Cognitive-Science

“A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Consciousness & Cognition 16 (2007): 897-912.

This more empirically minded paper extracts from the self-representational theory of consciousness a concrete hypothesis about the NCC.

“The Phenomenologically Manifest.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007): 115-136.

I try to address the issue of how sincere phenomenological disagreements might be addressed and resolved by extracting from existing work two first-personal methods for settling such disputes.

“Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.” In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (pp. 195-217). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

I argue that the relationship between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is that of a dispositional property to its categorical basis, and that this vindicates current scientific practice in Consciousness Studies.

“The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2004): 171-193.

This paper develops what is effectively an empirical speculation about the cognitive significance, or functional role, of consciousness. The speculation is grounded in my self-representational theory of consciousness.