Mind—other

 Perception

• “The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2023.
• “The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.” In Limbeck-Lilienau and Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception (2019).
• “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.” In Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar (2019).
• “Experiencing the Present.” Analysis 2015.
• “Perception and Imagination: A Sartrean Account.” In Miguens, Preyer, and Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness (2015).
• “The Veil of Abstracta.” Philosophical Issues 2011.
• “Phenomenal Content.” Erkenntnis 2002.

Imagination and Memory

• “Imagination, Modal Knowledge, and Modal Understanding.” In Vendrell Ferran and Werner (eds.), Imagination and Experience (forthcoming).
• “The Structure of Phenomenal Justification.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2023.
• “Dignāga’s Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement.” Philosophy East & West 2019.
• “Experiencing the Present.” Analysis 2015.
• “Perception and Imagination: A Sartrean Account.” In Miguens, Preyer, and Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness (2015).
• “Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2009.

Emotion and Mood

• “Mood and Wellbeing.” Forthcoming in Inquiry.
• “Moral Judgment and the Content-Attitude Distinction.” Philosophical Studies 2022.
• “Indignation, Appreciation, and the Unity of Moral Experience.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2022.
• (With Tricia Magalotti.) “Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.” Topoi 2022.
• “The Intentional Structure of Moods.” Philosophers’ Imprint 2019.
• “Reductive Representationalism and Emotional Phenomenology.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2017.
• “Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 2017.
• “Cognitivism about Emotion and the Alleged Opacity of Emotional Content.” Philosophical Studies 2016.
• “Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion.” European Journal of Philosophy 2014.
• “The Reduction of Conscious Emotion.” Theoria et Historia Scientiarum 2005.
• “Emotional Content.” Consciousness and Emotion 2002.

Introspection and Self-Knowledge

• "A New Perceptual Theory of Introspection." In A. Giustina (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Introspection.
• (With Anna Giustina.) “Two Kinds of Introspection.” In J. Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes from the Work of David Rosenthal (2022).
• “Introverted Empiricism: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation.” Metaphilosophy 2019.
• (With Anna Giustina.) “Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017.
• “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology.” Philosophical Studies 2009.
• (With Terry Horgan.) “Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know It so Well?” Philosophical Issues 2007.
• “Self-Consciousness.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2007.
• “Consciousness and Self-consciousness.” The Monist 2004.
• “A Hesitant Defense of Introspection.” Philosophical Studies 2013.

Belief and other Doxastic Attitudes

• “Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?” In Gzrankowski and Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality (2018).
• “Brentano on Judgment.” In Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School (2017).
• “The Character of Cognitive Phenomenology.” In Breyer and Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking (2015).
• “Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude: A Non-Reductive Characterization.” American Philosophical Quarterly 2013.
• “Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 2012.
• “Moore’s Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief.” Erkenntnis 2004.

Desire and Will

• “Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger 2017.
• “Justifying Desires.” Metaphilosophy 2013.
• “Understanding Conative Phenomenology: Lessons from Ricœur.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2013.