I argue that when properly developed, a feeling theory of emotion can overcome the standard objections leveled in the literature. The key is to portray emotional feelings as rather complex, involving cognitive and conative phenomenology.
Prιcis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2012): 443-445. (See also "Reply to Critics" from the same issue.)
This is a Precis of my book on consciousness for a Philosophical Studies symposium. It does the usual. There is also a "Reply to Critics" that goes with it...
Self-Representationalism and the Explanatory Gap. In J. Liu and J. Perry, Consciousness and the Self: New Essays (pp. 51-75). Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
I present an initially promising
self-representationalist approach to the problem of the explanatory gap, and consider what I take to be the deepest challenge to it, namely, an objection due to Joe Levine that I call the "just more representation" objection.
Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 357-381.
I offer a formulation of the phenomenological argument for the
self-representationalist theory of consciousness, and defend the theory
from certain phenomenological challenges, including the transparency of
(With Terry Horgan.) Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We may Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 123-144.
We defend two theses. The first is that there is a kind of knowledge
of phenomenal experiences that is infallible. The second is that what
explains this limited infallibility is a special feature of phenomenal
experiences, namely, a sort of inbuilt awareness of themselves.
The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness (pp. 143-170). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2006. [click here for Second Version]
Monitoring approaches to consciousness claim that a mental state is
conscious when it is suitably monitored. Higher-order monitoring theory
makes the monitoring state and the monitored state logically
independent. Same-order monitoring theory claims a constitutive,
non-contingent connection between the monitoring state and the
monitored state. I articulate different versions of the same-order
monitoring theory and argue for its supremacy over higher-order
Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 23-57.
When I have an experience of the blue sky, there is a bluish it is
like for me to have the experience. There are two components to this
bluish way it is like for me: the bluish component, which I call
qualitative character; and the for-me component, which I call
subjective character. The paper examines six options for naturalizing
Consciousness and Self-consciousness. The Monist 87 (2004): 185-209.
I distinguish two kinds of self-consciousness: transitive
self-consciousness is typically reported with x is self-conscious of
thinking that p; intransitive self-consciousness with x is
self-consciously thinking that p. I then argue that although
consciousness is completely independent of the former, there can be no
consciousness in the absence of the latter.
Moores Paradox and the Structure of Conscious Belief. Erkenntnis 61 (2004): 99-121.
I offer a solution to Moore paradox according to which (i) the
absurdity of Moorean assertions derives from that of conscious Moorean
beliefs and (ii) the absurdity of conscious Moorean beliefs is due to
the fact that conscious beliefs are self-representing, in a way that
makes Moorean conscious beliefs explicitly self-contradictory.
Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2003): 103-132.
This paper offers an early presentation of my master argument for
the self-representational theory of consciousness, according to which a
mental state is conscious iff it represents itself in the right way.
Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles. Synthese 134 (2003): 477-504.
I argue that the difference between a self-representational theory
of consciousness and higher-order theory may be much smaller than might
be initially thought, and that what little difference there is favors
Phenomenal Content. Erkenntnis 57 (2002): 175-198.
I defend a version of Sheomaker-style representationalism about
qualitative character. (Note: although this paper is couched in terms
of phenomenal character, it is meant to apply only to qualitative
character; I explain what I mean by distinguishing the two in Naturalizing Subjective Character and other places.)
PANIC Theory and the Prospects for a Representational Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 15 (2002): 55-64.
I argue that representationalist theories of consciousness, typified
by Tyes, may be able to account for differences among phenomenal
states in representational terms, but lack the resources to account for
the difference between phenomenal and non-phenomenal states in