CV

 

 

Quick Bio: 
Haifa (19) ---> Tel Aviv (23) ---> Jerusalem (25) ---> Providence (30) ---> Tucson, Arizona (32) ---> Sydney (35) ---> Tucson, Arizona (36) ---> New York (37.5) ---> Tucson, Arizona (39) ---> Paris 


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CV Essentials:

Research Areas

 

Education

 

Publications


Authored Books    

  1. Brentano's Philosophical System: Mind, Being, Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
  2. The Varieties of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.
  3. The Sources of Intentionality. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  4. Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Selected Papers

  1. Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
  2. Cognitivism About Emotion and the Alleged Hyperopacity of Emotional Content. Philosophical Studies 173 (2016): 315-320.
  3. Thought and Thing: Brentano’s Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015): 153-180.
  4. Experiencing the Present. Analysis 75 (2015): 407-413.
  5. A Hesitant Defense of Introspection. Philosophical Studies 165 (2013): 1165-1176. 
  6. The Epistemological Challenge of Revisionary Metaphysics. Philosophers’ Imprint 13 (June 2013): 1-30.
  7. Moral Motivation, Moral Phenomenology, and the Alief/Belief Distinction. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2012): 469-486.
  8. Precis of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational TheoryPhilosophical Studies 159 (2012): 443-445.
  9. The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (2011): 245-267.
  10. Intentionality and Normativity. Philosophical Issues 20 (2010): 185-208.
  11. Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2009): 357-381.
  12. The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects. Philosophical Studies 141 (2008): 79-95.
  13. Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (2007): 307-340.
  14. Phenomenal Epistemology: What Is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well? Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 123-144. (with Terry Horgan)
  15. Naturalizing Subjective Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005): 23-56.
  16. Is Intentionality Dependent upon Consciousness? Philosophical Studies 116 (2003): 271-30.