Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? Forthcoming in A. Grzankowski and M. Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. OUP.
I present and defend as plausible Brentano's unusual view that all judgments are a matter of believing in something or disbelieving in something (hence an objectual rather than propositional attitudes).
Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4/2 (2016): 1-15.
Two Notions of Mental Representation. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in the Philosophy of Mind (pp. 161-179). Routledge, 2013.
I argue that Brentano's mature theory of intentionality construed intentionality as a non-relational property of subjects, a sort of variant of adverbialism.
I argue that there are two notions of mental representation, which I call objective and subjective, and that familiar tracking theories of mental representation account at most only for the former.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality (pp. 1-26). OUP, 2013.
I review some of the work already done around the notion of phenomenal intentionality and propose a way of turning this body of work into a self-conscious research program for understanding intentionality.
The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (2011): 245-267.
I argue that just as the sense-datum theory erected a veil of appearances over the external world, so currently popular accounts of perception in terms of relation to properties erect a veil of abstracta over the concrete world.
Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 185-208.
I argue that Davidsonian claims about the normativity of intentionality work well for non-phenomenal intentionality but not for phenomenal intentionality.
The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (2008): 79-95.
The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of being related thought-wise to dragons but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.
(With Terry Horgan.) Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist 91 (2008): 347-373.
We argue that the letter of the Extended Mind hypothesis can be accommodated by a strongly internalist, broadly Cartesian conception of mind. The argument turns centrally on an unusual but (we argue) highly plausible view on the mark of the mental.
Real Narrow Content. Mind & Language 23 (2008): 304-328.
This paper develops a positive account of narrow content designed to neutralize the charge that narrow content is not real content.
Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (2007): 307-340.
The problem of intentional inexistence is posed by the fact that we can think of what doesnt exist. I sketch a solution to this problem and argue that its viable.
Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 271-307.
I examine two arguments to the effect that there would be no
intentionality if there was no consciousness, due one to Searle and one
to McGinn, and defend the second.
Discussion: Biggs; Brandl; Cohen; Crawford; Maher; Orlando; Seron