“Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness.” Forthcoming in U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
“Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place under the Sun.” Forthcoming in D. Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. New York: Bloomsbury.
Consciousness science has focused on identifying the neural correlates of consciousness. But typically science attempts not only to discover but also explain correlations. I discuss the different explanations there might be of this particular correlation and the prospects for a scientific resolution of the question of which explanation is the best.
What is the point of experimental philosophy? More specifically, what is the rationale for experimentalization of research relating to conceptual analysis? I argue that some of the common answers to this question don't withstand scrutiny, then suggest a new one.
(with Alexandre Billon.) "Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness." In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness (pp. 29-54). Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2015.
Subjectivity theories hold that phenomenal consciousness involves constitutively a subjective for-me-ness. Some psychopathologies appear to undermine any constitutive connection of the sort. We offer two new ways in which subjectivity theories can fend off this psychopathological challenge.
(with Benjamin Kozuch.) "Correlation, Causation, Constitution: On the interplay between the science and philosophy of consciousness." In S.M. Miller (ed.), The Constitution of Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2015.
"A Hesitant Defense of Introspection." Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 1165-1176.
address what we take to be the two central contributions of philosophy
to NCC research: methodological issues pertaining to the identification
of the NCC, and metaphysical issues pertaining to what intimate relation
might be suggested by the tight correlation between consciousness and a
Check out this argument: when a phenomenon P is observable, any legitimate understanding of P must take account of observations of P; some mental phenomena are introspectively observable; therefore, any legitimate understanding of the mind must take account of introspective observations. This paper explores the merits and implications of this line of reasoning.
“Personal-Level Representation.” Protosociology 28: 77-114 (2012).
I argue that the orthodoxy on mental representation in the philosophy of psychology can at most account for sub-personal representation. It does not have the resources to account for personal-level representation.
“Review of E. Schwitzgebel, Perplexities of Consciousness.” Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2011).
This is a review of Schwitzgebel's skeptical book on introspection, in which I defend what I call the "equireliability thesis": introspection is as reliable as non-visual perception.
“A Cross-Order Integration Hypothesis for the Neural Correlate of Consciousness.” Consciousness & Cognition 16 (2007): 897-912.
This more empirically minded paper extracts from the self-representational theory of consciousness a concrete hypothesis about the NCC.
“The Phenomenologically Manifest.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007): 115-136.
I try to address the issue of how sincere phenomenological disagreements might be addressed and resolved by extracting from existing work two first-personal methods for settling such disputes.
“Consciousness: Phenomenal Consciousness, Access Consciousness, and Scientific Practice.” In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science (pp. 195-217). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
I argue that the relationship between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness is that of a dispositional property to its categorical basis, and that this vindicates current scientific practice in Consciousness Studies.
“The Functional Role of Consciousness: A Phenomenological Approach.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (2004): 171-193.
This paper develops what is effectively an empirical speculation about the cognitive significance, or functional role, of consciousness. The speculation is grounded in my self-representational theory of consciousness.