I present a systematic challenge to the viability of revisionary metaphysics: show me epistemic grounds on which to believe that one revisionary-metaphysical theory in some area is more likely to be true than its competitors.
A Hesitant Defense of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 1165-1176.
I (hesitantly) argue that introspection is crucial to cognitive science both in the context of discovery and in the context of justification.
The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (2011): 245-267.
I argue that just as the sense-datum theory erected a veil of appearances over the external world, so currently popular accounts of perception in terms of relation to properties erect a veil of abstracta over the concrete world. This is unpacked in terms of the the kind of justification perceptual experiences bestow on beliefs based on them.
(With Terry Horgan.) Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We may Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 123-144.
We defend two theses. The first is that there is a kind of knowledge of phenomenal experiences that is infallible. The second is that what explains this limited infallibility is a special feature of phenomenal experiences, namely, a sort of inbuilt awareness of themselves.
Moores Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 99-121.
I offer a solution to Moore paradox according to which (i) the absurdity of Moorean assertions derives from that of conscious Moorean beliefs and (ii) the absurdity of conscious Moorean beliefs is due to the fact that conscious beliefs are self-representing, in a way that makes Moorean conscious beliefs explicitly self-contradictory.