Moral-Psychology

“The Moral Problem: One More Time, with Feeling.” Forthcoming in Z. Radman (ed.), Critique of Pure Consciousness.

I apply David Chalmers' thesis of "the double life of mental terms" to Michael Smith's "moral problem" - to great advantage! Chalmers' thesis is that mental terms lead a double life as psychological terms and as phenomenological terms. Smith's problem, or a problem very much like it, can be formulated in terms of an inconsistent triad of claims about our moral mental life. Since these claims use mental terms, they admit of a psychological reading and a phenomenological reading. I argue that once we distinguish the psychological inconsistent triad from the phenomenological one, each lends itself to a natural resolution, though it is a different resolution in each case.

“Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2008): 1-19.

What is moral phenomenology? How should we pursue it? Why? I answer.