(With Mark Timmons.) "The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons." Forthcoming in R. Dean and O. Sensen (eds.), Respect.
Discussions of Kant's account of respect for persons tend to focus on the distinctive functional role of respect in Kant's writings; we try to bring out of his writings, espectially the Groundwork and the Doctrine of Virtue, a portrait of respect's distinctive phenomenal character.
"Brentano's Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion." Forthcoming in Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger (invited special issue on Brentano).
I offer an interpretation of Brentano's accounts of will and emotion, and argue that he also had an account of the difference between the two that Brentano scholars have missed.
"Dignity and the Phenomenology of Recognition-Respect." Forthcoming in J.J. Drummond and S. Rinofner-Kreidel (eds.), Emotions: Moral and Political Significance, Routledge.
I argue that the dignity of persons is partially grounded in the privacy of their subjective experience - this privacy creates a kind of inviolability central to dignity.
"Justifying Desires." Metaphilosophy 44 (2013): 335-349.
I present an argument for the view that an agent's having a desire to act a certain way is not only a necessary condition for the agent having a justificatory reason for action, as ethical internalists often argue, but also a sufficient condition for having such a reason.
"Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 469-486.
I address the tension between cognitivist and internalist accounts of moral judgment by distinguishing two types of moral judgment - moral belief and moral alief. Cognitivism is true of the former, internalism of the latter.
“Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008): 1-19. (Invited special issue on moral phenomenology)
What is moral phenomenology? How should we pursue it? Why? I answer.