

Chapter 2.

Intentionality

The notion of intentionality is what Brentano is best known for. But disagreements and misunderstandings still surround both the phenomenon he had in mind and the account of it he proposed, that is, both his explanandum and his explanation. In this chapter, I argue for two main claims. Regarding the explanandum, I argue that, unlike the notion of intentionality central to modern philosophy of mind, Brentano's notion of intentionality has nothing to do with mental states' capacity to track elements in the environment; rather, it has to do with a phenomenal feature in virtue of which conscious experiences present something to the subject. Regarding the explanation, I argue that, contrary to common wisdom in Brentano scholarship, there is no real evidence that Brentano took intentionality to be a relation to immanent objects; rather, his mature theory clearly casts intentionality as an *intrinsic, non-relational* property, and a property in the first instance *of subjects* (rather than of subjects' internal states).

1. Intentionality as the Mark of the Conscious

If you know nothing else about Brentano, you know this: he said that intentionality was the mark of the mental. This may be thought of as the following claim:

(I1) All and only mental states are intentional.

Recall from Chap. 1, however, that Brentano took the mental and the conscious to coextend, and so tended to present theses targeting consciousness as applying to

mentality writ large. Ultimately, it seems to me, Brentano derives I1 from two more fundamental claims:

(I2) All and only conscious states are intentional.

(COEXTENSION) All and only mental states are conscious.

Clearly, I1 is entailed by I2 plus COEXTENSION. Brentano is committed to all three claims, but the entailment relations work in one specific direction, suggesting that Brentano's more fundamental mark thesis is that intentionality is the mark of the *conscious*. The claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental just falls out of it against the background of COEXTENSION.

This is important, because it shows that Brentano's notion of intentionality is the notion of a feature characteristic of *conscious experience*. To that extent, it is very different from the notion of intentionality discussed in most twentieth-century philosophy of mind, the notion of an objective relation that conscious and nonconscious states alike bear to some environmental feature. While there may well be such objective relations between mental states and environmental features, they are simply not the phenomenon Brentano has in mind in speaking of intentionality. What he has in mind is a *subjective* feature special to conscious experiences – a kind of *felt aboutness*, an experience of the mind's endogenous directedness at the outside world.

Accordingly, the only way to grasp what intentionality *is*, for Brentano, is to experience intentionality for oneself. The various descriptions of intentionality he offers – including the celebrated 'intentionality passage' – are intended to help the reader focus her mind on the right phenomenon; but the nature of the phenomenon cannot be appreciated simply by reading those descriptions. It must be experienced directly. In a 1906 piece, for example, he writes:¹

The general nature of all mental things, as we experience it, is the having of [intentional] objects. What is said thereby cannot be made distinct without recourse to experience: just as it would be impossible to make clear to a blind man the concept of red, it is impossible to make clear to someone ... who has never apprehended himself as a thinker the concept of

thinking ... and to show him what one means when one says there is no thinking thing without thought object, no mental subject without object. (Brentano 1966: 339)

Imagine trying to explain to someone what babaganush tastes like, or what nocciola gelato tastes like, or what vegemite tastes like. Indeed, imagine trying to explain to someone congenitally incapable of gustatory experience what experience *taste* is like. If you are lucky, your various descriptions may be suggestive and intriguing. Ultimately, however, to fully grasp what it is like to taste nocciola gelato, or to taste at all, a person must be able to experience taste for herself. Similarly, according to Brentano, true appreciation of intentionality requires experiencing for oneself the subjective quality of endogenous directedness, of felt aboutness. This subjective experience is much more general than that of experiencing the taste of nocciola gelato (indeed, for Brentano the latter is a *species* of the former) but both are equally experiential, subjective properties.

In this respect, the notion in current philosophy of mind that dovetails most closely with the phenomenon Brentano has in mind is that of *phenomenal intentionality* (see Loar 1987, 2003, as well as Horgan & Tienson 2002 and Kriegel 2013a,b). Phenomenal intentionality is supposed to be precisely an experiential feature of endogenous directedness at the world. The idea is that our conscious experiences *feel* as though they are directed at something other than themselves. It is something like this felt directedness that Brentano had in mind with his notion of intentionality (Potrč 2002, 2013, Dewalque 2013). Accordingly, it is something like phenomenal intentionality, I contend, that constitutes the explanandum in Brentano's theory of intentionality.²

Taking all this into account, it is clear that Brentano's I2, the thesis that intentionality is the mark of the conscious, concerns specifically phenomenal intentionality. We may therefore formulate it more accurately as follow:

(I3) All and only conscious states exhibit phenomenal intentionality.

We might call this 'phenomenal intentionality as the mark of the conscious.'



Unlike I1, which has met with justifiable resistance, I3 is extremely plausible. It is not tautological, because phenomenal intentionality is not *defined* as the intentionality that conscious states exhibit. In a sense, it is not defined at all, but rather grasped through direct encounter in inner perception. Although not tautological, however, I3 is highly plausible. To see this more clearly, let us start by factorizing I3 into two claims:

(I3a) *All* conscious states exhibit phenomenal intentionality.

(I3b) *Only* conscious states exhibit phenomenal intentionality.

It is hard to imagine a counterexample to I3b. Can we think of a nonconscious state exhibiting the kind of felt directedness we encounter in inner perception? Surely not. The only real challenge to I3 must therefore concern I3a: whether *all* conscious states exhibit phenomenal intentionality. In particular, it has sometimes been claimed that (i) algedonic experiences of pain and pleasure and (ii) long-term moods, such as depression and anxiety, are undirected.

Brentano addresses the algedonic worry. He argues that pain and pleasure experiences present *sui generis* secondary qualities, that is, secondary qualities distinct from color, sound, and the like perceptible properties. He writes:

[When we] say that our foot or our hand hurts, that this or that part of the body is in pain ... there is in us not only the idea of a definite spatial location but also a particular sensory quality analogous to color, sound, and other so-called sensory qualities, which is a physical phenomenon and which must be clearly distinguished from the accompanying feeling.

(Brentano 1874: I, 116 [83])

For some perceptual modalities, ordinary language generously provides two terms, one naturally applicable to the experience and one to its object. Taste is a property of gustatory experiences, flavor a property of gustatory objects; smell is a property of olfactory experiences, odor a property of olfactory objects; and so on.

Unfortunately, 'pleasure' and 'pain' are ambiguously applicable to both experience

and object, and this is what misleads us into non-intentional thinking in this case.

Yet:

If we hear a pleasing and mild sound or a shrill one, harmonious chord or a dissonance, it would not occur to anyone to identify the sound with the accompanying feeling of pleasure and pain. But then in cases where a feeling of pain or pleasure is aroused in us by a cut, a burn or a tickle, we must distinguish in the same way between a physical phenomenon, which appears as the object of external perception, and the mental phenomenon of feeling, which accompanies its appearance, even though in this case the superficial observer is rather inclined to confuse them. (1874: I, 116-7 [83])

In other words, the non-intentional conception of pleasure and pain rests on a linguistic illusion. In reality, an experience of taking pleasure in a piece of music presents two types of secondary quality of the music: its sound properties and its hedonic properties.

I am not familiar with a discussion of moods in Brentano. Perhaps one reason is that Brentano focuses on *occurrent acts*, whereas moods appear to be *states* of some longevity (though not quite *standing* states). Nonetheless, moods are clearly part of our conscious life, and must be brought into the intentional fold if I3 is to be accepted. It is thus a real lacuna in Brentano's discussion that he nowhere (again: to my knowledge) addresses the case of moods. It falls on us, then, to 'supplement' Brentano's case for I3 with an intentionalist account of moods. In contemporary philosophy of mind, the most prominent intentionalist approach to mood construes it as presenting properties of *everything*, or else properties of *the world as a whole* (Crane 1998, 2009, Seager 1999). On the first view, anxiety presents everything as threatening and euphoria presents everything as delightful or exciting; on the second, anxiety presents the world as whole as a threatening place and euphoria as a delightful, exciting place. A different intentionalist account attempts to capture the undirected character of moods by claiming that they present features but without presenting them as being *anything's* features (Mendelovici 2013). On this view, anxiety may present threateningness, but not anything's a kind of uninstantiated,

‘uninhabited’ threateningness. It is impossible to know how Brentano would look upon either of these views, but they are at least options.

The next question is: what is Brentano’s *account* of phenomenal intentionality? In the remainder of this chapter, I want to argue that Brentano’s mature account of intentionality construes it as a non-relational, intrinsic property of subjects. This is twice removed from the notion that intentionality is a relation that conscious states bear to immanent objects: first, insofar as it casts intentionality as intrinsic rather than relational; second, insofar as it casts intentionality as a property of subjects rather than of subjects’ internal states. (Note well: I frame the claims being debated in terms of properties just for convenience. As we will see more fully in Chap. 6, Brentano does not have a place for properties in his ontology. Nonetheless, claims that appear to make reference to properties get paraphrased in a way that preserves their truth. This will be the case with claims about intentional properties as well.)

2. Brentano’s Non-relational Account of Intentionality

It is striking how little there is in the *Psychology* about the *nature* of intentionality. Long discussions are dedicated to arguing that intentionality is the mark of the mental, but to say this is not yet to say anything about what intentionality *is*. On the issue of the nature of intentionality, all we find in the *Psychology* are the 97 words (in the German original) constituting the ‘intentionality passage.’ Here is the passage in full:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional or mental inexistence of an object (*Gegenstandes*), and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference (*Beziehung*) to a content (*Inhalt*), direction (*Richtung*) toward an object (*Object*) (which is not to be understood here as meaning an entity (*Realität*)), or immanent objecthood (*Gegenständlichkeit*). Every mental phenomenon contains (*enthält*) something as object (*Object*) within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or

denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. (Brentano 1874: I, 124-5 [88])

On the basis of this passage alone, interpretive debates have flourished in more than one philosophical tradition. The dominant interpretation, thought to require the least interpretive ‘creativity,’ ascribes to Brentano an ‘immanentist’ account of intentionality. According to this, intentionality is a relation between subjects’ intentional acts and immanent objects, objects that exist only ‘in the subject’s head.’ That is, when S perceives a tree, there is (i) a perceptual act taking place in S, (ii) a ‘mental tree’ or ‘tree-idea’ in S’s mind, and (iii) a primitive intentional relation that (i) bears to (ii). Perhaps partly because this immanentist theory is taken to suffer from fatal flaws,³ some have attempted to reinterpret the passage so as to ascribe to Brentano a more plausible account (e.g., Moran 1996, Chrudzimski 2001).⁴ Proponents of the immanentist interpretation tend to dismiss these endeavors as ‘twisting Brentano’s words’ (Smith 1994: 40; see also Crane 2006).

My own view is that the passage is too short and underdeveloped to discriminate among a number of importantly different accounts: many accounts of the nature of intentionality will be compatible with Brentano’s 97 words. The choice of interpretation is thus strongly underdetermined by *this* textual evidence. Moreover, it is not implausible that at that early stage of his career, Brentano had simply not yet worked out anything very specific, perhaps had not even appreciated the multitude of theoretical options. What is clear, in any case, is that by 1911 Brentano had developed a much more textured account of the nature of intentionality. In 1911, the last four chapters of the *Psychology* were reprinted, in slightly reedited form, along with eleven appendices, under the title *The Classification of Mental Phenomena* (Brentano 1911). In the first of these appendices (1911: 133-8 [271-5]), Brentano presents a more determinate and worked out account of intentionality, to which I will refer as the ‘mature account.’ In the remainder of this section, I present an interpretation of Brentano’s mature account according to which:

(INTRINSICNESS) Intentionality is an intrinsic property of subjects.⁵

This thesis has two important elements: (i) it assays intentionality as an intrinsic, non-relational property and (ii) it construes that property as a property not of intentional *acts*, but of *subjects*. I start by developing more fully this interpretation of Brentano's mature theory (§2.1), then discuss Brentano's argument for it (§2.2).

2.1. *The View*

A first step toward understanding Brentano's view is a correct appreciation of his conception of the intentional object. The notion of an intentional object involves a tangle of substantive and terminological issues. With deliberate artifice, let us pretend that it is a matter of simple terminological decision whether when subject S veridically perceives a tree, the expression 'intentional object' will be used to denote (a) the external tree targeted by S's perception or (b) a different entity which might be called the-presented-tree or the-tree-qua-presented (never mind what exactly that means). On this terminological issue, it is clear that the mature Brentano chose the first route. In a 1905 letter to Anton Marty, he writes:

It has never been my view that the [intentional] object is identical to the *presented object* (*vorgestelltes Objekt*). A presentation, for example a horse-presentation, has as its [intentional] object not the *presented thing* but rather the *thing*, in this case not a *presented horse* but rather a *horse*. (Brentano 1930: 87-8 [77])

This 'decision' raises, however, three important questions: (i) how to understand the status of the intentional object in *non-veridical* experiences, (ii) how to understand the nature of the relation between the intentional act and the intentional object, and (iii) whether the intentional relation involves also a third relatum, sometimes called 'content.'

Debates among Brentano's students (Twardowski 1894, Meinong 1904), and Brentano's own reflections on the various theoretical options in the area (see Chrudzimski 2001 Chap. 2-7), have concerned mostly these issues. Perhaps through witnessing the various options' travails, in particular as concerns the

accommodation of radical error and hallucination, Brentano, as I read him, had by 1911 come to the position that intentionality is not a relation at all, but a non-relational property of the intentional act, or rather of the subject performing that act. As we will see, this non-relational conception of intentionality goes hand in hand with the claim that in cases of non-veridical experience, *there is no* intentional object.

The title of the relevant 1911 piece already suggests this notion: 'Mental reference (*Beziehung*) as distinguished from relation (*Relation*) in the strict sense.' This already suggests that, *strictly* speaking, intentionality is not a relation.⁶ The point is articulated most clearly here:

The terminus of the *so-called relation* does not in reality need to exist at all. For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something relational here, and not rather with something in certain respects *relation-like* (*Relativen Ähnliches*), something which might therefore be called *quasi-relational/relational-ish* (*Relativliches*). (Brentano 1911: 134 [272]; my italics)

The English translators chose to translate *Relativliches* as 'quasi-relational,' but the expressions 'relational-ish' and 'relation-like' may in truth be more felicitous. The expression 'quasi-relational' suggests a status curiously intermediate between those of being relational and being non-relational. As the rest of the passage shows unequivocally, however, Brentano's idea is rather that intentionality bears some important *similarities* to a relation but strictly speaking is not a relation. This is why Brentano refers to a 'so-called relation' and voices 'doubt whether we are really dealing with something relational' (where this seems to be a stylistically guarded negative assertion rather than genuine doubt). As Moran (1996: 11) puts it, by *Relativliches* Brentano 'seemed to mean that it [intentionality] only looked like a relation.' *Strictly speaking*, intentional properties are non-relational, monadic properties. Brentano works out the similarities between intentional properties and relations in the sentences immediately following this passage, but consistently refers to them as mere similarities.⁷ The expression 'relation-like' is thus apt, as it

suggests something non-relational that resembles relations in some respects (rather than some intermediate status between relational and non-relational).

Clearly, the surface grammar of intentional reports, such as 'S is thinking of dragons,' is relational. Brentano must hold, then, that such statements also have a (very different) 'deep grammar,' one that reflects more accurately the ontological structure of their truthmaker. The challenge is to find the kind of paraphrase whose 'surface grammar' would manifest this non-relational character. The 'deep grammar' claim boils down to this, then: (i) 'S is thinking of dragons' is paraphraseable into some statement P whose grammatical structure is non-relational, and (ii) the ontological structure of the truthmaker of 'S is thinking of dragons' is more accurately reflected in P's grammatical structure. The question is: what exactly is P?



Several options are available. One is *adverbialism*, where 'S is thinking of dragons' is paraphrased into 'S thinking dragon-ly' or 'S is thinking dragon-wise.' Here the grammar suggests that the subject, S, is engaged in a certain *activity*, thinking, and is engaged in it in a certain *manner*, namely dragon-wise. There is no relation between S and a separate entity or group of entities, only a first-order monadic property (thinking) of S and a second-order property (occurring dragon-wise) of the first-order property (or of S's instantiating of the first-order property).⁸

Some scholars ascribe such adverbialism to Brentano (Moran 1996, Chrudzimski and Smith 2004). Presumably, however, what they have in mind is primarily the non-relational construal of intentionality. The adverbialist technique for rendering that construal intelligible is only one option. Another option is what we might call *hyphenism*, where 'S is thinking of dragons' is paraphrased into 'S is thinking-of-dragons.' The purpose of the hyphens is to intimate that 'thinking-of-dragons' is a grammatically simple, unstructured predicate, of which 'dragons' is a merely *morphological*, but not *syntactic*, part. Compare: 'apple' is a morphological but not syntactic part of 'pineapple'; accordingly, something's being a pineapple does not involve its being an apple as part or component. Likewise, someone's

thinking-of-dragons does not involve as part dragons: dragons are not constituents of the truthmaker of 'S is thinking-of-dragons.' The only constituents of the truthmaker are S and its monadic property (which, misleadingly, is denoted by a composite-sounding predicate).⁹ As in adverbialism, there is no relation involved. Unlike in adverbialism, no second-order property is invoked either.

Brentano himself appeals neither to adverbialization nor to hyphenation. The closest he comes to adopting a specific paraphrase technique is in describing the subject, especially in his metaphysical writings (esp. Brentano 1933), as *this kind of thinker* or *that kind of thinker*, in the sense of that-which-thinks (*Denkendes*). This can be developed into what we may call *subjectism*, where 'S is thinking of dragons' is paraphrased into 'S is a dragons-thinker.' Here the grammar suggests a monadic property of the subject, that of being a particular species of the genus Thinker.

Brentano writes:

'There is' has its strict or proper meaning when used in connection with genuine logical names [i.e., expressions used to refer to entities], as in 'There is a God' or 'There is a man.' In its other uses, 'there is' must not be taken in its strict sense... [Thus,] 'There is something which is the object of thought (*ein Gedachtes*)' may be equated with [i.e., paraphrased into] 'There is something which thinks (*ein Denkendes*).' (Brentano 1930: 79 [68])

More generally:

... not the contemplated round thing, but the person contemplating it is what is in the strict sense. This fiction, that there is something which exists as a contemplated thing, may also prove harmless, but unless one realizes that it is a fiction, one may be led into the most glaring absurdities... Once we have translated [paraphrased] statements about such fictive objects into other terms, it becomes clear that the only thing the statement is concerned with is the person who is thinking about the object. (Brentano 1933: 8 [18])

Here Brentano states that intentional truths require as truthmakers only subjects (thinkers) and their taxonomizing into kinds; only careless constructions in public language mislead us into thinking there are further constituents in these truthmakers.¹⁰



A word on the issue of taxonomizing. A dragon-thinker is a species of a thinker, and a green-dragon-thinker is a subspecies of it. For Brentano, in asserting ‘S is thinking of a green dragon,’ we talk of an object (a green dragon) to indirectly classify the subject. This phenomenon is more familiar from other parts of our mentalistic discourse. It is often remarked that we have no better way to describe our visual experiences than indirectly, in terms of the color and shape properties of the objects of which they are experiences. Asked to describe your visual experience of a Mondrian, you are likely to fall back on terms which strictly speaking denote properties of the Mondrian you see, not properties of the seeing. If you are hallucinating the Mondrian, it is still true that your experience has the kind of qualitative character that it would have if it veridically presented an horizontal red rectangle at the bottom right corner, a vertical white rectangle next to it, and so on. That is, it is still true that your experience is *as of* an horizontal red rectangle at the bottom right corner, a vertical white rectangle next to it, and so on. For Brentano, we essentially use the same strategy to classify our thoughts, judgments, desires, and other intentional states across the board: we describe them indirectly by using terms for properties of what they are about (or would be about if they were veridical). Thus, we have no better way to describe a thought than by noting that it *is of dragons, or about the financial crisis*.

And so when we wish to state how one thinking individual differs from another, it is natural to characterize the thinker by reference to that which he is thinking about and to the way in which he relates to it as a thinker. We thus speak as though we were concerned with a relation between two things... Our language in these cases treats the object of thought as though it were a *thing* along with the person who is thinking. (Brentano 1933: 15 [22])

For Brentano, then, every intentional state is but an intrinsic modification of a subject, and we parasitically use expressions originally designed to pick out worldly items to indirectly describe these intrinsic modifications. A correct thought is accurately described by describing its object; an incorrect thought is accurately described by describing the object it would have if it were correct. Thus, in a 1911 letter to his *Enkelschüler* Franz Hillebrand, Brentano writes:

[W]e can say that a centaur, if it were to exist, would be a creature whose upper parts are like those of a man and whose lower parts are like those of a horse. ...[I]n such a case, it would be better to say that one is describing, not a centaur, but someone who is thinking about a centaur... (Brentano 1930: 114 [101])

Ultimately, it is this reliance on terms for external objects' properties to indirectly describe the intrinsic properties of subjects that has misled philosophers to construe thought as an honest-to-goodness relation between a subject and an object.

It is part of Brentano's view that, in cases of nonveridical presentation, strictly speaking there *are* no intentional objects. Conscious states involve intentional acts, which are intrinsic modifications of the subject, and intentional-object talk is just a device for characterizing different modifications. Importantly, intentional-object talk is still useful in classifying and describing a nonveridical intentional state. For we can still classify an intentional state according to the intentional object there would be if it were correct. Call this kind of 'would-be intentional object' a *merely-intentional object*. The present point could be summarized as follows: it is hard to classify or describe an intentional state without mentioning its intentional or merely-intentional object; all the same, strictly speaking there are no merely-intentional objects. Thus, in a 1904 fragment Brentano writes that 'there is nothing other than things, and "empty space" and "object of thought" (*Gedachtes*) do not name things' (Brentano 1930: 79 [68]). There are certainly objects which are intentional, namely, regular objects when targeted by some intentional act, or more accurately, by a subject suitably modified. But there are no objects which are *merely* intentional, that is, ones that have no other existence but as targeted by some intentional act. To that extent, merely-intentional objects are *useful fictions*: there are no such things, but it is useful to speak as though there are to indirectly describe and classify intentional states. In a 1916 dictation, Brentano explicitly describes intentional objects as useful fictions:

Obvious examples of such fictions are so-called *intentional beings*. We speak of 'a contemplated man,' or of 'a man who is thought about by this or that thinker,' and our

statements are like those in which we actually do speak of a man. But in such a case what we are thinking of *in recto* is [just] the person thinking of the man. (Brentano 1933: 19 [24])

Regardless of whether the man that S contemplates exists, what is really going on when S contemplates the man is that S exists and is intrinsically modified in a specific way, so that he can be described – classified – as a man-contemplator.

2.2. *The Argument*

What is Brentano's *argument* for the non-relational account of intentionality? Much of the 1911 piece is dedicated to an analysis of statements about relations among nonexistent putative entities, outside intentional contexts. Brentano's mature position is that such statements are elliptical:

I am not unmindful that some people nowadays, in opposition to Aristotle, deny that both things must exist in order for something to be larger or smaller than another thing. [But...] Someone who says that three is less than a trillion is not positively asserting the existence (*Existenz*) of a relation. He is saying, rather, that if there is a plurality/multitude (*Menge*) of three and a plurality/multitude of a trillion, that relation must obtain (*bestehen*) between them... (1911: 134-5 [273])

The passage presupposes a mathematical nominalism according to which talk of numbers is just talk of pluralities or multitudes (compare Maddy 1981). But the main point does not depend on such nominalism. It is that a categorical statement such as 'Hobbits are cuter than dragons' only *appears* to assert (read: has a surface grammar suggesting) the obtaining or holding (*bestehen*) of the cuter-than relation. In reality, it is merely elliptical for the hypothetical statement 'If there were hobbits and dragons, the former would be cuter than the latter.' The hypothetical statement does not assert the obtaining, the actual instantiation, of any relation – it only says that *if* certain conditions were met, *then* that relation would obtain/be instantiated. We may suppose that this hypothetical is true, and therefore requires a truthmaker; but the truthmaker will not involve any actual instance of a relation. It is only the original categorical, unparaphrased into the hypothetical, that would require a relation-instance as part of its truthmaker; but the unparaphrased categorical is

strictly speaking true, precisely because there is no actual instantiation of the cuter-than relation due to hobbits and dragons.

A similarly treatment applies to cases in which one, but only one, relatum does exist. Thus, 'Dogs are cuter than dragons' is elliptical for 'If there were dragons, dogs would be cuter than them.' The paraphrasing hypothetical is true but does not require a relation-instance in its truthmakers, while the unparaphrased categorical is strictly speaking false, so does not require *any* truthmakers. Either way we are spared the need for a relational truthmaker.

Against the background of this analysis, consider now an intentional expression, such as 'thinking of.' The view that thinking of x is a matter of bearing a certain relation to x , the thinking-of relation, would lead to odd results. First, given that there are no dragons, it would require us to reinterpret 'S is thinking of dragons' as elliptical for 'If there were dragons, S would be thinking of them.' Secondly, it would require us to consider the unparaphrased categorical 'S is thinking of dragons' as strictly speaking false. But both consequences are implausible. Therefore, we should reject the view that 'thinking-of' denotes a relation. Instead, we should construe it as denoting a non-relational property of the subject, misleadingly denoted by a transitive verb.

Brentano's argument for the non-relational account of intentionality is basically this, then. *Categorical* intentional statements (statements about intentional states) can be true, without being paraphrased into hypotheticals, even where the 'intended object' does not exist. But statements involving relational predicates cannot be true, unparaphrased, in such circumstances. So, the intentional predicates used intentional statements are not really relational predicates.

We may regiment Brentano's argument as follows. Let S be a statement composed of terms or expressions T_1, \dots, T_n plus logical vocabulary. Let N be a proper subset of T_1, \dots, T_n , whose members ostensibly refer to concrete particulars, and let M be the complement of N in T_1, \dots, T_n . How can we tell whether S is a *relational statement*? A superficial criterion might require M to include a 'relational term' as

member, where T is a relational term just if a grammatical statement involving T must involve at least two other terms. The problem with this criterion is that it gets the extension wrong: it correctly classifies as relational the statement 'Jimmy argued with Johnny,' but incorrectly classifies as relational 'Jimmy argued with conviction.' A deeper, more semantic criterion might require M to include a member that successfully refers to a relation, or requires S to have a relation among its truthmaker's constituents. That sort of criterion is surely right, but is dialectically unhelpful in the present context: we want to know whether 'Jimmy is thinking of dragons' is a relational statement, but only because we want to settle precisely the question of whether thinking-of is a relation. What would be useful for us would be a partly semantic criterion that does not presuppose knowledge of whether a relation is denoted. In a way, this is what Brentano offers us. More precisely, from what he offers us we can generate the following criterion, which combines the syntactic condition presented above with a semantic condition that does not presuppose prior knowledge of whether a relation is involved in S's putative truthmaker:

S is relational iff: (i) M includes a relational term and (ii) for S to be both categorical and true, every member of N must successfully refer.

If some member of N fails to refer, S is either false or hypothetical (or else non-relational). For example, if 'Johnny' fails to refer, then the categorical 'Jimmy argued with Johnny' is false, though the hypothetical 'If Johnny existed, Jimmy would have argued with him' may well be true. The key to Brentano's argument is the claim that some intentional statements are categorical and true even though some of the terms ostensibly referring to concrete particulars ('ostensibly singular') fail to refer. For example, 'Jimmy is thinking of Bigfoot' is true and categorical even though 'Bigfoot' fails to refer. Therefore, 'Jimmy is thinking of Bigfoot' is *not* a relational statement. And *therefore*, we have no reason to think that its truthmaker involves a relation as constituent.

In summary, Brentano's argument for the non-relational assay of intentionality may be represented as follows:

- 1) For any relational statement S, if S is true and categorical, then necessarily, all of S's ostensibly singular expressions successfully refer;
- 2) For any intentional statement S*, if S* is true and categorical, then possibly, some of S*'s ostensibly singular expressions fail to refer; therefore,
- 3) For any intentional statement S* and any relational statement S, $S^* \neq S$.

The modality at play in the premise is *conceptual*: it is part of the concept of a relational statement that it meets the condition cited in Premise 1, and part of the concept of an intentional statement that it allows for the possibility cited in Premise 2. These premises strike me as highly plausible, and they do seem to entail the conclusion. So, I find myself quite convinced by Brentano's argument.

3. Objections and Replies

Let us consider some objections, to the view I ascribe to Brentano (§3.2) but also to the ascribing of it (§3.1).

3.1. *Objections to the Interpretation*

To the ascribing, it might be objected that another interpretation of '*Relativeliches*' is possible: intentionality *is* a relation, but a special kind of relation, where only one of the relata need exist. Perhaps this is what a 'quasi-relation' is: a relation whose occurrence or instantiation does not require the existence of all relata.

There is no doubt that Brentano seriously entertained this alternative account. In some of his unpublished fragments, he clearly expounds the idea – see esp. Brentano 1933: 167-9 [126-7], a dictation from 1915. One view might be that Brentano simply changed his mind sometime between 1911 and 1915 (Moran 1996). Another, however, is that Brentano wanted to let the idea play out in private writings but what he *published* should still be taken as his considered view.

Regardless, I would argue, charity exhorts us to focus on the 1911 view, because the envisaged notion of quasi-relation is forsooth not altogether intelligible. As far as I can see, saying that a dyadic relation can be instantiated even if only one relatum exists is no more plausible than saying that a monadic property can be instantiated even where there is no instantiator of it. On the face of it, it is absurd to think that the property of having mass m can be instantiated even if there is no object whose mass is m . (I am assuming here that mass is monadic.) It should strike us as equally absurd that some relation R might be instantiated in the absence of an appropriate number of relata.

An objector might insist that the 1915 dictation, being posterior to the 1911 appendix, must be taken to represent Brentano's final, considered position. My main response to this is that if we accept this reasoning, I would simply contend that Brentano took one final wrong turn, and would have done better to stick with his 1911 account. In addition, however, it is not clear that we have to accept this reasoning. For it is significant, in this context, that Brentano *published* the 1911 piece but not the 1915 piece. For all we know, the 1915 piece is just an attempt to let a view play out and see where it goes and how it might be defended.¹¹

Another objection to the ascription of a non-relational view to Brentano is that Brentano clearly thinks that in thinking of a tree, one is *aware of* a tree-idea. The tree-idea is the *content* of one's thought. So even if the intentionality of one's thought does not involve a relation to a tree, it does involve a relation to this tree-idea. One way to put this is to say that intentionality is a relation to a content even if it is not a relation to an object. However we put this, though, a relation is involved after all.

This objection relies on a confusion. The expression 'tree-idea' can be read in two ways. One is as denoting a kind of mental tree that resembles worldly trees in some respects but exists only in the subject's mind. So construed, the notion of a tree-idea is both ontologically and phenomenologically suspect, and as we have seen, it is clearly rejected by Brentano. A more plausible construal of a tree-idea is

simply as an idea *of* a tree. But in this construal, the idea seems to be the intentional act, not the object (*or* content). Now, it is true that in Brentano's picture one would still be *aware of* the tree-idea, but this is simply because every intentional act is intentionally directed at itself. Insofar as it is its own intentional object, then, the intentional act is something the subject is aware of. Nonetheless, it is still just the intentional act of the tree thought – not the thought's content or (primary) object!

A third objection to the ascription might appeal to Tim Crane's (2006) unusual basis for an immanentist interpretation of Brentano. Crane does not rely primarily on the intentionality passage. Rather, his main reason for ascribing to Brentano an immanentist theory of intentionality is that for Brentano the intentional objects of perceptual experiences are Kantian appearances 'which are signs of an underlying reality but which are not real themselves' (Crane 2006: 23) and instead 'only exist in the mind' (2006: 25).

Crane relies on passages from the opening chapter of the *Psychology*, where Brentano says, for example, that 'light, sound, heat, spatial location ... are not things which truly and really (*wahrhaft und wirklich*) exist' (Brentano 1874: 28 [19]). Consider a visual experience as of a yellow lemon. Brentano takes the yellow lemon presented by the experience to be a Kantian phenomenon (as opposed to a noumenon). However, Brentano nowhere says that such Kantian phenomena 'only exist in the mind.' On the contrary, he says very explicitly (including in the sentence just quoted) that they *do not exist at all* – not in the mind and not elsewhere. In ascribing the immanentist view to Brentano, Crane is *presupposing* that Kantian phenomena are immanent objects that exist only in the mind. This is quite a common view, of course, but it is not Brentano's. The only view we can ascribe to Brentano is that Kantian phenomena are mere intentional objects of our conscious states. Since Brentano takes talk of intentional objects to be a roundabout way of describing the species of intentional act the subject is performing, this is how he would take talk of Kantian phenomena as well. This explains why he says that Kantian phenomena do not 'really and truly exist.' After all, his view – as interpreted

here – is that *merely-intentional objects* do not really and truly exist. They are useful fictions and not *entia realia*.

In addition, Crane's interpretation does not extend to non-perceptual experiences, since those are not directed at Kantian phenomena. But Brentano's theory of intentionality is supposed to apply to non-perceptual acts such as judgments and decisions. So Crane's interpretation has no real chance of applying generally.

3.2. Objections to the View

An immediate objection is that the view ascribed to Brentano fails to do justice to the pull of the relational conception of intentionality. It is not just English or German that have a relational surface grammar for intentional ascriptions; all known languages do. Surely there is some underlying reason why they are all forced to do so.

I have already indicated the reason Brentano is likely to proffer for this phenomenon. The elusiveness of conscious experience forces us to describe its phenomenal character indirectly. There is a kind of 'direct-ineffability' of conscious states, in the sense that such 'effability' as they admit is always indirect. One might wonder why *that* should be the case, but perhaps the contrast between the private character of conscious states and the public nature of language could be part of the explanation here.

One way to appreciate the pull of the relational conception is this. A symptom of the fact that carrying is a relation is that the active-voice 'Jimmy is carrying Johnny' seems to mean the same as the passive-voice 'Johnny is carried by Jimmy.' Remarkably, the same holds for intentional statements: 'Jimmy is thinking of Johnny' means the same as 'Johnny is thought of by Jimmy' (or indeed 'Johnny is the object of Jimmy's thought'). This suggests that thinking-of is just as relational as carrying.

In response, however, Brentano could deny that 'Jimmy is thinking of Johnny' means the same as 'Johnny is thought of by Jimmy' – when left unparaphrased, that is. Statements S_1 and S_2 cannot mean the same if they differ in truth value: given that the world is the same, they must be saying something different about it if one ends up true and the other ends up false. It is significant, then, that 'I am thinking of Bigfoot' and 'Bigfoot is thought of by me' have different truth-values: the first is true but the second untrue. On Russell's (1905a) view, 'Bigfoot is thought of by me' is false, as is 'The present king of France is bald'; on Strawson's (1950) view, 'The present king of France is bald' has a third, 'neutral' truth-value intermediate between truth and falsity – and so does 'Bigfoot is thought of by me.' Using the term 'untrue' to cover both falsity and the neutral truth-value (if there is one), we can say that on all standard semantic views 'Bigfoot is thought of by me' is untrue (again, unless paraphrased). Accordingly, it cannot mean the same as the true 'I am thinking of Bigfoot.'

Another objection in the same spirit is that there is still something hard to swallow in the non-relational account. For the phenomenology of being in an intentional state often involves a feeling of bearing a relation to something in the outside world. This is most obvious with perceptual experience: the phenomenology of having a visual experience of a yellow lemon is a phenomenology of bearing a distinctive perceptual relation to an object standing before one (a *Gegenstand* indeed!).

It is hard to know how Brentano would respond to this objection, but here is one possible line. We may concede this: when I have a visual experience of a yellow lemon, I experience a *feeling of perceptually connecting* to the lemon. In a way, the experience's overall phenomenology says more than 'here is a yellow lemon'; it says something like 'here is a yellow lemon I am perceptually connecting to.' Thus if I am hallucinating a yellow lemon before me, but there happens to be a lemon of the same color, shape, and size just there, it is natural to assess the experience as *non-veridical*, and non-veridical purely in virtue of its phenomenology (Searle 1983, Kroon 2013). If so, the feeling of perceptually connecting to the lemon is a

component of the experience's overall phenomenology, in addition to the yellow-lemon component. So it is true that perceptual experience includes a phenomenology of perceptual connection to an object. However, as just noted, this feeling of perceptual connection, like any feeling, may or may not be veridical. And when it is non-veridical, the subject need not *in fact* perceptually connect to anything. Thus although this is a phenomenology *as of* bearing a relation to something, *having* the phenomenology does not require actually bearing a relation to something. The having of a phenomenology never guarantees that the phenomenology is *veridical*. To that extent, the fact that the experience of being in an intentional state involves a phenomenology as of bearing a relation to something does not tell against a non-relational metaphysics of intentionality. The non-relational account can readily admit that intentional states involve such a phenomenology but insist that a relation is actually instantiated only when this phenomenology is veridical. Since what makes an intentional state the intentional state it is, and an intentional state at all, is independent of whether the state is veridical or not, the fact that a veridical intentional state involves a relation does not imply that what makes that state the intentional state it is (and an intentional state at all) is that relation.



Perhaps the most formidable objection to Brentano's mature theory is due to Moran (1996). Adapting Jackson's (1977) argument against the adverbial theory of perception, Moran (1996: 9-10) claims that Brentano's 'adverbial view' faces a 'daunting problem': it cannot account for the similarity or type-identity among some intentional states. I have suggested that Brentano does not *have* an adverbial view, but a 'subjectist view'; nonetheless, Moran's objection can be reformulated to target that. Compare (a) a dragon-visualizer, (b) a unicorn-visualizer, and (c) a horse-seer. Clearly, (a) resembles (b) more than it resembles (c). The most straightforward explanation of this would be that (a) and (b) share an aspect or component that (c) lacks. But since 'visualizer' is not a syntactic part of 'dragon-visualizer' and 'unicorn-visualizer' (think of 'apple' and 'pineapple' again), Brentano cannot identify a

component that (a) and (b) might share. He thus lacks the resources to explain, or even accommodate, this resemblance fact.

One might respond that incomposite, structureless states can also resemble, and the way in which they do could apply to the case of (a)–(c). Someone who believes that colors are simple, monadic, structureless features can still admit that red is more similar to orange than to yellow. Being a dragon-visualizer might resemble being a unicorn-visualizer more than being a horse-seer in the same way. One problem with this response is that the objector may reverse it to claim that a monadic conception of color has no resources to explain resemblance facts. But there is a more serious problem with the response: it seems to misrepresent how one could grasp what a *horse-visualizer* is. On the face of it, once we possess the concepts of dragon-visualizer and horse-seer, we can ‘put together’ the concept of a horse-visualizer, without having to go through a separate process of concept acquisition.¹² If subjectism is true, however, we would have to acquire the concept of a horse-visualizer in the same laborious way as the concepts of dragon-visualizer and horse-seer. For ‘visualizer’ is not a component of ‘dragon-visualizer’ and ‘horse’ is not a component of ‘horse-seer,’ so they could not be separated and recombined.¹³

A better response to the objection is called for, then. One distinctly Brentanian response is to claim that although a state such as (a) has in some sense no components, it nonetheless has a *structure*, indeed a structure that behaves in ways that mimic combinatorial components. The obvious problem with this response is that it is unclear how it might work: normally, we think of an entity’s *structure* as precisely a matter of its having different parts, or components, bearing certain interrelations. It is unclear, then, how the property of being a dragon-visualizer could have a structure despite having no components.

Here again, however, Brentano’s mereological innovations may be helpful. We might suggest that although intentional states are incomposite, in that they do not have *separable parts*, they do have structure, in that they have *distinguishable parts*. On the standard view, intentionality is a relation between an intentional act

and an intentional object, each of which is ontologically independent of the other. This casts the act and the object as mutually separable: you can think of a cat even if the cat does not exist, and the cat can exist even if you do not think of him. An alternative picture, however, may construe the intentional act and the (merely-)intentional object as two mutually merely distinguishable parts of a single whole. In that scenario, the intentional state has no *components*, in the sense of separable parts, but it does have *structure*, in the sense that we can *distinguish* different aspects of it. We can *think* of it in different ways, one act-centric and one object-centric, just as we can think of it in terms of awareness-of-the-object or in terms of awareness-of-awareness-of-the-object. These distinguishable aspects of an intentional state constitute its structure, and explain, or at least enable, purely combinatorial concept acquisition. A subject who acquired the concepts of dragon-visualizer and horse-seer, could *distinguish* within these concepts (i) an act-aspect to do with visualizing or seeing and (ii) an object-aspect to do with dragons or horses. She could distinguish these even though they can never come apart. She could then imaginatively 'put together' these aspects in different combinations, thereby acquiring the concepts of a horse-visualizer and dragon-seer.

This suggestion is clearly very speculative, but the model it offers does recover combinatorial concept acquisition while insisting on the non-relational nature of intentionality. Its availability to Brentano is thus good news. Interestingly, there is textual evidence that Brentano indeed took the intentional act and the merely-intentional object to be mutually merely distinguishable:

As in every relation, two correlates can be found here [in intentionality]. The one correlate is the act of consciousness, the other is that which it is directed upon.... The two correlates are *only distinctionally separable from one another*. And so we have here again two purely distinctional parts of the pair of correlates, one of which [the act] is real, the other [the merely-intentional object] is not. (Brentano 1982: 21-2 [23-4]; my italics)

When S visualizes a yellow lemon, we can distinguish *in thought* a visualization element and a yellow-lemon element. Even if *in reality* there are not two separate entities here, we can tell apart these two distinctional parts of the experience. We

should be able, accordingly, to acquire the concept of a visualization experience and the concept of a lemon-ish experience. Once we have, we can recombine these concepts with others like them.

Jackson's (1977) original objection to adverbialism pressed the compositionality of adverbial paraphrases from another angle as well. Adapted to the subjectist context, we might put Jackson's objection as follows: from 'S is thinking of a dragon,' one can validly infer 'S is thinking'; but from 'S is a dragon-thinker,' one *cannot* infer 'S is a thinker.' For 'dragon-thinker' is a syntactically unstructured predicate, so making this inference would be akin to inferring 'x is an apple' from 'x is a pineapple.'

In response, note first that although 'x is a pineapple, therefore x is an apple' is a bad inference, 'x is a strawberry, therefore x is a berry' is a good one – even though they seem superficially similar. What makes the latter inference good, it seems, is the availability of a certain bridge premise, which we may formulate as 'A strawberry is a species of berry' (contrast 'An apple is a species of pineapple'). The question, then, is whether a similar bridge principle is available to Brentano. And the answer seems positive: 'A dragon-thinker is a species of thinker' is as plausible as 'A strawberry is a species of berry.' Accordingly, it *is* possible to correctly infer 'S is a thinker' from 'S is a dragon-thinker.' The point is that although 'dragon-thinker' is syntactically simple, it is not true that its *only* relation to 'thinker' is morphological. Another relation is the genus/species relation: 'dragon-thinker' picks out a species of what 'thinker' picks out. It is this further relation that licenses the inference (for a fuller discussion of this, see Kriegel 2008).¹⁴

Conclusion

Perhaps the main reason I am a Brentano fan is simply that I think he got so much *right*, especially when it comes to the most fundamental problems of philosophy. Where I do not share his views, I can usually appreciate the grounds for them (his substance dualism is a case in point!), and can enjoy considering how the system

alters if we remove the piece I dislike and replace it with one more to my liking. Importantly, such replacements are usually possible, without excessive reverberations through the system, because they do not go to the system's core. In the whole of Brentano's philosophy, I think there is only one wrong turn that has proven disastrous to his legacy. This is the claim that all mental states are conscious.

As I argued at the end of Chap. 1, Brentano's argument for this is poor. But even if there were strong grounds for the claim, I think Brentano would have done well to cordon off this commitment of his. As it stands, the official agenda of the *Psychology* is to lay methodological and theoretical foundations for the scientific study of the mind. Remarkably, Brentano's proposed foundations have zero relevance to the actual science of the mind that developed around the middle of the twentieth century. The basic reason for this is that Brentano focused on the first-person study of subjective phenomena available to inner perception, whereas much of actual cognitive science concerns the third-person study of processes and mechanisms posited in the context of explaining behavior. In retrospect, it is not clear why it should be so important for Brentano to insist that processes responsible for shaping behavior but inaccessible to inner perception do not deserve the appellation 'mental.' As long as they are clearly distinguished from the inner-perceptible phenomena that interested him more, he could have readily accorded them the courtesy of being called mental. He could then have presented the *Psychology* as a book about the methodological and theoretical foundations of the science of *consciousness*, rather than the science of *mind*, while bracketing the issue of whether anything outside consciousness qualifies as mental.

Crucially for our present purposes, in that scenario intentionality would be cited as the mark of the *conscious* rather than the mental. Its character as a subjective phenomenon accessible to inner perception would be more manifest. It would not be confused by later generations with the objective tracking relations posited in the context of explaining behavior. Informational and teleological accounts of such tracking relations would not be confused for accounts of the phenomenon Brentano was interested in. And the plausibility of Brentano's mature

account of the phenomenon *he* was interested in would be more easily appreciated, since it is not all that odd to hold that the phenomenal property of felt directedness is an intrinsic, non-relational property of the conscious subject. But when the claims that all mental states are conscious and that intentionality is the mark of the conscious got fused into one thesis, ‘intentionality as the mark of the *mental*,’ its various components became invisible, and in consequence, both Brentano’s philosophical concerns and his substantive accounts in response to them became invisible to many readers. My goal in this chapter has been to undo that infelicitous fusion and present more cleanly Brentano’s basic ideas about intentionality – in particular, that intentionality is an intrinsic property of phenomenal directedness which subjects can fully grasp only if they experience it for themselves.¹⁵

¹ I am grateful to Mark Textor for bringing this passage to my attention.

² The theses that intentionality is in essence a relation between mental states and environmental features and that there exists phenomenal intentionality can be seen as competing theories of the same phenomenon: intentionality as such. But to my mind, it is at least as reasonable to see them (or some versions of them) as targeting two different but related phenomena. One phenomenon is the objective ability of mental states to track environmental features; the other is the subjective feature of felt directedness that some mental states exhibit (see Kriegel 2013c).

³ There are ontological, epistemological, and phenomenological worries: ontologically, it is unclear what to make of the notion of a ‘mental tree’; epistemologically, it is thought to raise a ‘veil of appearances’ between the subject and the external world; phenomenologically, it is in conflict with the so-called transparency of experience, the observation that when attending to our own experience it is hard to pick up on anything other than what the experience represents.

⁴ The other option would be to defend the immanentist theory, or a slightly modified variant, against the objections to it (see, for example, Brandl 2005).

⁵ I use the expression ‘intrinsic property,’ as is common, to denote a property that something has not in virtue of bearing a relation to anything else independent from it. This allows two scenarios: where the thing does not bear a relation to anything, and where it bears a relation to a part of itself (as when a person is intrinsically legged in virtue of having a leg as part). Sometimes the expression ‘intrinsic property’ is used to denote a property that something cannot exist without having – the property is thus ‘intrinsic’ to the thing’s nature. However, I prefer to use ‘essential property’ to denote that kind of property.

⁶ This title does contain some ambiguities, insofar as (i) mental reference might yet be a relation in some loose sense and (ii) it is not immediately transparent that mental reference is the same thing as intentionality. But the passage I discuss in the text next seems to me to remove these ambiguities.

⁷ The similarity, according to Brentano, is that both when we think of a (two-place) relation and when we think of intentionality, we have in mind two objects, and we think of one of them directly (*in recto*) and of the other indirectly (*in obliquo*). Thus, thinking that Jim is taller than Jane and thinking that Jim is thinking of Jane both involve having two objects in mind, Jim and Jane, and representing Jim directly and Jane indirectly. This is the crucial similarity between intentionality and bona fide relations, according to Brentano. (For what it is worth, it strikes me personally that this claim of similarity is fraught with difficulties, but that other claims in the vicinity would indeed show important similarities between the non-relational property of intentionality and paradigmatic relations and relational properties.)

⁸ For a more detailed development of the adverbial machinery, and hesitant defense of the underlying philosophical idea, see Kriegel 2011 Ch.4. The original adverbialist theory was developed by Chisholm (1957) and applied just to sensory perception. The gambit here is to apply it to all intentional states.

⁹ We could obtain the same result with ‘sequencing’ instead of hyphenation: we could write out ‘S isThinkingOfDragons,’ or even ‘S is TOD’ for short.

¹⁰ The *reason* Brentano prefers subjectism over adverbialism and hyphenism seems to do with his particular brand of nominalism, which we will explore in detail in Chap. 6.

¹¹ Recall my methodological principle, presented in the introduction, to given priority to materials Brentano decided to publish himself. This is an example of the principle’s application – and, I would say, of its plausibility.

¹² This capacity is related to, or parallels in some way, what Fodor (1975) called the ‘productivity’ of thought: the fact that any subject who grasps the proposition that John loves Mary has all the resources needed to grasp the proposition that Mary loves John, needing no further learning or acquisition process.

¹³ Observe that in the case of colors, it is *not* plausible that we acquire the concept of orange by ‘putting together’ the concepts of red and yellow. Rather, we seem to require going again through the laborious process of acquiring the concept of orange ‘from scratch.’ (This claim is compatible with the possibility of acquiring a concept of a missing shade of blue in the more direct way; the point is that this cannot work for such concepts as orange, which are ‘too distant,’ in some sense, from red and yellow to be acquired in the same way.) In this respect, we can see that the cases of color concepts and intentional-state concepts are disanalogous.

¹⁴ It might be objected that ‘S is a dragon-thinker’ still fails to recover the exact inferential profile of ‘S thinks of a dragon,’ since the latter supports an inference to ‘S thinks’ *without* need of a bridge principle, whereas the former does not. This seems right to me, but it also seems like a minor liability on the paraphrase. Arguably, it is permissible for a paraphrase to be *somewhat* revisionary – indeed, this is often the *point* of the paraphrase.

¹⁵ For comments on a previous draft, I am grateful to Lionel Djadaojee, Anna Giustina, and two OUP referees. I have also benefited from presenting drafts of this chapter at École Normale Supérieure, Kings’ College London, and the University of Liege. I am grateful to the audiences there, in particular Géraldine Carranante, Arnaud Dewalque, Bob Hale, Zdenek Lenner, Alice Martin, Denis Seron, and Mark Textor. For useful exchanges and conversions of relevance, I am grateful to Ben Blumson, Davide Bordini, Johannes Brandl, and Hamid Taieb.