“Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?.” Forthcoming in A. Grzankowski and M. Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. OUP.
I present and defend as defensible Brentano's unusual view that all judgments are a matter of believing in something or disbelieving in something (hence are objectual rather than propositional attitudes).
“Brentano's Concept of Mind: Underlying Nature, Reference-Fixing, and the Mark of the Mental.” Forthcoming in S. Lapointe and C. Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the History of Analytical Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
I offer an interpretation of Brentano's view on the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to it, the concept of the mental is a natural kind concept, with intentionality serving as the mental's underlying nature and inner-perceivability as the concept's reference-fixer.
“Brentano's Philosophical Program.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York, Routledge, 2017.
I argue that Brentano had a philosophical system, which offered a unified account of the true, the good, and the beautiful.
“Brentano's Classification of Mental Phenomena.” In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York, Routledge, 2017.
“Brentano's Mereology.” Unpublished.
A short expository piece on the topic telegraphed by the title.
“Brentano's Latter-day Monism.” Brentano Studien 14 (2016): 69-77.
A short piece on Brentano's mereology and how it differs from classical mereology. I've integrated it into Chap. 1 of my monograph on Brentano, since it's crucial for a full understanding of many Brentanian moves.
This 3000-word piece discusses a dictation from January 1915 I dug up, where Franz Brentano defends a kind of Schaffer-style priority monism.
“Brentano's Mature Theory of Intentionality.” Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4/2 (2016): 1-15.
“Perception and Imagination: A Sartrean Account." In S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. Bravo Morando (eds.), Prereflective Consciousness: Early Sartre in the Context of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. London and New York: Routledge, 2015.
I argue that Brentano's mature theory of intentionality construed intentionality as a non-relational property of subjects, a sort of variant of adverbialism.
“Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015): 153-180.
I develop Sartre's case for a categorical, qualitative difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination.
“How to Speak of Existence: A Brentanian Approach to (Linguistic and Mental) Ontological Commitment.” In S. Lapointe (ed.), Themes from Ontology, Mind, and Logic: Essays in Honor of Peter Simons (pp. 81-106). Leiden: Brill, 2015.
What are the truthmakers of "Socrates is wise" and "Socrates is Greek"? According to Brentano, as I interpret him, they are two numerically distinct but collocated concrete particulars, Wise-Socrates and Greek-Socrates. I explain this view and air a defense of it.
“Understanding Conative Phenomenology: Lessons from Ricoeur.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2013): 537-558. (special issue on "Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present").
Articulates and defends an unusual approach to existence talk, drawn from Brentano, according to which to say that X exists is to say that the right attitude to take toward X is the attitude of believing in it.
I discuss Ricoeur's intriguing account of the phenomenology of the will, which focuses on deciding rather than desiring as the experientially paradigmatic exercise of the will.
“Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present: Introductory.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (2013): 437-444. (special issue on "Phenomenal Intentionality Past and Present").
A non-philosophical short piece about the history of intentionality in the Brentano School, at least as it pertains to the special issue.
(With Angela Coventry.) “Locke on Consciousness.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (2008): 221-242.
We present and defend an interpretation of Locke as a forerunner not of higher-order perception but self-perception (or same-order perception) theories of consciousness.