

## Chapter 3.

# The Modes of Conscious Intentionality

In Chap. 1, we saw Brentano's theory of consciousness, and in Chap. 2, his theory of intentionality, the *mark* of the conscious. This chapter lays the foundations for the rest of the book by discussing the three fundamental *modes* of conscious intentionality in Brentano's theory of mind. This three-way distinction is crucial, as we will later see, to Brentano's metaphysics and value theory.

### 1. Brentano's Attitudinal Classification of Conscious States

Although the topic of psychological taxonomy has not seen much play in contemporary philosophy of mind, in the history of philosophy it has often been regarded as one of the central tasks of a philosophical theory of mind. In *The Republic*, Plato divided the soul into three 'departments': reason, spirit, and appetite. Aristotle had his modifications to make, Aquinas his own, and so on. Brentano takes up the topic in Chap. 5-8 of Book II of the *Psychology*, and considered it one of the most important aspects of that work.<sup>1</sup> So much so, in fact, that in 1911 he published a revised edition of just those four chapters (plus appendices) as a stand-alone book titled *On the Classification of Mental Phenomena* (Brentano 1911). Moreover, he returned to the topic in various manuscripts and lecture notes, some of which are published posthumously – most notably an essay titled 'A Survey of So-Called Sensory and Noetic Objects of Inner Perception' (in Brentano 1928). The bulk of this section is dedicated to exposition and elucidation of the basics of Brentano's classification (§1.1); toward its end I will also present Brentano's *argument* for his fundamental classification (§1.2).

### 1.1. *The Fundamental Classification*

The central task in this area, as Brentano sees it, is to identify the 'fundamental classes' of conscious experience. What does 'fundamental class' mean? Brentano's basic assumption is that the domain of consciousness is structured by genus/species relations (observer-independently!), so that some kinds of consciousness are species of others. This assumption he imports from zoology, botany, and chemistry, which had seen an explosion of classificatory research in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fifteen years before the publication of Brentano's *Psychology*, Darwin already marveled at the 'wonderful fact' that


... all animals and all plants throughout all time and space should be related to each other in group subordinate to group, in the manner which we everywhere behold – namely, varieties of the same species most closely related together, species of the same genus less closely and unequally related together, forming sections and sub-genera, species of distinct genera much less closely related, and genera related in different degrees, forming sub-families, families, orders, subclasses, and classes. (Darwin 1859: 128)

It is a priority for Brentano's *Psychology*, as a programmatic book designed to lay the foundations of psychology on a footing akin to that of the natural sciences, to show that a similar scheme imposes itself in the realm of consciousness. For example, color consciousness is a species of visual consciousness, which in turn is a species of perceptual consciousness, and so on. The *highest* genus here is consciousness per se. What Brentano calls the 'fundamental classes' are the *second-to-highest* genera – kinds of consciousness which are species of only one higher genus. Any conscious kinds which are species of more than one conscious genus are not fundamental in this sense. Thus, visual consciousness is not a fundamental class of conscious phenomena, since it is a species of both perceptual consciousness and consciousness per se. Only conscious kinds which are species *only* of consciousness per se are fundamental.

So what *is* Brentano's fundamental classification? Here is his crispest presentation of it:

It is clear that all modes of reference (*Beziehungsweisen*) to an object fall into three classes: presentation, judgment, and emotion [or interest]. The second and third modes always presuppose the first, and in both we find a contrast, in that a judgment is either a belief or a denial, and an emotion is either a form of love or hate. (Brentano 1928: 55 [42])

The three fundamental classes are: presentation (*Vorstellung*), judgment (*Urteil*), and 'interest' (*Interesse*) or 'emotions' (*Gemütsbewegungen*) (see also Brentano 1874: II, 33 [198]). Unlike presentation, judgment and interest are each divided into two opposing kinds: judgment into acceptance (*Anerkennung*) and rejection (*Verwerfung*), interest into love (*Liebe*) and hate (*Hasse*) (see Figure 3.1). Let us expand a little on each of Brentano's three classes, then go slightly deeper into his taxonomic framework.



**Figure 3.1. Brentano's fundamental classification**

Consider first the category Brentano calls judgment. The term 'judgment' is in truth misleading, as it suggests an intellectual exercise of conceptual thought. In reality, Brentano has in mind any conscious act that targets the way things *are* – any state that presents what it does as true, as real, as obtaining, etc. Brentano writes:

By 'judgment' we mean, in accordance with common philosophical usage, acceptance (as true) or rejection (as false). (Brentano 1874: II, 34 [198])

This includes not only the products of conceptual thought, such as belief, but also perceptual experience. 'Every perception counts as a judgment,' he writes (1874: II, 50 [209]). A visual experience of a yellow lemon has veridicality conditions in the same sense the belief that the lemon is yellow has truth conditions. Both are in the business of *getting things right*. What characterizes Brentano's category of judgment is this kind of concern with *truth*, with how things *are*.

This contrasts with the category of conscious states Brentano calls interest. These are essentially concerned with *goodness*, with how things *ought* to be:

Just as every judgment takes an object to be true or false, analogously every phenomenon which belongs to [the category of interest] takes an object to be good or bad. (Brentano 1874: II, 36 [199]; see also 1874: II, 88-9 [239])<sup>2</sup>

This category, too, covers a large group of phenomena, including emotion, affect, the will, and pain/pleasure. For this reason, Brentano has no satisfactory name for this class, and calls it alternately interest, emotion, or (often) 'phenomena of love and hate.'<sup>3</sup> What unifies the phenomena in this category is the fact that they present what they do as good or bad – in a suitably generic sense of the word (*not*, mind, in the narrower sense of *moral* goodness). Wanting a beer presents beer as good, but so does taking pleasure in the beer, wishing for beer, liking beer, deciding on beer, and so on. Meanwhile, being disgusted with beer, being displeased with a beer, disliking beer, and being disappointed with a beer all present a beer as bad. In truth, the modern technical notions of 'pro attitude' and 'con attitude' are perfect terms for Brentano's positive ('love') and negative ('hate') kinds of interest.

Brentano's other fundamental class is presentation.<sup>4</sup> This is a kind of intentional state that in itself presents what it does neither as true or false nor as good or bad. Instead, it presents what it does in an entirely 'neutral' manner, without commenting on its object's truth or goodness. Brentano writes:

We speak of a presentation whenever something appears to us. (Brentano 1874: II, 34 [198])

Brentano holds that every state of judgment or interest involves presentation as a component: to present a beer as good, for example, you have to present it at all. It is a separate question whether a presentation can occur entirely on its own.

Brentano's occasional talk of *mere presentation* (*bloße Vorstellung*) suggests this kind of state. And indeed mental states that present an object without taking a stand on the matters of truth and goodness abound in our mental life: entertaining something, contemplating something, apprehending, considering, or supposing something – as well as sensory analogs such as imagining, daydreaming, and visualizing – all seem to be *mere* presentations in this sense.<sup>5</sup> When you merely contemplate *p*, *p* appears to you neither as true/false nor as good/bad; it just appears to you.



It might seem natural to frame Brentano's fundamental classification in terms of the modern notion of *direction of fit*. The idea would be that judgment has a mind-to-world ('thetic') direction of fit, interest a world-to-mind ('telic') direction of fit, and presentation a 'null' direction of fit. This is plausible, but only if we construe direction of fit in terms of modes of presenting an intentional object: presenting as true/false (judgment), presenting as good/bad (interest), and 'mere' presenting (presentation). In current philosophy of mind, direction of fit is often glossed in terms of *functional role*: the mind-to-world direction is cashed out in terms of *inferential* role, the world-to-mind direction in terms of *motivational* role. On this understanding, the difference between judgment and interest would be a difference in functional role. This is certainly not Brentano's view.

One problem with the functionalist gloss is that it is unclear what the distinctive functional role associated with the null direction of fit would be. But Brentano has a more basic argument against the functionalist gloss, namely, that it simply *gets the extension wrong*. For it fails to classify wish with desire, intention, and other states of interest:

Kant indeed defined the faculty of desire (*Begehrung*) simply as ‘the capacity to bring into existence the objects of one’s presentations through those presentations.’... This is why we find in Kant that curious claim that any wish (*Wunsch*), even if it were recognized to be impossible, such as the wish to have wings for example, is an attempt to obtain what is wished for and contains a presentation of our desire’s causal efficacy. This is a desperate attempt to harmonize the boundary between the two classes [interest and causally efficacious states]... (Brentano 1874: II, 117 [259]; see also Brentano 1907a: 157 [151], quoted in Chap. 7)

It is (nomologically) possible to wish for what is recognizably unachievable (immortality, say), which means that wish is not inherently characterized by a motivational force. Yet wish seems to naturally belong in one class with desire and hope, not with supposition and apprehension (and certainly not with belief). Brentano’s own notion of mode of presenting does secure this result, since wishing for immortality presents immortality *as good*.

The moral is: if we want to use the modern notion of direction of fit to elucidate Brentano’s trichotomy, we must not construe direction of fit functionally but in terms of presentational modes. That is how I will be understanding direction-of-fit talk hereafter.

The notion of *mode* is crucial here. The idea is that different kinds of conscious state present what they do *in different ways*. The difference between them is not in *what* they present but in *how* they present. Importantly, Brentano’s presentational modes are not Frege’s – they are not aspects of a state’s (fine-grained) *content*. Rather, they are aspects of the state’s *attitude*. When you judge that  $2+2=4$ , you are mentally committing to the truth of  $2+2=4$ . But this commitment is built into the attitude you are taking toward  $2+2=4$ , it does not show up in the content of your judgment. You do not judge that  $2+2=4$  *is true*, but simply that  $2+2=4$ . Nonetheless the judgment is inherently committed to the truth of  $2+2=4$ . This commitment is thus built into the very nature of judgment as a type of mental state.

We may put this by saying that the judgment that  $2+2=4$  does not present  $2+2=4$  as true, but rather *presents-as-true*  $2+2=4$ . Presenting-as-true is a mode or modification of the presenting. Compare (a) a pink wall on which a white light is shined with (b) a white wall on which a reddish-pink light is shined, with the result that both walls look the same to a normal perceiver under normal conditions. The wall is cast as pink in both cases, so that it appears the same. But in one case the pinkness comes from the wall being lit, whereas in the other it comes from the light being cast thereon. The truth-element in an act of judging that  $2+2=4$  is like the pink element in the light cast on a white wall.

The same goes for the other presentational modes. When you *disbelieve* that  $2+2=5$ , you are mentally committing to the falsity of  $2+2=5$ , but the commitment is built into the attitude of your disbelief rather than into its content: your disbelief *presents-as-false*  $2+2=5$ . By the same token, your love of ice cream *presents-as-good* ice cream and your disapproval of jingoism *presents-as-bad* jingoism. And the difference between belief and desire is purely *attitudinal*: a belief that  $p$  and desire that  $p$  both present  $p$ , but the former *presents-as-true*  $p$  while the latter *presents-as-good*  $p$ .

In all these cases, the relevant mental commitment is an 'attitudinal feature' of the conscious state, not a 'content feature.' Accordingly, it does not show up in the state's satisfaction or correctness conditions. Nonetheless, it has an important role with respect to such conditions: namely, it determines *what kind* of satisfaction or correctness conditions are appropriate for the relevant state. Because it is in the nature of belief to *present-as-true*, belief is evaluated *for truth*, and its appropriate correctness conditions are *truth conditions*. In contrast, since it is in the nature of desire to *present-as-good*, desire is to be evaluated for goodness, and the appropriate correctness conditions for desire are what we might call goodness conditions.<sup>6</sup>


To summarize the discussion thus far, Brentano divides conscious states into three basic kinds, and locates the fundamental difference between them in the mode

of intentionality each uses – the distinctive attitudinal presentational feature characteristic of each. The following exposition of Brentano’s basic classification by Chisholm is spot on:

He believes that there are three *ways* in which one’s thoughts may be directed upon an object A. First, one may simply contemplate – or think about – the object A. Secondly, one may *take an intellectual stand* with respect to A; this stand consists either in accepting A or in rejecting A. And, thirdly, one may *take an emotional stand* with respect to A; this emotional stand consists either in taking a pro-attitude toward A or in taking a negative attitude toward A. (Chisholm 1981a: 4; italics mine).

The term ‘intellectual stand’ is suboptimal, insofar as it suggests a conceptually sophisticated kind of mental state, but otherwise Chisholm’s presentation is perfectly accurate.

If we interpret direction-of-fit talk not in terms of functional role but in terms of Brentanian presentational mode, we can represent Brentano’s classification as in Figure 3.2.



**Figure 3.2. Brentano’s classification, reframed**

### 1.2. The Argument for the Fundamental Classification

So much, then, for Brentano's *view* on the fundamental classification of conscious states. What is his *argument* for the view?

Brentano's argument focuses on the role of presentational modes in capturing the deep homogeneity and heterogeneity relations among conscious states. Brentano writes:

Nothing distinguishes mental phenomena from physical phenomena more than the fact that something inheres (*inwohnt*) in them object-wise (*gegenständlich*). And that is why it is so understandable that the fundamental differences in the *manner* something inheres in them object-wise constitute the principal class differences among mental phenomena. (Brentano 1874: II, 32 [197]; my italics)

Insofar as intentionality is the mark of the conscious, different *kinds* of intentionality should distinguish different kinds of consciousness. Compare: insofar as a vehicle is a machine that gets you from A to B, different *kinds* of vehicle are distinguished by the different *ways* they get you from A to B: flying, floating, rolling, and so on. These different *modes* of transportation parallel our different *modes* of intentionality. The underlying idea here is that what makes a vehicle the kind of vehicle it is is intimately connected to what makes it a vehicle at all; and by the same token, what makes a conscious state the kind of conscious state it is is intimately connected to what makes it a conscious state at all. Where intentional directedness is the principle of *demarcation*, it stands to reason that *manner* or *mode* of intentional directedness should serve as principle of *speciation* or *classification*.

Once Brentano adopts this approach to fundamental classification, it straightforwardly delivers his classification. We have already quoted this key sentence: 'It is clear that all modes of reference (*Beziehungsweisen*) to an object fall into three classes: presentation, judgment, and emotion [interest]' (Brentano 1928: 55 [42]). Presentation is characterized by the neutral mode of mere-presenting, judgment by alethic mode of presenting-as-true/false, and emotion or interest by the axiological mode of presenting-as-good/bad.

Brentano's argument for his trichotomy may be reconstructed as follows, then: 1) the correct principle for classifying conscious states is by mode of intentionality; 2) the three fundamental modes of intentionality are presenting-as-true/false (characteristic of judgment), presenting-as-good/bad (characteristic of interest), and mere-presenting (characteristic of presentation); therefore, 3) the three fundamental classes of conscious state are judgment, interest, and presentation. The argument is clearly valid. What supports Premise 1 is (a) the claim that intentionality demarcates the mental and (b) the idea that the principles of classification and of demarcation should be connected in the expected way. What supports Premise 2 is Brentano's careful analysis, in the *Psychology*, of the relation between (i) presentation and judgment (Book II, Chap. 7) and (ii) feeling and will (Book II, Chap. 8). We will consider both in due course.

For Brentano, the fundamental classification of mental phenomena (which, we should remember, is at bottom a classification of *conscious* phenomena) guides the structure of psychological inquiry. His original, six-book plan for the *Psychology* involved a Book III on presentation, a Book IV on judgment, and a Book V on interest (see Rollinger 2012). Each book were to lay out (among other things) further, *non-fundamental* classifications; some of these are discussed in the next section.<sup>7</sup>

## **2. More on Brentano's Classification**

As noted, in contemporary philosophy of mind the question of psychological taxonomy has not seen much uptake. Explicit discussions of the matter are few and far between. Implicitly, mainstream research seems to work with a model positing four fundamental types of mental phenomenon: there is input in the form of sensory perception, output in the form of intentional action, and a mediating layer consisting of beliefs and desires.<sup>8</sup> These themselves are differentiated by two cross-cutting (intentional) distinctions: perception and belief exhibit a mind-to-world direction of fit, desire and action a world-to-mind direction of fit; perception and action are nonpropositional, belief and desire are propositional (see Table 3.1).

	<b><u>M → W</u></b>	<b><u>W → M</u></b>
<b><u>Nonpropositional</u></b>	sensory perception	intentional action
<b><u>Propositional</u></b>	belief	desire

**Table 3.1. Mainstream’s fundamental classes**

There are many other mental phenomena, of course, but they can be accounted for in terms of the four fundamental ones: either as species of them (remembering that  $p$  is believing that in the past,  $p$ ), combinations of them (being disappointed that  $p$  is a combination of believing that  $p$  and desiring that  $\sim p$ ), or combinations of species of them (hoping that  $p$  is a combination of desiring that  $p$  and believing that possibly,  $p$ ).

Brentano’s explicit taxonomy involves many notable differences from today’s mainstream implicit taxonomy. The most striking one will be discussed in the next section. In this section, I discuss other important features of Brentano’s taxonomic system. I divide the discussion in two: a consideration of Brentano’s ‘fundamental’ taxonomy (§2.1) and a consideration of his non-fundamental taxonomy (§2.2).

### *2.1. More on the Fundamental Classification*

The most central feature of Brentano’s taxonomy is that it is driven almost entirely by attitudinal properties of conscious states, properties such as presenting-as-true

and presenting-as-good. This is quite an original take on the essence of conscious states. Consider currently popular theories of the nature of belief. Perhaps the leading theory is functionalist: what distinguishes belief from desire and other mental states is its distinctive functional role. But functional role is a *dispositional* property, and such properties are typically grounded in deeper, more essential *categorical bases*.<sup>9</sup> It would thus be natural to identify the categorical basis of the relevant functional role, rather than the functional role itself, as the essential feature of belief. The property of presenting-as-true is occurrent and might for all we know ground and explain belief's functional role. Likewise, a more recent approach to belief focuses on the distinctive norms governing beliefs: the 'aim' of belief is truth, we are told, and so belief is governed by a truth norm.<sup>10</sup> But here too, one suspects there is something about belief, something nonnormative, that *makes* it governed by the truth norm rather than other norms. After all, belief is an *empirical* phenomenon whose very existence cannot be owed to anything like supra-empirical norms. The thought imposes itself that belief is governed by the truth norm precisely because it is of its essence to present-as-true. Thus Brentano's attitudinal account of the nature of belief seems to go deeper than currently popular approaches. In Chap. 7, I will make a parallel claim about Brentano's attitudinal account of desire and emotion.

A second important feature of Brentano's taxonomy is its division of judgments into two mutually irreducible, *categorically distinct* kinds. On Brentano's view, to disbelieve that  $p$  is not just to believe that  $\sim p$ . (Nor, of course, is it to fail to believe that  $p$ .) Rather, it is a *sui generis* attitude irreducible to belief (Brentano 1874: II, 65-6 [222-3]).<sup>11</sup> On this view, there is a psychologically real difference between believing that  $\sim p$  and disbelieving that  $p$ . The former involves mental commitment to the truth of  $\sim p$ , the latter mental commitment to the falsity of  $p$ .<sup>12</sup> In this respect, disbelief parallels displeasure: being displeased that  $p$  feels nothing like being pleased that  $\sim p$ .<sup>13</sup> This is a psychologically real categorical difference between two kinds of state. Thus believing and disbelieving can have the same content, and take the judgment attitude toward it, but one takes the positive-judgment attitude while the other takes the negative-judgment attitude.

What motivates this nonreductive account of disbelief? After all, disbelief that  $p$  and belief that  $\sim p$  seem inferentially equivalent, and it would certainly be more *parsimonious* to treat disbelief that  $p$  as nothing but belief that  $\sim p$ . Moreover, it is not clear that there is any *phenomenological* evidence for a categorical distinction here. So Brentano must adduce some compelling reason why a *sui generis* disbelief attitude is *needed*. It is quite obvious that Brentano is attracted to this view partly by his evident penchant for aesthetic symmetries, of which a parallelism between positive and negative judgments on the one hand and positive and negative affective states on the other would be an instance.<sup>14</sup> But in addition, there is a genuine dialectical pressure for the nonreductive account of disbelief in the context of trying to account for negation within the framework of Brentano's particular theory of judgment; we will only be in a position to appreciate this pressure in the next chapter.

Thirdly, Brentano takes perceptual states to form a species of judgment. This is *not* intended as the substantive claim that perceptual experiences have a propositional content akin to that of judgments as we ordinarily think of them. Rather, Brentano simply uses the label 'judgment,' unadvisedly, to cover both beliefs and perceptions. What unifies this category is that all mental states belonging to it employ the same attitudinal property in presenting their intentional object. This might seem initially implausible: all beliefs essentially present-as-true, but plausibly, not all perceptions do. When you see that the cat is on the mat, your perception does perhaps present-as-true what it presents. But when you simply *see the cat*, the perception surely does *not* present-as-true the cat. Cats are not truth-bearers, after all. However, this worry does not in fact arise within the Brentanian framework. Again, we will be able to fully appreciate why only in the next chapter. As we will see there, Brentano attempts to reduce all belief-that to belief-in. This matters because believing *in* a cat does not present-as-true the cat, but rather presents-as-existent (or presents-as-real) the cat. Plausibly, now, this is exactly how seeing a cat presents the cat: as-existing.

There is a traditional view that opposes this outlook, holding that a perceptual experience of a cat does not in and of itself commit to the cat's existence. In and of itself, it does not comment on the cat's existence; it merely presents the cat. It is just that perceptual presentations of this sort are typically accompanied by *beliefs* that do commit to the existence of their presented object. Brentano rejects this view, however, holding instead that every act of perceiving *x* has accepting *x* as a merely distinguishable part (Brentano 1982: 86-7 [92-3]).<sup>15</sup> His reason for this is that belief in the external world does not feel as though it is acquired *on the basis of* perceptual experience; rather, it feels as though it *comes with* perceptual experience:

Particular evidence in favor of belief in the primary object being contained in [sensory perception] is provided by reflections arising from the question concerning the origin of the belief in an external world. These reflections seem to lead to [the conclusion] that rather than having originally been without such a belief, [and] having only gained it later by realizing that the law-governed connection between the sequence of our mental experiences can be best understood on the basis of such hypotheses, one did trust immediately... The belief [contained] in the fundamental sensory acts thus seem to be involved in the beginning. (Brentano 1982: 87 [93])

Commitment to the independent reality of a cat seems immediate upon perceiving the external cat; it does not seem based on inference (e.g., to the best explanation) from perception of feline sense-data, as Russell (1910 Chap. 2) for example held. Believing and perceiving thus share an attitudinal essence for Brentano, and therefore belong to a single mental category. Obviously, there is also an important *difference* between them; this difference will be discussed in the next subsection.

Fourthly, while the domain of emotion/interest is analogous to that of judgment in dividing into positive and negative attitudes, there is also an important disanalogy between the two: we can present things as *better* or *worse*, but not as truer or falsier. Accordingly, Brentano recognizes the need for a third sui generis type of interest state: preference (Brentano 1889: 23 [26], 1907a: 148 [143], 1952: 147 [92]). To prefer *x* over *y* is to present *x* as better than *y* in the same sense in which to love *x* is to present *x* as good. That is, it is to present the superiority of *x*

over  $y$  *attitudinally*. To a first approximation, we might say that preferring  $x$  to  $y$  *presents-as-structured-by-value-superiority* the ordered pair  $(x, y)$ .<sup>16</sup> Importantly, Brentano adopts a nonreductive account of preference, arguing that preferring  $x$  over  $y$  is irreducible to loving  $x$  more than  $y$ . Various intriguing questions arise around this set of ideas; some will be taken up in Chap. 8.

Fifthly, Brentano claims that judgment and interest are ‘grounded in’ presentation, or have presentation as their grounds/foundations (*Grundlage*). (1874: I, 112 [80]). It is an open question what notion of grounding Brentano has in mind, and whether it is the notion currently widely discussed in metaphysics and beyond (see Fine 2001 for the *locus classicus*). One *similarity* is that Brentanian grounding is a matter of *ontological asymmetric dependence*, what Brentano calls ‘unilateral separability.’ Since a judgment presents-as-true/false  $p$ , a fortiori it presents  $p$ . But the converse does not hold: not every presentation presents-as-true/false.<sup>17</sup> Presenting is thus unilaterally separable from presenting-as-true/false: a conscious state can be a presentation without being a judgment, but it cannot be a judgment without being a presentation. (In order to believe that  $p$ , one must apprehend  $p$ ; but one may apprehend  $p$  without believing what one apprehends.) To that extent, Brentano’s notion of grounding resembles ours. On the other hand, Brentanian grounding is not an *explanatory* relation. The currently much-discussed notion is often thought to provide for a (‘vertical’ rather than ‘horizontal’) explanation of the grounded in terms of the ground: the vase is fragile *because* of its microstructure, a car is parked illegally *because* it is parked on the sidewalk, and so on. In contrast, it is clearly not the case that a conscious state is a judgment *because* it is a presentation – its being a presentation leaves many other options open. In summary, we may say that Brentano’s notion of *Grundlage* is just the notion of an ineluctable foundation, something without which the grounded cannot come to be, but is not meant to denote an explanatory in-virtue-of relation.

## 2.2. *The Non-fundamental Classification*

While the initial trichotomy exhausts Brentano's *fundamental* classification of conscious states, further classification is possible. In particular, further divisions among conscious states are possible according to their attitudinal properties of presenting-as-F. Notably, both Brentano's 'acceptance' and 'rejection' can come in two varieties: 'assertoric' or 'apodictic.' The former variety presents what it does as *contingent*, the latter as *necessary*. That is to say, assertoric belief that *p* presents-as-contingently-true *p*, while apodictic belief that *p* presents-as-necessarily-true *p*. Meanwhile, assertoric disbelief presents-as-contingently-false, while apodictic disbelief presents-as-necessarily-false, i.e., as impossible (see Brentano 1928: 55 [42]). A parallel distinction applies to interest: apodictic hate of genocide presents-as-necessarily-bad genocide, while assertoric hate of car salesmen presents-as-contingently-bad car salesmen; an assertoric pro attitude toward football presents-as-contingently-good football, while apodictic pro attitude toward *eudaimonia* presents-as-necessarily-good *eudaimonia* (see Brentano 1928: 55 [42-3]). Other attitudinal distinctions apply to both judgment and interest (Ibid.).

Just as alethic modality is an attitudinal feature of judgments, so is *temporal* modality. Consider the difference between having a visual experience of rain and having an episodic memory of rain (or of seeing rain). There are in fact many differences between the two, but one of them seems to concern what we might call *temporal orientation*: the episodic memory presents the rain as (having occurred) in the past, whereas the visual experience presents the rain as (in the) present. According to Brentano, this difference is not a content difference (Brentano 1956: 34). It is entirely attitudinal: the episodic memory presents-as-past the rain, while the visual experience presents-as-present the rain. His argument is that only this attitudinal view of temporal orientation can diffuse a certain puzzle about hearing a melody. The puzzle is that at a single moment we seem to enjoy sensuous awareness of both the note currently playing and the note just played. How is it that in such a case we do not experience the audible superposition of both notes? Brentano's answer is that the two awarenesses are kept separate by presenting their objects in

different *ways*. Calling the awareness of the current note ‘aesthesia’ and that of the note just past ‘proteraesthesia,’ he dictates the following on Boxing Day 1914:

What then could constitute the essential difference in the [experience] of proteraesthesia as compared to aesthesis? The way to the only possible answer is clearly indicated. Sensing is a [kind of] mental reference to an object. Such reference can be distinguished, first, through the difference in objects, and secondly, through the difference in the *manner* of reference to the same object... Admittedly, proteraesthesia has the exact same object as aesthesis, but it refers to it that object a different *manner*... (Brentano 1928: 48 [36]; my emphasis)

The two notes are not experientially superimposed because the aesthesis presents-as-present its note while the proteraesthesia presents-as-past its.

There are also attitudinal distinctions proper to the domain of presentation. Unlike judgment and interest, presentation does not come in a positive and a negative varieties. Nor is there an assertoric/apodictic-like distinction in this case. Nonetheless, other attitudinal distinctions apply. Paramount among these is the distinction between a direct mode (*modus recto*) and an oblique mode (*modus obliquo*). When you contemplate whether your friend wants a vacation, your contemplation presents your friend *directly*, but it also presents a vacation *obliquely* (Brentano 1928: 56 [43]). This distinction does a considerable amount of work for Brentano in the last stage of his philosophical development, but will be largely ignored in this book (see Dewalque 2014 for discussion).<sup>18</sup>

Note the absence in Brentano’s classification of what has often been taken to be the most basic division of mental phenomena: between those that are sensory or visceral or ‘lower’ and those that are cognitive or intellectual or ‘higher.’ In the above presentation of the current mainstream, the distinction between propositional and nonpropositional states plays this role. Brentano’s fundamental classification, however, lumps together sensory perception and abstract thought, on one side, and on the other, sensuous pleasure and considered moral preference. Now, surely Brentano *recognizes* the distinction between the ‘lower’ senses and the ‘higher’ intellect. Equally clearly, however, he takes this distinction to be *less fundamental* than the distinction between modes of intentional directedness. The

point is that the ‘natural homogeneity’ between a sensory perception of a eucalyptus and a belief that this is a eucalyptus is greater, for Brentano, than both (i) the natural homogeneity between the belief that this is a eucalyptus and the desire that it be a eucalyptus and (ii) the natural homogeneity between the sensory perception of a eucalyptus and a sensuous pleasure in the eucalyptus’ minty odor.

What underlies this assessment of comparative ‘natural homogeneity,’ or objective similarity, between conscious states? Brentano says almost nothing about this. It might be, however, that he takes the sensory/intellectual distinction to pertain merely to the *contents*, or *objects*, of conscious states. Clearly, for Brentano content distinctions are always ‘shallower’ than any attitudinal distinction. His taxonomic principle is that the classification of conscious states must start up top with the modes of intentional directedness, which are then divided and subdivided as far as the attitudinal phenomena allow; only when attitudinal distinctions have been exhausted can we start classifying conscious states by their types of content. (This is quite plausible: attitudinal differences go to the very nature of judgment, love, etc. as types of conscious states; the specific types of object they may take are more accidental.) If the sensory/intellectual distinction is a content distinction, then it would stand to reason that it would be subordinate to Brentano’s three-way distinction between intentional modes. Perhaps the following passage suggests this content view of the sensory/intellectual distinction:

Let us turn now to the differences that the mental activities we inner-perceive exhibit with regard to their objects. They can be divided into sensory and intelligible (noetic). (Brentano 1928: 58 [44])


This passage could be seen as suggesting that the most basic distinction between kinds of intentional object is between sensibles and intelligibles. This content construal of the sensory/intellectual distinction explains why Brentano is so confident that the distinction is subordinate to the direction-of-fit distinction in the overall taxonomy of conscious states.

It is a separate question how plausible this content construal of the sensory/intellectual distinction is. On the face of it, one can think about what one perceives, for example a brown dog. Both believing *in* a black swan and *seeing* a black swan present a black swan. This may suggest that the difference between them must ultimately be attitudinal rather than content-based. However, given that both the belief in the black swan and the perceptual experience of the black swan present-as-existent the swan, it is not immediately obvious what the attitudinal difference between the two might be. One promising idea might be that perception goes beyond belief in not merely presenting-as-existent its object, but presenting-as-existent-here-and-now that object. As we have seen, Brentano construes temporal orientation as an attitudinal feature of perception and episodic memory. Something similar might be said about spatial relations. Thus, while a belief in a black swan can be correct even if black swans exist far away from the believer, a perceptual experience of a black swan is veridical only if a black swan is present roughly in the same place as the perceiver. The experience does not count as veridical if there happens to be an indistinguishable swan (identically surrounded) but on another planet. Plausibly, this kind of spatial constraint on veridicality is specified by the very mode of perception – it is in the nature of perception to inform us about the *hic et nunc* (see Recanati 2007: 201, 285).<sup>19</sup>

Brentano's taxonomic efforts push further. One might expect the sensibles to divide according to the five/six senses, for example. Somewhat oddly, Brentano argues instead that there are *three* classes of sensible: colors, sounds, and the rest (1907b: 160-3, 1928: 63 [48]). The reason for this heterodox individuation of the senses is that Brentano's underlying criterion for the individuation, which has to do with the mixability of sensibles (see Massin forthcoming). I am unaware of a taxonomy of intelligibles in the Brentano corpus.<sup>20</sup>

In summary, Brentano's full taxonomy of conscious states is to be produced in three steps. First, a comprehensive classification of states by attitudinal features is to be produced. Then, a full classification of sensible and intelligible contents is to be produced. Finally, the content classification is to be plugged in at the 'bottom' of

the attitudinal classification, such that attitudinally maximally determinate conscious states are to be classified in the first instance by minimally determinate intentional contents they might take. The result is (partially) represented in Figure 3.3.



**Figure 3.3. Brentano's full taxonomy – fragment**

### 3. Presentation as an Attitudinal Primitive

The fundamental classification of mental states implicit in contemporary philosophy of mind, as presented in Table 3.1 above, differs from Brentano's in two ways. First, it treats the propositional/nonpropositional (higher/lower) distinction as equally important as the distinction between directions of fit. Second, it divides mental

states by direction of fit only into two basic categories: belief-like cognitive states and desire-like conative states. I have already discussed Brentano's reason for diverging from the contemporary approach on the first point: if the propositional/nonpropositional distinction is a content-level distinction, it is perforce subordinate to any attitude-level distinction. In this section, I want to discuss in some length Brentano's reason for diverging on the second point. I want to flesh out a bit more Brentano's view and the way it differs from current-day orthodoxy (§3.1), then assess Brentano's two *arguments* for the view (§§3.2-3.3).

I should note that this section is in some sense 'optional' for the rest of the book and can in principle be skipped. As we will see in Parts II and III of the book, Brentano's theories of judgment and of interest are foundational for his accounts of the true, the good, and the beautiful. In contrast, while Brentano's theory of presentation has some relevance to his account of the beautiful, it does not play the same foundational role as judgment and interest. In particular, the thesis that presentation is a third type of basic attitude, on a par with and irreducible to judgment and interest, is not necessary for the rest of the system to hold together. It is, so to speak, an optional commitment for Brentano's system. This is why this section, which discusses that commitment, is likewise optional for the book. Nonetheless, I think Brentano's view here is both correct and important, so that contemporary philosophy of mind can learn from him on this score.

### *3.1. The View*

Brentano's fundamental classification divides conscious states into states of judgment, interest, and presentation. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the prominent 'belief-desire psychology' suggests analogs of judgment and interest: both Brentano's judgment and our belief are cognitive states with a mind-to-world direction of fit, and both Brentano's interest and our desire are conative states with a world-to-mind direction of fit. However, the state of presentation, which is central to Brentano's classification, lacks a clear counterpart in belief-desire psychology.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, belief and desire are construed as propositional attitudes. Belief reports overtly suggest that belief has propositional content: we say 'Jimmy believes *that* the weather is nice.' Desire reports do not always: we often say things like 'Jimmy desires ice cream.' Nonetheless, it is common to treat 'Jimmy desires ice cream' as just shorthand for 'Jimmy desires *that* he have ice cream,' so that the desire is in fact a propositional attitude. Now, as we will see starting Chap. 4, Brentano's conception of judgment and interest is completely different. In particular, he takes both belief and desire to be *non-propositional*. We may nonetheless indulge here the propositional framework, and ask the following question: is there also a third propositional attitude on a par with belief and desire and irreducible to (any combination of) them?

Belief-desire psychology answers in the negative. It recognizes, of course, the existence of further propositional attitudes; but as already noted, it insists that these can be handled in terms of belief and desire. Some propositional attitudes, such as suspecting and being unwilling, can be construed as simply *species* of belief or desire (S suspects that  $p$  just if S believes that  $p$  with a sufficiently low degree of conviction; S is unwilling to  $\varphi$  just if S desires not to  $\varphi$ ).<sup>21</sup> Other propositional attitudes, such as gladness and disappointment, can be reduced to logical combinations of belief and desire (being glad that  $p$  is just believing that  $p$  and desiring that  $p$ ; being disappointed that  $p$  is just believing that  $p$  and desiring that  $\sim p$ ). According to belief-desire psychology, *all* propositional attitudes succumb to such a treatment. The only *primitive, irreducible* propositional attitudes are belief and desire.

Brentano's position is different. Still indulging the propositionalist framework, we could say that he holds that in addition to belief and desire, there is a third primitive propositional attitude – what he calls presentation and we may call *entertaining, contemplating, or apprehending*. More specifically, in addition to believing that  $p$ , which presents-as-true  $p$ , and desire that  $p$ , which presents-as-good  $p$ , there is *entertaining* that  $p$  (or contemplating or apprehending  $p$ ), which merely-presents  $p$  (without commenting on  $p$ 's truth or goodness). According to Brentano, entertaining that  $p$  can be considered neither (i) a species of believing, nor (ii) a

species of desiring, nor (iii) a 'product' of (some species of) belief and desire. Instead, it is a third attitudinal primitive on a par with belief and desire. At the very least, then, we should replace 'belief-desire psychology' with 'belief-desire-entertaining psychology.'<sup>22</sup>

Brentano does not bother arguing against (i) and (ii). One may conjecture that this is because he thinks it evident that there is no *constitutive* connection between entertaining that *p* and desiring that *q* for any *q*. At bottom, what Brentano argues against is a certain nuanced version of (i) – the notion that belief and entertaining form a single 'natural kind.' This is the idea that the cognitive 'department' of our mind includes such states as believing, suspecting, assuming, supposing, and entertaining, and even though some of these may be reducible to others, they all fall under a single fundamental category of mental activity – they are all in the business of getting the world right. For Brentano, this view fails to do justice to the fundamental difference between belief-like and entertaining-like states: whereas believing, suspecting, and assuming that *p* all present-as-true *p*, entertaining and supposing that *p* do not. This is a fundamental categorical difference that goes to the deep natures of these two types of state, which therefore constitute two different natural kinds.

In the background is Brentano's principle, which we have already seen, that the fundamental classification of mental states appeals to mode of intentionality. If belief and entertaining (judgment and presentation) involve different modes of intentionality, then they are fundamentally distinct classes of mental states. Accordingly, Chap. 7 of Book II of the *Psychology* is dedicated to making the case that judgment and presentation indeed differ in their mode of intentionality. Brentano offers there two arguments. The more central argument, pursued in §§1-7 of the chapter, is a deductive argument by elimination – a demonstration of the attitudinal distinction between belief and entertaining *via negativa*. The other argument proceeds *via positiva*, but offers a more abductive route to the same conclusion. I consider the first argument in §3.2, the second in §3.3.

### 3.2. *The Via Negativa Argument*

Brentano's central argument for the attitudinal distinction between belief and entertaining may be summarized as follows:

- 1) There is some difference between believing and entertaining;
- 2) The difference between them is not in their extrinsic properties;
- 3) The intrinsic difference between believing and entertaining is either (i) a difference in intensity/vivacity, (ii) a difference in content, or (iii) an attitudinal difference;
- 4) The intrinsic difference is not one of intensity;
- 5) It is not one of content; therefore,
- 6) The difference between believing and entertaining is attitudinal (they employ different modes of intentionality).

Brentano provides no support for Premises 1 and 3 (both stated explicitly in 1874: II, 39 [202]). He argues for Premise 2 in §2 of Chap. 7, for Premise 4 in §3, and for Premise 5 in §§4-7.

Premise 1 indeed seems beyond reproach. The fact that we have two different *words* here suggests *prima facie* that we find a *need* to denote two different phenomena. Just as most languages contain one expression for wanting to  $\varphi$  and one for being willing to  $\varphi$ , because we need to be able to speak differently of these two different phenomena, so most languages contain one expression for believing that  $p$  and one for entertaining that  $p$ , for a similar reason. Desire and willingness both belong to a single fundamental category of mental state, however: conative states with a world-to-mind direction of fit. The burden of Brentano's argument is to show that the same fate does not attend belief and entertainment.

In defense of Premise 2, Brentano argues against a functionalist account of the belief/entertaining distinction that grounds it in *relations* to different potential effects. One might hold, as Alexander Bain apparently did, that believing that  $p$

differs from entertaining that  $p$  in having a more direct impact on the will, and ultimately on behavior. Thus, believing that the weather is nice enough for a picnic has more chances of leading to picnic-pursuing behavior than merely entertaining that the weather is nice enough for a picnic. Nonetheless, Brentano thinks, these differences in functional role must ultimately be grounded in some intrinsic features of belief and entertaining:

... why is it that the one presentation of the object has such an influence on behavior while the other does not? Just to raise the question is to show very clearly the oversight of which Bain is guilty. There would be no special consequences [for behavior], if there were no special *ground* (*Grund*) for them in the nature/quality (*Beschaffenheit*) of the thought process. Rather than making the assumption of an intrinsic difference between mere presentation and judgment unnecessary, the difference in [behavioral] consequences emphatically points up this intrinsic difference. (Brentano 1874: II, 40 [202-3]; my italics)

Brentano is exactly right here. Functional role is a dispositional property of conscious states, and dispositional properties are *grounded* in categorical bases. So if there is a functional-role difference between belief and entertaining, ultimately it must be grounded in a categorical, intrinsic difference between them. It is because belief and entertaining have the intrinsic natures they do that they dispose the subject to act in the way they do. If they had different intrinsic natures, they would dispose the subject's behavior differently. The question is what the relevant difference in their intrinsic natures is.

As regards Premise 3, it is hard to think of another candidate intrinsic difference between belief and entertaining than those Brentano cites: intensity, content, and attitude. Certainly Brentano is entitled to consider it his opponent's burden to provide a fourth alternative.

Premise 4 claims that the intrinsic difference is not one of experiential intensity. Importantly, the kind of intensity Brentano has in mind is not a matter of degrees of conviction. The hypothesis under consideration is not that entertaining that  $p$  is simply a very tentative belief that  $p$ . (That seems rather to be *suspecting* that  $p$ .) Rather, the intensity in question is a matter of the degree of vivacity or

'fullness' (*Vollkommenheit*) with which  $p$  is *present before the mind* (1874: II, 39 [202]). The hypothesis under consideration, vaguely Humean, is that to believe that  $p$  is simply to entertain that  $p$  specially vividly. Brentano offers two arguments against this hypothesis. One is that it could not handle disbelief, since it seems to suggest that to disbelieve that  $p$  is to entertain that  $p$  with *negative* vivacity – a patently absurd proposal (1874: II, 44 [205]). This argument presupposes, of course, Brentano's sui generis account of disbelief. For if, contra Brentano, one were willing to identify disbelief that  $p$  with belief that  $\sim p$ , then one could hold that disbelief that  $p$  is just specially vivid entertaining of  $\sim p$ . Brentano's other argument, however, is more theoretically neutral and thus more compelling. It is that the identification of belief with vivid entertaining is simply extensionally inadequate:

But even if in certain cases the act of taking something to be true coincides with the greater intensity of a presentation, the presentation is not, on that account, itself a judgment. That is why [a judgment recognized as mistaken] may disappear, while the vividness (*Lebendigkeit*) of the presentation persists. And in other cases we are firmly convinced of the truth of something, even though the content of the judgment is anything but vivid. (1874: II, 43-4 [205])

Even though the intensity of a presentation can lead us to assent to its content, we sometimes recognize that in fact we should dissent from it without any consequent change in experienced vivacity. A person may suddenly have a strong feeling that her favorite football team will lose this weekend, but upon reflection realize that this feeling is baseless and untrustworthy. She could then stop believing that her team will lose while the proposition that it will remains highly vivid in her mind. (Keep in mind that the relevant kind of vivacity is *not* a degree of conviction.) Conversely, we often find ourselves believing to be true a proposition relatively dully present before the mind. Arduously following through the proof of some complex mathematical theorem, one is liable to feel highly confident in its truth without having a particularly vivid awareness of the theorem itself. Thus entertaining and tentative believing are doubly dissociable.

It might be objected that we may still account for the belief/entertaining distinction in terms of intensity in the sense of degree of conviction. In particular, one might hold that entertaining that  $p$  is nothing but having .5 credence in  $p$  (or better: having .5 credence in  $p$  and .5 credence in  $\sim p$ ). The thought is that when one has .5 credence in  $p$  and .5 credence in  $\sim p$ , one is committed neither to the truth of  $p$  nor to its falsity. One's mental state then merely-presents  $p$ . In this model, the belief/entertaining distinction is one of degree rather than kind.

To my knowledge, Brentano does not consider this kind of deflationary hypothesis. But the hypothesis faces several difficulties. First, on the face of it we can entertain propositions in which our credence is much lower than .5. Thus, I can entertain the notion that England will win the next World Cup. Indeed, secondly, one may entertain a proposition precisely with a view to establishing some credence in it. I may entertain the proposition that England will win the next World Cup in the context of attempting to know what kinds of bet would be wise for me to make; the episode of entertaining may then span moments in which I am .1 credent in the proposition entertained, moments I am .15 credent, and indeed moments of thorough indecision. Finally, a rational subject .5 credent in  $p$  who was also .9 credent in  $q$  would have .45 credence in  $p \& q$ ; whereas an equally rational subject who merely entertained that  $p$ , but was also .9 credent in  $q$ , may not be .45 credent in  $p \& q$ .

I conclude that the belief/entertaining distinction is not one of intensity, as per Premise 4 of Brentano's argument. Premise 5 asserts that the belief/entertaining distinction does not pertain to content. The hypothesis under consideration is that entertaining and believing form a single kind of state, but with two structurally different kinds of content. Here too, Brentano considers one particular version of the hypothesis: that entertaining that  $a$  is  $F$  involves a presentation of  $a$  and of  $F$ , whereas believing that  $a$  is  $F$  involves that *plus predicating  $F$  of  $a$* . That is, belief contents are predicative, whereas entertained contents refer to the same entities but are non-predicative. We might say that the content of entertaining is  $\langle a, F \rangle$  whereas the content of believing is  $\langle Fa \rangle$  – with the

attitudes themselves being the same. Brentano responds that belief and entertaining often have the same content (1874: II, 44-5 [205]). Indeed, it seems clear that we can sometimes come to believe something precisely by endorsing the content of an entertaining. Thus, I may entertain a philosophical proposition for a few hours, consider its plausibility, and eventually come to accept it. When I do, I seem to simply endorse the content I have been entertaining all along. If so, the entertaining and the believing must have the same content. In addition, Brentano maintains that existential beliefs are *not* predicative (1874: II, 48-9 [208]). As we will see in Chap. 4-5, in believing that there are ducks, I do not quite predicate existence of ducks. So not all beliefs involve predicative contents.<sup>23</sup>

From Premises 1-5, the conclusion certainly follows: the belief/entertaining distinction must be attitudinal at bottom, and pertain to the manner in which each presents its content. This conclusion, however, falls short of Brentano's full-fledged position in two ways. First, it does not commit to the *nature* of the attitudinal distinction between belief and entertaining, in particular to the notion that belief presents-as-true whereas entertaining merely-presents. Secondly, the conclusion does not specify the *level* at which the attitudinal distinction arises: Brentano means presentation to be an attitudinal primitive at the same ('fundamental') level as judgment and interest, but for all the argument shows, presentation may simply be an attitudinal primitive one level lower, for example at the level of belief and disbelief. In that case, entertaining would turn out to be a species of belief.

One way to fill in the lacunae in Brentano's argument is as follows. First, we might propose the present-as-true/merely-present distinction as the *best explanation* of the belief/entertaining distinction. Secondly, once the belief/entertaining distinction is construed specifically in terms of presenting-as-true and merely-presenting, the notion that entertaining is a species of judgment on a par with belief and disbelief, rather than a species of consciousness on a par with judgment and interest, becomes implausible. For the common feature of all judgments, beliefs and disbeliefs alike, is what we might call their *alethic orientation*, the fact that they are concerned with truth and falsity. *If* merely entertaining that *p*

were nothing but having .5 credence in *p*, *then* it would be plausible to see entertaining as a third species of judgment. But given that entertaining is by its nature alethically disengaged (if you will), it cannot be a species of judgment – no more than entertaining the idea of ice cream is a third species of interest, in-between loving ice cream and hating ice cream.

I conclude that Brentano's main argument for his account of presentation as an attitudinal primitive is highly plausible, especially when augmented with the just-raised more abductive considerations. Nonetheless, there is a very basic objection to it we must consider: that entertaining cannot be treated as quite on a par with belief and desire, given the much more central role the latter play in the explanation of action and behavior. I will consider this objection in §4. Before that, I want to assess Brentano's subsidiary argument for his view.

### 3.3. *The Via Positiva Argument*

In §9 of Chap. 7, Brentano presents in rapid succession four asymmetries between judgment and presentation. Each asymmetry *suggests* that belief and entertaining belong to different fundamental categories. Together, they constitute *converging lines of evidence* for Brentano's attitudinal conception of the belief/entertaining distinction; which conception in turn supports the notion that entertaining is an attitudinal primitive on a par with belief and desire.

Brentano's first asymmetry has to do with the existence of contraries in the case of the former but not the latter:

Among presentations we find no contraries other than those of the objects which are contained in them. Insofar as warm and cold, light and dark, higher and lower pitch, etc., constitute contraries, we can say that the presentation of the one is opposed (*entgegengesetzte*) to that of the other... When love and hate enter in, there arises an entirely different kind of opposition. This opposition is not an opposition of objects, for the same object can be loved or hated; it is, rather, an opposition between [intentional] relations (*Beziehungen*) to the object... An entirely analogous opposition manifests itself unmistakably

in the domain of mental phenomena when we affirm or deny the presented object instead of directing love or hatred toward it. (Brentano 1874: II, 65-6 [222-3])

The argument here is straightforward: there is no positive/negative distinction for presentation; there is one for judgment; so, presentation is importantly unlike judgment. Brentano would presumably suggest that the *reason* there is a positive/negative distinction in the case of judgment is that some judgments present-as-true while others present-as-false, so that the former can be thought of as positive and the latter as negative. Since presentations merely-present, no similar distinction is possible for them.

Obviously, this too presupposes Brentano's nonreductive account of disbelief: if disbelief that  $p$  were just belief that  $\sim p$ , the contrast between belief and disbelief would also be just a content-level contrast. As noted, we will see the main motivation for the nonreductive account in Chap. 4. It is, in any case, clearly controversial.

Brentano's second asymmetry concerns the kinds of intensity we find in judgment and presentation. A presentation is less or more intense depending on the 'sharpness (*Schärfe*) and vivacity' with which its intentional object is present to the mind (1874: II, 66 [223]). I can visualize a purple horse in a somewhat drowsy or inalert manner, and a second later, after drinking a double espresso, imagine it with great liveliness and clarity – even if no further *details* are added to the imagined horse. In judgment, the same kind of intensity occurs as well: I can also *believe* that no horses are purple before and after my espresso! But in the case of judgment, there is also a completely different kind of intensity, to do with the 'degree of certainty in conviction (*Überzeugung*)' (Ibid.). My belief that there are no purple horses is stronger than my belief that there are no purple parrots in a sense unrelated to the vivacity with which I am having these thoughts. I am simply *surer* of the former.

It might be objected that while variation in degrees of conviction is a familiar phenomenon, the notion of variation in an independent degree of vivacity is quite

mysterious. However, although this latter phenomenon is quite important to Brentano, it is *not* important in the present dialectical context. For even if there is a single type of intensity in the area, one along which judgments vary but presentations do not, this already creates an asymmetry between the two.

A second objection is that intensity talk is unsuitable even for degrees of conviction. But this too is quite immaterial to Brentano's purposes. What matters for the asymmetry claim is just the idea of purely quantitative variation among judgments. It is plausible that presentations can vary quantitatively in one way at most, whereas judgments may vary quantitatively in an additional way. That is already an asymmetry. Brentano's attitudinal account of the judgment/presentation distinction then provides an elegant *explanation* of this: belief that *p* presents-as-true *p*, and can vary quantitatively along the 'presents' dimension or along the 'as-true' dimension; the former is variation in vivacity, the latter variation in conviction. In contrast, entertaining that *p* merely-presents *p*, and so can vary quantitatively only along the 'presents' dimension.

A third objection is that judgments do not in fact vary quantitatively in and of themselves. Rather, different beliefs are accompanied by different *second-order* appraisals of their likely plausibility. The idea is that one does not believe that *p* *confidently*; rather, one believes that *p* *with confidence*. That is, confidence is not an intrinsic modification of a single belief state, but rather involves two mental states: a belief with the content <*p*> and a confidence state with the content <my belief that *p* is very likely true>. If this is right, then beliefs in themselves do *not* vary along an intrinsic dimension we may call degree of conviction.<sup>24</sup> This strikes me as a fair objection, one which shows, at the very least, that Brentano's second purported contrast between judgment and presentation carries its own theoretical baggage, just as the first did.

Brentano's third asymmetry concerns normativity: while judgment is governed by a norm, and is evaluable in light of a standard of correctness, neither is the case for presentation. A belief can be evaluated for truth, and is criticizable when

false. In contrast, 'there is no virtue, no wickedness, no knowledge, no error in presentation. All this is intrinsically foreign to it' (1874: II, 66-7 [223]). Here too, it is clear that the *reason* belief has a standard of correctness is that it presents-as-true. Indeed, the fact that it presents-as-true determines truth as the kind of correctness by which belief is to be evaluated. As already noted, truth is the norm of belief precisely because belief by its nature presents-as-true its content. In contrast, since there is no F such that entertaining by its nature presents-as-F, there is no F that can serve as a standard of evaluation for entertaining – there is no 'norm of entertaining.' We can entertain whatever we wish without ever exposing ourselves to epistemic blame. Thus the normativity of belief and entertaining serves as indirect evidence for the thesis that the belief/entertaining distinction is an attitudinal distinction to do with the difference between presenting-as-true and merely-presenting.

Here it might be objected that while entertaining cannot be assessed in terms of truth or goodness, there are a host of other dimensions along which it can be: clarity, distinctness, informativeness, detail, and others. A more detailed contemplation of something is in some sense *better than* a less detailed one; conceiving a possible scenario in a more distinct manner (that is, with a stronger grasp of how it differs from other possible scenarios) is superior to conceiving it in a vaguer fashion; and so on. In response, however, Brentano might say that detailed and distinct apprehensions are not in fact better *in and of themselves*. Perhaps they are only better insofar as the judgments that would be formed simply by endorsing them would be better. Perhaps they are better in affording greater joy, especially where the apprehension of an aesthetic object is concerned (see Brentano 1959: 127). But in any case it is not quite *intrinsically* that a clear and distinct idea is better than an unclear and indistinct one. If so, there is no normativity *proper* to the domain of mere presentation.

Finally, Brentano invokes an asymmetry to do with psychological laws governing judgments and presentations:

... besides the general laws governing the succession of presentations ... we find special laws, which are particularly valid for judgments, and which bear the same relation to logic as the laws of love and hate do to ethics. (Brentano 1874: II, 68 [224])

Brentano seems to suggest here that while the only laws governing presentations are the kind of laws posited in 'associationist psychology,' judgments are also governed by the kind of laws posited in 'rational psychology.' The latter dictate that, at least in the well-functioning subject, causal connections among mental states track logical connections (deductive, probabilistic, or whatever) among their contents. This contrasts with 'laws of association,' where causal connections among states track non-logical connections – resemblance, contiguity, etc. – among contents.

Of Brentano's four asymmetry claims, this is probably the most dubious. When one *considers* whether to believe that *p*, one does not yet believe that *p* but merely presents *p*. Thus there is no attitudinal opposite here (there is no such thing as 'dis-considering' whether *p*) and no truth-evaluation is possible (one cannot be said to consider falsely). Yet considering whether *p* will involve considering the evidence for *p*, the implications of *p*, and so on, where logical or 'rational' connections between contents are very much concerned. Similar remarks apply to supposing that *p* (say, in order to see what follows from it). So while there are certainly such states as imagery and contemplation, for which association laws may be in force, rational laws do govern *some* states that merely-present.

In conclusion, of Brentano's four asymmetry claims, only the third is compelling against a neutral theoretical background: plausibly, there is a kind of 'ethics of judgment' but no 'ethics of presentation.' This asymmetry claim *could* be taken all by itself as a springboard for an inference to the best explanation for an attitudinal judgment/presentation distinction. But the idea behind Brentano's *via positiva* argument was more ambitious: that the four asymmetry claims admit of a single, unifying explanation in terms of the idea that the *nature* of judgments is to present-as-true/false whereas the nature of presentations is to merely-present, and as such provide converging lines of evidence in favor of the Brentanian take on the

distinction. With only one compelling asymmetry, the force of such an argument is much weakened.

For my part, I am quite convinced by Brentano's claim that entertaining that  $p$  is an attitudinal primitive on a par with, and irreducible to, belief and desire (see Kriegel 2015 Chap. 3). But I find the (suitably strengthened) *via negativa* argument much more effective in making the case for it. In the next section, I consider (what I suspect is) the main reason the Brentanian outlook has not had much traction in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, where entertaining has been disregarded within belief-desire psychology.<sup>25</sup>

#### **4. Classification and Demarcation: Brentano versus Contemporary Philosophy of Mind**

Why is entertaining (and more generally presentation) not treated in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind as on a par with belief and desire? Arguably, the basic reason is that it does not play the kind of *direct role in the explanation of behavior* that belief and desire do. Since Davidson (1963), we are accustomed to working with a straightforward model of action explanation in terms of reasons consisting of belief-desire pairs. Why did Jimmy buy chocolate? Because he *desired* to eat chocolate and *believed* that by buying chocolate he would be able to eat some. More generally, if a person  $\varphi$ s for reason R, then (a) she has a desire that  $p$  and a belief that  $\varphi$ -ing would increase the likelihood that  $p$ , (b) this belief-desire pair constitutes R, and (c) R causes the  $\varphi$ -ing. Clearly, entertaining plays no role in this kind of model. On the one hand, the combination of Jimmy desiring chocolate and him merely entertaining the notion that buying chocolate would enable eating some does not quite explain the actual buying; nor does the combination of Jimmy entertaining the eating of chocolate and believing that by buying some he would be able to. On the other hand, the combination of Jimmy's belief and desire does explain

the behavior, so citing entertaining as a third component would be explanatorily pointless.

We might be able to cite entertaining in the explanation of how Jimmy came to form the desire: perhaps he entertained eating chocolate, considered that this is quite a good idea, and thence came to desire to eat chocolate. Likewise, entertaining might play a role in the explanation of Jimmy's belief's formation: perhaps Jimmy entertained a number of ways of satisfying his desire for chocolate – buying some, stealing some, making some – and came to think that the buying option is best, thus forming the belief. However, this does not quite cast entertaining as 'on a par' with belief and desire. For in this model entertaining is causally twice removed from the action it helps explain, so that its explanatory role is not quite as direct as that of belief and desire. (This is so even if it is not immediately obvious how to unpack 'direct.')

Now, one could certainly quarrel about all of these claims. But it seems to me that something like them underlies the absence of entertaining in the fundamental taxonomy of mental states implicit in contemporary philosophy of mind.

In the background, it would seem, is something like the following taxonomic principle: we should classify mental states according to their explanatory role vis-à-vis action. A 'fundamental classification' of mental states would cite the states appearing in the 'direct' explanation of action; less fundamental types of mental state are those which explain directly not action but the mental states that explain action; and so on. This is in contradistinction to Brentano's taxonomic principle, which appeals instead to modes of intentionality or *ways of presenting*. Indeed, for all we have said here, everybody could in principle agree on the following: (a) *if we classify mental states by explanatory role, then belief and desire are the only fundamental propositional attitudes*; (b) *if we classify mental states by modes of intentionality, then belief and desire must be complemented with entertaining*. The disagreement, at bottom, is on how we should go about the taxonomic business.

Recall from §1 that, in Brentano, the fact that mode of intentionality is the principle of classification is connected to the fact that intentionality is the principle of demarcation. It stands to reason that mental states should be differentiated by mode of intentionality if what makes them mental in the first place is that they exhibit intentionality at all. A similar link may be supposed within the framework of action explanation: if mental states are classified by the kind of role they play in explaining action, it is because having a role in explaining action at all is what makes them mental states in the first place. And indeed, one gets the impression that explaining action is the 'mark of the mental' implicit in much contemporary analytic philosophy of mind.

To appreciate the plausibility of this mark claim, it is crucial to distinguish action from *movement*, *motor activity*, and so on (Dretske 1988). Imagine two identical leg movements, resulting in the same worldly state of affairs, but produced by two different causes: one is produced by the person's intention to kick a ball, the other by a dog bumping into the person's leg (which happens to adjoin a ball). Intuitively, we have here type-identical movements, but not type-identical actions. In fact, intuitively the dog-caused movement may not be an action at all, whereas the intention-produced movement clearly is. Clearly, then, there is more to action than movement. It is the explanation of action, and not of movement, that is proper to *mental* phenomena. Many neurophysiological phenomena that we would not consider mental (e.g., cerebral hormone secretions) are relevant to the explanation of movement and motor activity, but do not seem to have the same relevance to the explanation of action as such.



Arguably, then, the gap between Brentano's taxonomy and ours lies, at bottom, in a different conception of what makes a given phenomenon mental in the first place: we today think of mental phenomena as those relevant to the explanation of action; Brentano thinks of them as those exhibiting intentionality. This conflict may, however, be more apparent than real. For recall that Brentano takes all mental

states to be conscious, and accordingly is better understood as holding that intentionality is the mark of the *conscious*. Indeed, as we have seen in Chap. 2, it is a specific kind of intentionality – a felt quality of endogenous directedness which we called phenomenal intentionality – that serves as the mark of the conscious. Now, it is perfectly coherent to hold that what makes a state mental is that it is suitably relevant to the explanation of action, but what makes it conscious is that it exhibits phenomenal intentionality. Brentano himself would reject this, precisely because he sees no daylight between the mental and the conscious, but as I have argued in Chap. 1, this is probably the least plausible part of his philosophy of mind. A plausible yet largely Brentanian philosophy of mind, I suggest, would embrace the picture just articulated: action-explanation as the mark of the mental, endogenous directedness as the mark of the conscious.

This picture recommends two parallel taxonomies: a classification of *mental* states by kind of role played in action explanation, and another classification of *conscious* states by kind of endogenous directedness. From this perspective, it is natural to regard entertaining as a third fundamental type of *conscious* propositional attitude, on a par with conscious belief (judgment) and conscious desire (interest). Certainly Brentano himself considered the judgment/presentation distinction to be experientially manifest:

... inner experience (*Erfahrung*) directly reveals/shows (*zeigt*) the difference in the reference to their content that we assert of presentation and judgment (1874: II, 70 [225]).<sup>26</sup>

What Brentano has in mind, I suspect, is that once we grasp the idea of presenting-as-F, and become inner-perceptually sensitive, for instance, to the difference between presenting-as-true and presenting-as-good, we can also become sensitive (in inner perception) to the difference between presenting-as-true and merely-presenting. When we inner-perceive side by side, so to speak, an imagined episode of consciously believing that *p* and an imagined episode of merely entertaining that *p*, we detect a difference in the manner in which each presents *p*. Thus these episodes are different not just *qua* mental states, but also *qua experienced conscious*

*states*. So even if entertaining is not a *mental* state on a par with (i.e., at the same taxonomic level as) belief and desire, insofar as it does not play a similarly direct role in the explanation of action, it may nonetheless be a *conscious* state on a par with conscious believing and conscious desiring, insofar as it embodies a distinctive and equally fundamental way of being endogenously directed.

In contemporary philosophy of mind, not everybody is comfortable speaking of *conscious* belief. Belief, we are sometimes told, is essentially a standing state, rather than a conscious occurrence (Crane 2001). But even those who reject the notion of conscious belief often accept a conscious occurrence whose intentional profile is akin to that of belief (Crane 2013). They accept, for example, conscious occurrences with a mind-to-world direction of fit. Or better yet, they accept a conscious occurrence that presents-as-true. Consider this passage from L.J. Cohen:

Feeling it true that *p* may thus be compared with feeling it good that *p*. All credal feelings, whether weak or strong, share the distinctive feature of constituting some kind of orientation on the ‘True or false?’ issue in relation to their propositional objects, whereas affective mental feelings, like those of anger or desire, constitute some kind of orientation on the ‘Good or bad?’ issue. (Cohen 1992: 11)

Cohen’s outlook is extraordinarily similar to Brentano’s. Feeling it true that *p* is a conscious occurrence directed at *p* in a distinctive, truth-committal manner, while feeling it good that *p* is a conscious occurrence directed at *p* in a distinctive, goodness-committal manner. Brentano would accept all this but insist that there is also a kind of felt conscious occurrence of simply apprehending *p*, where we neither feel it true that *p* nor feel it good that *p*, but just experientially grasp *p*.

In conclusion, despite the appearance of tension between Brentano’s system of mental classification and ours, the two can be held together as long as we keep in mind one thing: that Brentano’s is really tailored for the conscious domain, and is presented as targeting the mental domain only because of Brentano’s (problematic) view that conscious states exhaust mentality.

## Conclusion

The classification of conscious states by intentional mode is not only fundamental in Brentano's philosophy of mind, it is *foundational* for his entire philosophical system. As I will try to show in Parts II and III of this book, Brentano's accounts of the true, the good, and the beautiful are largely based on his accounts of judgment, interest, and presentation. Already in the *Psychology*, he writes:

We see that ... the triad of ideals, the beautiful, the true, and the good, can well be explicated in terms of the system of mental faculties [presentation, judgment, and interest]. Indeed, this is *the only way in which it becomes fully intelligible (erklären)*... (Brentano 1874: II, 122 [263]; my italics)

In the *Psychology*, Brentano only sketches the grounding of truth, goodness, and beauty in judgment, interest, and presentation – and sketches an early version of the idea that was to give way to a more sophisticated version. Parts II and III of the present book lay out the more sophisticated version. Part II focuses on Brentano's theory of judgment and the manner in which it grounds his metaphysics. Part III focuses on Brentano's theory of interest and the manner in which it grounds his value theory (both moral and aesthetic). Although presentation has an important role to play in Brentano's account of aesthetic value, it is less central to the system than judgment and interest – except insofar as both are asymmetrically dependent upon it. Accordingly, we have focused on it in the second half of the present chapter, instead of dedicating to it a chapter of its own.

Regardless of the specifics of Brentano's grounding of the true, the good, and the beautiful in judgment, interest, and presentation, it is an intriguing gambit to attempt to construct one's philosophical system around one's theory of mind. The gambit casts philosophy of mind in the role of *first philosophy*, the philosophical discipline that all others presuppose. For much of its history, analytic philosophy has taken philosophy of *language* as first philosophy, while early modern philosophy – certainly Descartes, the British empiricists, and Kant – reserved that role for epistemology. Brentano's tenure offers us a historical window in which

philosophy of mind held this pride of place. And when we remember that Brentano's philosophy of mind is forsooth just a philosophy of consciousness, we realize that Brentano's system offers a unique opportunity to consider how a philosophy of consciousness can ground a comprehensive philosophical system in the traditional sense.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Chap. 5 offers a survey of traditional classifications of mental phenomena. Chap. 6 lays out Brentano's alternative scheme. Brentano considers that his classification diverges from the tradition in two important respects; the goals of Chap. 7 and 8 is to make the case for each divergence.

<sup>2</sup> This parallelism between judgment and interest, the understanding and the will, is noted already in Brentano's doctoral dissertation, published when he was just 24: 'Just as the good is that at which the will aims, so the understanding aims at the true as its goal' (Brentano 1862: 29 [19]).

<sup>3</sup> Clearly, the terms 'love' and 'hate' are used in a wide sense here. I love my wife, but I also love ice cream. It is the second, less demanding sense of 'love' that Brentano has in mind (1874: II, 36 [199]).

<sup>4</sup> Brentano's '*Vorstellung*' has been variously translated as presentation, representation, apprehension, idea, thought, and contemplation. In this book, I stick to the English term closest to *Vorstellung* in everyday non-philosophical talk – 'presentation.'

<sup>5</sup> A word on supposition may be in order here. When one supposes that *p*, one is not thereby committed to the truth of *p*. There is a sense in which in supposing that *p*, one presents *p* to oneself under the guise of truth. Nonetheless, one is not genuinely *committed* to the truth of *p*. For Brentano, this lack of commitment to truth lands supposition in the category of presentation. His student Meinong argued that in fact suppositions (*Annahmen*) share one essential characteristic with presentations but another with judgments, and so constituted a sui generis category (Meinong 1902). Brentano argues against this in several places, for example Brentano 1911: 149-50 [284-6] (see also manuscript XPs5).

<sup>6</sup> Such attitudinal properties as presenting-as-true and presenting-as-good are in an important sense still *intentional* properties, and that is certainly how Brentano treats them. Presenting-as-F some *a* and presenting some *a* as F both cast *a* as F, so if the latter is regarded as an intentional property so should the former. The difference goes back to where the F-information is encoded, in the content or the attitude. Both are informative, however.

<sup>7</sup> The books were never published, and to my knowledge only a draft of the third – on presentation – exists (manuscript XPs53, 277 sheets' worth). But many relevant ideas exist in dispersed manuscripts. Incidentally, Book VI of the planned *Psychology* was supposed to concern the soul and its immortality: while all other envisaged books concerned mental *accidents*, the final one was to concern the mental *substance*.

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<sup>8</sup> Intentional action is treated here as a mental phenomenon, because what intentional action a person has performed – as opposed to what movements her body has undergone – is partially a matter of the intentions the person had in moving her body as she did.

<sup>9</sup> In addition, conscious occurrent beliefs must have more to them than dispositional properties, since they are precisely *occurrent*. From this perspective, the fact that Brentano takes *all* mental states to be conscious and occurrent closes the functionalist avenue to him.

<sup>10</sup> It is sometimes claimed that something other than truth is the norm of belief – for example, that knowledge is the norm of belief (Sutton 2007). But in any case, most everybody agrees that truth is *a* norm of belief, and those who are attracted by a normative approach to the nature of belief tend to take this norm as capturing the essence of belief.

<sup>11</sup> Brentano stresses this when highlighting the systematic differences between judgment and presentation (as we will see in §3.3).

<sup>12</sup> I am assuming here, with Brentano, that belief and disbelief are occurrent states with an inner-perceived experiential character. Obviously, this does not sit well with contemporary functionalist approaches to belief, which typically construe it as a standing state with no notable experiential dimension. This discrepancy will be taken up in §4.

<sup>13</sup> It might be objected that in the case of pleasure and displeasure, there is a *phenomenal* difference between the two kinds of acts. But for Brentano, there is also a phenomenal difference between belief and disbelief, at least in the sense that they appear differently to inner perception (which is the only sense of ‘phenomenal difference’ Brentano would accept).

<sup>14</sup> Such oppositional models were apparently commonplace in the surrounding culture of the Austro-Hungarian empire: the intellectual historian William Johnston, whose *The Austrian Mind* is a classic in the field, speaks of ‘certain attitudes that have permeated Austrian thought, such as hostility to technology and delight in polar opposites’ (Johnston 1972: 1).

<sup>15</sup> This may be resisted on the grounds that we sometimes have a perceptual experience as of an object in whose existence we do not believe, say a centaur hologram. According to Brentano, however, this is just a case of having conflicting commitments: we are perceptually committed to the holographic centaur’s existence and doxastically committed to its nonexistence simultaneously – just as we can sometimes want ice cream (it is tasty) and not want it (it fattens) at once (see Brentano 1982: 87 [93]).

<sup>16</sup> There is also the important distinction between intrinsic and instrumental varieties of interests (Brentano 1907a: 149 [144]). We love happiness for its own sake, but dental health for the sake of something else. It is unclear to me, however, whether Brentano takes this distinction to pertain to the mode of presentation (attitude) or to the object presented (content).

<sup>17</sup> The same applies to interest and its distinctive mode of presenting-as-good/bad.

<sup>18</sup> In fact, according to Brentano the attitudinal difference between perception and episodic memory in terms of temporal orientation derives ultimately from the distinction between oblique and direct presentations. His reasons for claiming that it is originally a distinction between kinds of presentation, rather than kinds of judgment (as perception and memory are) is that differences in temporal orientation apply equally to states of judgment and interest (Brentano 1928: 49 [36]). His reason for claiming that the distinction derives from the oblique/direct distinction has to do with his presentism (Brentano 1933: 18 [24]): he wants to say that ‘Jesus died two thousand years ago’ is directly about the present time and obliquely about Jesus’ death, so that all *modus-recto* reference is to the present. For critical discussion, see Simons 1990.

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<sup>19</sup> One advantage of my proposed attitudinal approach to the sensory/intellectual distinction, from a Brentanian perspective, is that it falls out of it that perceptual experience is a *species* of judgment (since presenting-as-existent-here-and-now is a species of presenting-as-existent).

<sup>20</sup> Part of the issue may be that (as we will see in Chap. 6) Brentano is a nominalist who does not believe in *mere* intelligibles, that is, entities which can be apprehended in principle only intellectually.

<sup>21</sup> This is ultimately to be paraphrased in terms of propositions describing one's execution of the action-type  $\varphi$ , since unwillingness too must be construed as a propositional attitude in this framework.

<sup>22</sup> Obviously, for this to be the case, there must be such a thing as entertaining. Some psychologists and philosophers have denied this (Gilbert 1991, Mandelbaum 2013). Here I am going to assume that they are wrong; I offer an argument to that effect in Kriegel 2015a Chap. 3.

<sup>23</sup> One might object that the predicative/prepredicative distinction is not the only possible content distinction. Another is the distinction between presenting  $p$  as actually obtaining versus presenting it as merely (logically) possible. On this view, entertaining that  $p$  is just believing that  $\Diamond p$  – which casts entertaining as a species of belief. One problem with this, however, is that arguably one can entertain even propositions one believes to be (logically-)necessarily false. For example, I might entertain Frege's set theory, or perhaps just its axiom of comprehension, even though, being familiar with Russell's Paradox, I believe it to be incoherent.

<sup>24</sup> What motivates this picture is the observation that when we engage in the process of weighing the evidence for  $p$  and  $\sim p$  and finally come down on the issue, the act of coming down – the act of *making the judgment* – seems to involve a certain feeling of finality or absoluteness. At the instant one makes the judgment, one effectively decides to bring one's 'inquiry' as to whether  $p$  to an end. This sense of finality or absoluteness attaches to *all* judgment-making, however confident. To accommodate this phenomenal feature of judging, while doing justice to the evident fact that beliefs can vary in degree of conviction, we might think that the state of conviction or confidence must lie outside the judgment proper.

<sup>25</sup> To repeat, the present discussion indulges the currently orthodox supposition that such states as belief and desire have at bottom a propositional content; this is denied by Brentano, but is worth accepting for the sake of argument, to show that the rejection of belief-desire psychology does not presuppose Brentano's heterodox account of belief.

<sup>26</sup> In the heading of §1 of Brentano 1874 II Chap. 7, Brentano refers to the judgment/presentation difference as provided by the 'testimony of inner experience.'

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