starters, it is unclear how the account might be extended to pleasure. What does bodily pleasure track? Certainly not tissue *flourishing*, but what then?! (Massin 2013). More deeply, while the tracking of tissue damage in the leg might explain the fact that the pain is felt in the knee, it does not explain why the pain is so *unpleasant* (Aydede 2005). The point can be made by considering such unusual experiences as so-called morphine pain and pain asymbolia (see Grahek 2007), where subjects report that they are detecting a pain sensation but are entirely unbothered by it. Paradigmatic pain is of course very different from this, and involves a manifest *badness* of the pain. This additional aspect of pain experience remains unexplained by the original intentionalist account. In a slogan: it accounts for the sensory dimension of sensory pain, but not for the painfulness dimension of sensory pain.

The natural fix here is to suggest that pain also has an *evaluative* content: a knee-pain experience presents not only a specific event in the knee, but also presents the badness of that event. David Bain summarizes the view as follows:

A subject's being in unpleasant pain consists in his (i) undergoing an experience (the pain) that represents a disturbance of a certain sort, and (ii) that same experience additionally representing the disturbance as *bad* for him in the bodily sense. (Bain 2013: 82; italics original)

This account has the advantage of extending straightforwardly to pleasure: an orgasm does present something *good* down there! It even extends naturally to Brentano's 'mental' pleasures: the sublime pleasure of hearing BWV 565 presents, among other things, the piece's goodness.

Brentano certainly adopted an evaluative conception of algedonic feelings, since he took them to belong in the same category of mental state as will and emotion (this is what Chap. 8 of Book II of *Psychology* is mostly about). But given that for him the evaluative dimension of will and emotion are attitudinally encoded, we may see him as offering an evaluative-attitudinal account of algedonic feelings as well.²⁰ This distinguishes Brentano's view from Bain's and other contemporary evaluativists'. Labeling pleasure the positive algedonic feeling and pain the negative one, we may put Brentano's view as follows:

EVALUATIVE-F :: Any positive (or negative) algedonic feeling F about an object O essentially commits to the goodness (or badness) of O.

ATTITUDINAL-F :: An algedonic feeling F's commitment to the goodness (or badness) of an object O is an attitudinal property of F.

A toothache presents-as-bad the relevant buccal event, an orgasm presents-as-good the salient genital event.²¹

Arguing for this view is the mandate of §4 of Chap. 8 of *Psychology* II, which opens as follows:

Let us now turn to the other phenomena at issue, namely pleasure (*Lust*) and displeasure (*Unlust*), which are the ones most commonly separated, as feelings, from the will. Is it true that here, too, inner experience reveals (*erkennen läßt*) with clarity this distinctive manner of reference to a content – this 'agreeableness (*Genehmsein*) as good' or 'disagreeableness as bad' – as the fundamental character of the phenomena? ... As far as I am concerned, this seems no less obvious in this case than in the case of desire. (Brentano 1874: II, 92-3 [242])

Brentano offers in that section three considerations in support of the evaluative-attitudinal view of algedonic feelings. The first, manifest in the passage just quoted, is that inner perception *reveals* the shared essence of algedonic feelings and states of the will (1874: II, 84 [235], 93 [242]). The second is that respectable authorities (Aristotle and Kant, but also Aquinas, Moses Mendelssohn, William Hamilton, Hermann Lotze, and Herbert Spencer) have maintained the view (93-8 [242-5]). The final consideration pertains to ordinary language and the way it mixes talk of

pleasure, will, and love in a way that suggests they somehow belong together (98-100 [245-7]).

None of these is particularly probing. Nonetheless, the view itself has much to recommend it. On the one hand, it is clear that pleasure in a hazelnut ice cream casts the ice cream in a favorable light, and to that extent commits to its goodness. Theories of algedonic feelings that make no allowance for this evaluative dimension, such as the aforementioned early intentionalist theories, seem to leave out a central dimension of algedonic feelings. At the same time, the ice cream's value does not seem to be part of what the pleasure is directed *at*. They do not show up in the pleasure's content. To see this, ask yourself, which aspects of the ice cream are you aware of in this distinctively pleasurable way? The answer is probably: the sweet, hazelnutty *flavor* of the ice cream, its smooth texture, and perhaps also its cold, refreshing quality. *That* is what your pleasure responds to. Goodness does not appear in this list, because the pleasure-awareness is not awareness of goodness, even if you take pleasure in the ice cream *because* of its goodness. Accordingly, evaluative theories of algedonic feelings that place the evaluation within the feelings' content appear false to our experience of pain and pleasure. On the face of it, then, the commitment to the ice cream's goodness is attitudinally encoded: the pleasure must present-as-good the hazelnut ice cream rather than present the ice cream as good.²²

An immediate challenge the account faces is to provide a story about the distinctive way pleasure and pain present-as-good/bad compared to emotion and will. Clearly, there is a felt difference between being pleased with an ice cream, hoping for ice cream, wanting ice cream, and deciding on ice cream. Yet all four present-as-good ice cream. So to capture the nature of pleasure, as distinct from all those other interest states, something more must be said.

3.2. Distinguishing Algedonic Feelings from Emotion and Will

As far as the distinction between presenting-as-good_{PF} and presenting-as-good_{UF} is concerned, it is clear that pleasure aligns with emotion rather than will. You can take pleasure in the particular purplish hue of a fragment of an El Greco painting, even as you think that its brightness ruins the painting's composition and renders the painting weaker than it would have been, say, if El Greco had opted for a dull pink there. As far as your pleasure is concerned, so to speak, that bright purple is good, but there are incompatible options which would have been better. In other words, it presents-as-good_{PF} the fragment's purple hue. This distinguishes pleasure from decision and other volitional states. There is still the question, however, of what distinguishes pleasure from positive emotion (and pain from negative emotion).

I am not familiar with a discussion of this question anywhere in the Brentano corpus. The planned Book V of the *Psychology* was supposed to be about the entire category of interest (Rollinger 2012). Presumably, it would be part of that book's agenda to separate different types of interest, including algedonic and emotional. Unfortunately, that book was never written. So we are left to speculate in a Brentanian vein on the algedonic/emotional distinction.

One view might be that there is no real difference here. The idea might be that since they are characterized by the same attitudinal feature, emotional and algedonic states share an underlying nature that makes them belong to a single 'natural kind.' Another version would suggest we treat pleasure as one (positive) emotion among others, on a par – or on a continuum – with joy, satisfaction, contentment, and happiness. We have already noted that different emotions aim at different species of goodness or badness. For example, admiration presents-as-admirable whereas satisfaction presents-as-satisfying, where being admirable and being satisfying are two different ways of being good. One might hold that being pleasant is also a way of being good, and that pleasure is simply that mental states that presents-as-pleasant its object. As such, it can be seen as one among the positive emotions, or just a member of the same natural kind that the positive emotions are members of.

Although the view just presented is quite elegant, there is something uncomfortable about throwing such a simple and one-dimensional mental state as pleasure in the same basket with emotions, which can be so complex, textured, and multidimensional. Feeling satisfaction about finishing a paper one likes may involve pleasure in the fact, but it involves so much more: an appreciation of the paper's *worth*, of personal responsibility for the existence of that worth, and so on. Likewise, grief involves pain, but goes far beyond it, involving also appreciation of loss, of irreparability, and more. Even if at some level of abstraction pain and grief belong in a single category of mental states, surely there is a finer-grained taxonomy that also sets them apart; ditto for pleasure and satisfaction. Our question is how to articulate that which separates algedonic from emotional feelings in a principled way (that coheres well with Brentano's approach to mental taxonomy).

One thought might be that pleasure/pain is simply a *part* or *component* of emotion, one that can also occur by itself. Consider the fact that emotions divide into positive-affect ones and negative-affect ones. The former are pleasant, the latter unpleasant. One might suggest that positive-affect emotions involve pleasure as component, while negative-affect ones involve pain as component. At the same time, this constant aspect of emotion – its affective valence – is one that can detach from emotions and occur on its own. When it does, we experience simple pleasure or pain. On this line of thought, the difference between pleasure and (positive) emotion is the difference between a simple feeling *F* and a complex feeling *F** of which *F* is a proper part.

However, even if all this is true, it does not help us draw the distinction between pleasure and emotion. For being part of an emotion is neither sufficient nor necessary for being a pleasure. On the one hand, the fact that a mental state is a component of a positive emotion does not entail that it is a pleasure: plausibly, being happy that the weather is nice involves as part believing that the weather is nice, but a belief is not an algedonic feeling. (Indeed, some emotions also involve *other emotions* as parts: plausibly, anger is a component of indignation.) Conversely, as we saw pleasure can also occur outside any emotional constellation.

A different approach is to draw the pleasure/emotion distinction within the category of interest in a way that would parallel the perception/belief distinction within the category of judgment. As we saw in Chap. 3, for Brentano the perception/belief distinction is not one of attitude but of content: the intentional objects of perception are sensibles whereas those of belief are intelligibles (Brentano 1928: 58 [44-5]). If the pleasure/emotion distinction were parallel, it would be a content distinction: presumably, pleasure would be directed at sensibles, positive emotion at intelligibles.

However, the view is not really plausible: many emotional experiences are directed at sensible rather than intelligible objects, as when one is happy about one's new coffee-table; conversely, the 'mental pleasure' we take in *The Brothers Karamazov* would appear to have an intelligible rather than sensible object.

In Chap. 3, I rejected on parallel grounds Brentano's content-based distinction between perception and belief. And I also proposed on Brentano's behalf what I take to be a much better, *attitudinal* account of the perception/belief distinction. This was that while belief in *x* presents-as-existent *x*, perceptual experience of *x* presents-as-existent-here-and-now *x*. Belief-in aims at existents, perception aims at *present* existents (in both the spatial and the temporal sense of 'present!'). In similar fashion, we might hold that positive emotion aims at goods while pleasure aims at *present* goods. The difference between being glad about the new carpet and taking pleasure in the new carpet, on this view, is that the pleasure can be appropriately taken only in the *presence* of the carpet, whereas the gladness can be appropriately experienced anywhere, anytime. You can sit in your office and pleurably contemplate your new carpet, but the result would be gladness about the carpet, not pleasure in it. It may involve pleasure in *the idea* of the carpet, or in the idea of having the carpet, but not pleasure in the carpet itself. One has to be in the presence of an object, be in some sensory contact with it, to experience pleasure in that object. To that extent, pleasure is like perception in presenting its objects 'in the flesh.' If so, we might try distinguish emotional from algedonic states as follows:

DISTINCTION₃ :: For any mental state S intentionally directed at *x*, (a) S is a positive emotion about *x* iff S presents-as-good_{PF} *x*; (b) S is a pleasure in *x* iff S presents-as-good_{PF}-here-and-now; (c) S is a negative emotion about *x* iff S presents-as-good_{PF} *x*; (d) S is a pleasure in *x* presents-as-good_{PF}-here-and-now *x*.

To be clear, I am not attributing DISTINCTION₃ to Brentano. Indeed, I suspect that Brentano would plump rather for the content-based distinction between sensible and intelligible intentional objects, or perhaps for the ‘single natural kind’ approach. All the same, I recommend that a Brentanian philosophy of mind adopt DISTINCTION₃ as the best option for its account of the realm of mental states that present under the guise of the good.²³ (Note well: the account does not rule out the possibility of experiencing emotions about the here-and-now; it is just that the here-and-now must show up in the *content* of such emotions, whereas it is built into the *attitude* of algedonic feelings.²⁴)

If this approach could be made to work, we would obtain a principled distinction between the algedonic and the emotional that parallels the principled distinction between the perceptual and the doxastic – and does so with a distinctly Brentanian flair, whether or not Brentano would assent to it. The approach portrays the realm of interest states as comprised of all and only states which present-as-good, and structures that realm by the different manners different interest states do so: volitional states present-as-ultima-facie-good, emotional states present-as-prima-facie-good, and algedonic states present-as-prima-facie-good-here-and-now!



For Brentano, whatever the *differences* between pleasure, pain, emotion, and will, their *commonality* goes much deeper, making them belong to a single ‘fundamental class.’ What makes the class fundamental is that the *intra*-class differences pale in comparison to the *inter*-class differences. There are differences between presenting-as-good_{PF} and presenting-as-good_{UF}, and there are even deeper differences between presenting-as-good and presenting-as-bad. Yet the fact that all interest states frame

their objects in terms of value sets them apart from mental states that either frame their objects in terms of existence or merely present them in a neutral fashion (Brentano 1874: II, 105 [250]).

In modern philosophy of mind, this deep commonality between will, emotion, and pleasure/pain has been by and large neglected. To my knowledge, the only exception is Bennett Helm, who argues for a unified account of these three types of phenomenon precisely as *felt evaluations* (Helm 2002). Helm's account is to that extent thoroughly (though unwittingly) Brentanian. At the same time, it is unclear that Helm's account insists on the *attitudinal* construal of felt evaluation.

Conclusion

In the philosophy of mind of the past quarter-century, the literatures on emotion and on pain have rarely intersected. In contrast, it is clear that Brentano's evident need for a systemic bird's-eye view, expressed in a series of symmetries and parallels, pushes him to recognize the fundamental commonality among the phenomena he calls 'interest' – and their categorical difference from the two other mental categories. The most fundamental parallelism in the whole of our mental edifice is probably this:

If something can become the content of a judgment in that it can be accepted as true or rejected as false, it can also become the object of a [state of interest] in that it can be agreeable (*genehm*) (in the broadest sense of the word) as something good, or disagreeable (*ungenehm*) as something bad. (Brentano 1874: II, 88-9 [239])

Just as believing in ducks commits to the existence of ducks, loving chocolate commits to the goodness of chocolate, and just as disbelieving in ghosts commits to the nonexistence of ghosts, hating vegemite commits to the badness of vegemite. All four kinds of mental state, we saw in Chap. 3, rest on a fifth: sheer presenting.

Seeking this kind of symmetry appears to be a methodological heuristic in Brentano's theorizing about the mind. When one's account of interest phenomena

turns out to exhibit the same internal structure as one's account of judgment, this should give one a sense that one is onto something. Lack of symmetry, meanwhile, should raise *prima facie* suspicion. Obviously, this kind of heuristic has by and large disappeared from modern philosophy of mind. One might speculate that this disappearance goes hand in hand with the fragmentation and specialization in modern philosophy discussed in the Introduction. In Brentano's time, however, the degree of specialization and fragmentation characteristic of today's philosophical world was absent. It was still possible for philosophers to have their 'finger in every pie' and do so with a respectable level of scholarship. Relatedly, considerations of system-wide symmetry played a much more central role.

It is an independent question whether such systematic thinking is an intellectual virtue or vice. Certainly it is not clear in what way symmetry and cohesion might be *truth-conducive*. That is, given two theories T and T*, such that T exhibits more symmetries (and generally greater cohesion) than T*, should we, other things being equal, expect T to be more likely to be true? To my knowledge, there exists no *argument* for a positive answer. And in the history of philosophy, certainly in the history of German idealism, systematic thinking has tended to come with a familiar intellectual vice, namely, that of reinterpreting the phenomena in light of one's big-picture theory, or 'denying the datum' in order to protect the stability of one's system. The danger here is a kind of increasing insulation from reality as one's system evolves. The rise of analytic philosophy in *fin-de-siècle* Cambridge was inspired in large part by British idealists' intemperance in this domain (see Moore 1899), and Hegel is certainly no improvement. A bottom-up approach that was deemed more intellectually honest and more respectful of the phenomena entrenched itself in analytic philosophy in the aftermath.

Importantly, however, Brentano himself does not tend to impose preconceived theory on the phenomena. When the phenomena themselves create asymmetries, he is quick to point this out. A case in point is the asymmetry between judgment and interest we pointed out in Chap. 3: Brentano highlights the fact that goodness comes in degrees (some things are better than others), whereas truth and

existence do not (no existing things is 'more existent' than any other). This forces him to posit a primitive comparative interest state, *preference*, matched by no parallel state in the domain of judgment (more on this in Chap. 8). In this and other instances, Brentano gives expression to his deep empiricist sensibilities (see especially Brentano 1925), with the pride of place they assign to the phenomena.²⁵ Brentano's philosophy is a living example, then, of peaceable cohabitation between, on the one hand, systematic, top-down thinking and, on the other hand, empirically responsible, bottom-up thinking in a single philosophical project.²⁶

¹ This point applies also to more textured functionalist accounts of desire, which designate a more substantive set of causes and effects distinctive of desire. Consider Alan Goldman's account, which identifies five or six specific effects of a paradigmatic desire (and considers anything a desire which shares sufficiently many of these effects): 'A paradigm desire for x ... disposes one to bring about x , produces pleasant thoughts of x , involves a positive evaluative judgment of x , a yearning sensation in its absence, a direction of attention to things related to x , and possibly produces other instrumental desires for means to satisfy it' (Goldman 2017: 335). This kind of account, too, would be unacceptable to Brentano, as long as some of the effects are ones desire is said to be only *disposed* to bring about.

² Recall that descriptive psychology is for Brentano the project of describing the nature of the phenomena of consciousness, while genetic psychology is the project of offering causal explanations of their occurrence and development (genesis). Brentano seems to hold that the nature of states of the will, which makes them such, is manifest to inner perception (see Brentano 1874: II, 83 [235]).

³ For more on the notion of direction of fit, see Chap. 3.

⁴ That is, I do not mean to suggest that every desire commits *the desirer* to that goodness. It *may*, in case the desirer endorses her desire – but often we do not endorse our desires. So the point is that as far as the desire itself is concerned, the object is good. The point of using commitment talk here, as elsewhere, is to stay neutral for a time on the question of whether it is the state's content or attitude that ensures the casting of the object as good.

⁵ The only connotation of the term 'pro attitude' we must explicitly cancel here is that this is a *dispositional* state. As we saw in Chap. 1, Brentano rejects the existence of dispositional mental states. Accordingly, he takes desire and other interest states to be occurrent conscious states. They are occurrent pro attitudes, then.

⁶ I assume for the sake of exposition that there is such a thing as evaluative perception – since this is how Stampe understands desire. As we will see in Chap. 8, however, Brentano rejects this notion (Brentano 1952: 119-20 [74]).

⁷ This attitudinal twist is dialectically significant, because most arguments against evaluative accounts of emotion target the claim that values are presented by emotions (see, e.g., Dokic and Lemaire 2013). But Brentano's evaluative account does not claim that values are presented by emotions, so it is not vulnerable to arguments of this sort. Opponents of evaluative theories must therefore proffer some new argument against the attitudinal version of the evaluative account.

⁸ One option we will consider, in fact, is that desire *just is* a kind of emotion on Brentano's view. If so, EVALUATIVE-E and ATTITUDINAL-E in fact *entail* EVALUATIVE-D and ATTITUDINAL-D.

⁹ One might suggest, for example, that mixed-valence or 'bittersweet' emotions (see Massin 2011), such as nostalgia, always composites involving a plurality of emotional elements and corresponding objects, some of which are presented-as-good and some are presented-as-bad. Perhaps nostalgia for one's senior year of college combines presenting-as-good one's lifestyle during that time and presenting-as-bad the irrecoverable loss of that lifestyle, or of youth itself. Thanks to Kate Pendoley for discussion on this point.

¹⁰ If volitional states were composite states with a cognitive component, this cognitive component could be a constitutive part of their nature. But Brentano seems to think that interest states do not have a cognitive component *essentially*.

¹¹ If we introduce gradient incompatibility, whereby *x*'s existence *probabilifies* *y*'s nonexistence, we could also define a continuum of states between pure emotions and pure desires. But this is not strictly forced on us: some bright line might be drawn somewhere along the envisaged continuum. In that case, the will/emotion distinction remains dichotomous.

¹² By this I mean that the resulting state of affairs is *ultima facie* bad. This can be so even if the act leading to that state of affairs is not considered wrong, say because the person helping the lady was unaware of the ambulance.

¹³ Note well: since you are also *happy* with red wine, you also harbor a mental state that presents-as-good_{PF} the red wine. It is perfectly rational for you to be both happy with white and happy with red. But a volitional state such as decision or intention you can bear only toward one of the two wines.

¹⁴ This may not quite amount to the kind of 'internal connection' demanded by so-called motivational internalism (see, originally, Falk 1954, and more recently, Smith 1994 Chap. 3). But such an internal connection goes far beyond what Brentano needs here. All he needs is an intimate connection to action exhibited by volitional but not emotional states.

¹⁵ This does *not* mean that decisions cannot involve conditional commitment to action. It is just that when they do, the conditionality must be part of their *content*. I can certainly decide that I want the red wine unless it costs triple as much as the white wine. Here I enter a mental state with an unconditional attitudinal commitment to a conditional content. (This is to be distinguished from a case where I simply decide to get the red wine but am *later* told that it will cost triple as much as the white, whereupon I make a *new* decision. The latter is not a case of a conditional decision, but rather of a *change my mind* from one unconditional decision to another.)

¹⁶ There seems to be a close connection between the hypothetical/categorical pull distinction and the *prima facie*/*ultima facie* good distinction: if *G* is a *prima facie* good, then one ought to pursue *G* *unless* there are incompatible goods superior to it; but if *G* is an *ultima facie* good, one ought to pursue *G*, *period*.

¹⁷ A more nuanced version of this move would distinguish two notions of desire and place one in the emotional domain and the other in the volitional domain. Thus, in his book *Desire*, G.F. Schueler distinguishes between two notions of desire: In one sense of 'desire,' ... from the fact that an agent

intentionally performed some action, it follows that he or she wanted to do whatever it was that action was supposed to achieve. But in the other perfectly good sense of 'desire,' there is nothing at all problematic or mysterious about people doing things they have no desire to do, things they don't *want to do at all*. (Schueler 1995: 29; italics original) The first (arguably, more theoretical) notion of desire belongs in the will, but does not allow for conflicts of desire (since the agent cannot perform simultaneously conflicting actions). The second (more commonsensical) notion of desire, however, needs to be reclassified with the emotions.

¹⁸ It might be objected that even if the status of first-order desires as volitional is negotiable, that of second-order desires is much less so. Indeed, one view is that a person's will can be *identified* with what she desires to desire. (An approximation of this kind of view is developed in Frankfurt 1971.) However, arguably this sort of view is framed naturally in terms of second-order *desires* partly because of the prominence of desire talk in current discussions of the will. But if the above considerations are cogent, perhaps this kind of approach would be better framed in terms not of desired desires but desired *decisions* (or indeed decisions toward which one has any pro attitude).

¹⁹ This applies not only to sensory pleasure, but also to 'mental' (*geistigen*) pleasure, such as the 'refined delight (*edle Freude*) we experience when listening to a Beethoven symphony or gazing at one of Raphael's madonnas' (1952: 186 [118]).

²⁰ It is perhaps worth noting that Crane (2009) supports an attitudinal account of pleasure and pain as well. But crucially, Crane does not offer an evaluative characterization of the relevant attitude. In fact, in Crane pleasure is claimed to present in a distinctive mode, but what that mode is remains unsaid. Brentano's account is in this respect considerably more developed: it tells us that pleasure's characteristic mode is that of presenting-as-good, pain's that of presenting-as-bad.

²¹ Likewise, an experience of 'refined delight' at one of Shakespeare's better soliloquies or one of Messi's better slaloms presents-as-good the soliloquy or slalom, while the deep pain of missing one's deceased grandfather presents-as-bad his absence.

²² Another theory of pain that has been gaining momentum in current philosophy of mind and has commonality with Brentano's is imperativism (Klein 2007, Martínez 2011). According to this, pain is characterized by an *imperative* content, something like 'Avoid tokens of this type of event!' What is special about imperatives is their *force*, which aligns on the side of attitude rather than content. In this respect, the view is similar to Brentano's. The main difference is that an imperative force is in essence an action-guiding feature rather than an evaluative feature. At the same time, the action-guiding and evaluation tend to go hand in hand. In a way, then, the difference between the two views is in what each takes to be more fundamental, and thus essential, to pains. Imperativism takes the action-guiding character of pain to be essential to it, and sees evaluation as something that comes along with action-guiding; Brentano takes pain's evaluative character to be essential and sees action-guiding-ness as something that falls out of this evaluative character.

²³ It might be objected that DISTINCTION₃ cannot account for *mental* or *spiritual* pleasure, such as the pleasure taken in a powerful poem. But perhaps *that* type of pleasure could be safely classified as an emotion: it is at bottom just an experience of being happy about something. Relatedly, one might argue that even if DISTINCTION₃ is extensionally adequate for pleasures canonically picked by 'S takes pleasure *in*,' it seems obviously extensionally inadequate for pleasures canonically picked out by 'is pleased *that*' (as in 'Jimmy is pleased that Juventus lost'). But since Brentano rejects the existence of propositional mental states, he has to assay pleasure-that in terms of pleasure-in anyway (just as he assays belief-that in terms of belief-in).

²⁴ The same applies to belief, of course. I may believe not just in a table, but in a (spatially and temporally) present table. And likewise, I can be happy about my son smiling, but I can also be happy about my son smiling here and now (happy about his present-and-current smile). In contrast, I am

suggesting, it is in the nature of perception and pleasure to commit to the spatial and temporal proximity of their objects. That proximity is not part of *what* one perceives, and nor is it part of what one is pleased by.

²⁵ Indeed, one might speculate about Brentano's historical role in putting the phenomena first in twentieth-century philosophy. A similar concern for starting from the phenomena themselves can be found in Husserl's phenomenological method and its German and French practitioners, and as noted already Husserl was Brentano's student in Vienna from 1884-6. At the same time, Brentano exercised immense influence on George Stout (witness Stout 1896), who was both Moore's and Russell's mentor at Cambridge. One may therefore surmise that Brentano's project of descriptive psychology – with its emphasis on starting from the phenomena – was an inspiration to both phenomenology and analytic philosophy.

²⁶ For comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Mathilde Berger-Perrin, Paul Boswell, Géraldine Carranante, Julien Deonna, Lionel Djadaojee, Guillaume Fréchette, Anna Giustina, Vincent Grandjean, Tricia Magalotti, Karl Schafer, Josh Shepherd, and Fabrice Teroni. I have also benefited from presenting drafts of this chapter at the University of Geneva, as well as to two different audiences at École Normale Supérieure. I am grateful to the audiences there, in particular Romain Bourdoncle, Maria Gyemant, Raluca Mocan, Lylian Paquet, and Justin Winzenrieth.